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Abstract 
Enhancing Usability using Automated Security Interface Adaptation 
(ASIA) 
 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
BIT (Hons), MSc 
 
 
Many users are now significantly dependent upon computer application.  Whilst many 
aspects are now used very successfully, an area in which usability difficulties continue 
to be encountered is in relation to security.  Thus can become particularly acute in 
situations where users are required to interact and make decisions, and a key context 
here is typically when they need to respond to security warnings. 
 
The current implementation of security warnings can often be considered as an attempt 
to offer a one size fits all solution.  However, it can be argued that many 
implementations are still lacking the ability to provide meaningful and effective 
warnings.  As such, this research focuses upon achieving a better understanding of the 
elements that aid end-users in comprehending the warnings, the difficulties with the 
current approaches, and the resulting requirements in order to improve the design and 
implementation of such security dialogues.  
 
In the early stage of research, a survey was undertaken to investigate perceptions of 
security dialogues in practice, with a specific focus upon security warnings issued 
within web browsers.  This provided empirical evidence of end-users’ experiences, and 
revealed notable difficulties in terms of their understanding and interpretation of the 
security interactions.   
 
Building upon this, the follow-up research investigated understanding of application 
level security warnings in wider contexts, looking firstly at users’ interpretation of what 
constitutes a security warning and then at their level of comprehension when related 
warnings occurred.  These results confirmed the need to improve the dialogues so that 
the end-users are able to act appropriately, and consequently promoted the design and 
prototype implementation of a novel architecture to improve security warnings, which 
has been titled Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA).   
 
The ASIA approach aims to improve security warnings by tailoring the interaction more 
closely to individual user needs.  By automatically adapting the presentation to match 
each user’s understanding and preferences, security warnings can be modified in ways 
that enable users to better comprehend them, and thus make more informed security 
decisions and choices.   
 
A comparison of the ASIA-adapted interfaces compared to standard versions of 
warnings revealed that the modified versions were better understood.  As such, the 
ASIA approach has significant potential to assist (and thereby protect) the end-user 
community in their future interactions with security. 
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3 
1 Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Computer technology is continually evolving.  Simultaneously, threats continue to 
propagate, targeting end users at home or within organizations.  People realise on these 
technologies to make their life easier by any possible means.  They are now creating a 
dependency chain in day to day life with computer system and network.  In the era of 
80’s and 90’s, people went directly to stores or banks to get things such as kitchen 
appliances, paying utilities bill, banking transaction and shopping.  Today, these 
activities may be undertaken using computer technologies. However, while the 
invention is highly beneficial, the use of the computer may potentially cause harm to 
users if they do not know how to use it in a secure manner (Dourish & Anderson 2006).  
For instance, during online transactions, to purchase something from the website, users 
enter their personal details like credit card number and security codes.  The issue raised 
here is that information may be hacked by attackers during transmission on the Internet, 
users might log in to another website via e-mail or link which leading them to phishing 
attacks, malware attacks and others.  In this context, end users are the main subjects 
who use the computer.  They might not know the consequences of this event unless they 
realize them, and appreciate the risks that they are facing now (Besnard & Arief 2004).  
Whilst security in computer systems in organization is managed by the organization’s 
policies, protection for other general users such as at home is left to their own initiative.  
Users with knowledge and capabilities might know how to conceive of security matter 
to achieve better protection whereas for the laymen, they might know nothing if any 
impediments occurs on their current system.  Users always say that they understand the 
security features with regards to information security; however, in real life they still 
failed to demonstrate their understanding.  End users in general are not experts and they 
have a very general understanding of computers, but are unlikely to be familiar with 
most facets of security features and security technologies.  Therefore, it is essential to 
understand the interaction between usability and information security in order to make 
users know how to make a security decision, to differentiate between possible menaces 
towards and to minimize the risk of possibly becoming a victim of such attacks.   
 
In order for users to use security features correctly, to understand the computer interface 
and to manage their computer properly, all of the features represented must be usable 
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and users’ friendly.  Thus, in order to achieve that level is a challenging task (Folmer& 
Bosch 2004, Dickinson et al. 2003 and Bødker 2006).  Using the established principles 
of Human Computer Interaction (HCI) helps to make the computer system easy to use 
by finding some methods and processes to design interfaces (Carrol 2003).   This issue 
is raised as many users are still unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of computer 
security as a whole process.  Computer security is not just a technical issue.  The 
success of security is also dependent on the effective behaviour of users (Stanton et al. 
2003).  Understanding their actions is thus both needed and necessary.  The impetus of 
this study is the fact that there are still some users who are not heeding on these issues 
and decide to opt out from doing anything (Furnell 2005 and Furnell 2005b).  Various 
types of computer threat (e.g. virus, worms, spyware and rootkits) may cause 
catastrophic results for users’ assets.  A well devised action is essential in understanding 
how to deal with the issues.  Nevertheless, the challenging part here lies in the fact that 
users are responsible for their own system.  This means they simply cannot place the 
burden of responsibility on others.  One key factor in effective containment is based on 
the actions, attitudes and perception of people.  Therefore understanding the interaction 
between users and security tools and technologies is essential.  These tools (e.g. 
antivirus and firewall) are used to provide security and protection for users.  Since most 
of the applications, operating systems and web browsers use these tools; this indicates 
an attention to understanding the medium of interaction being used to deliver the 
message and information to end-users.    
 
1.2 Objectives of the Research 
 
This study aims to understand and improve upon the usability aspects of security 
warnings.  It focuses in particular on issues relating to the security warning interface, 
and specifically focuses on initial investigation of issues of security and usability of 
security warning, assessing users’ experience of encountering warnings, and proposing 
architecture to improve security warnings.  Thus, the web security warnings dialogues 
will be used as a focal point to evaluate and validates the proposed architecture.  The 
full objectives of the research programme may be more formally listed as follows: 
 
i. To establish the key usability issues relating to end-user interaction with security 
tools and technologies. 
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ii. To investigate the specific context of security warnings and experimentally 
assess the associated challenges of user perceptions and understanding.  
iii. To design a means of improving and enhancing the usability of security 
warnings based upon user feedback. 
iv. To evaluate the proposed approach by means of a prototype implementation. 
 
These objectives correspond to the general sequence of the material presented in the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis, as will be discussed in the next section.  
 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
 
This thesis describes the research that leads to a better way to understand and to 
improve usability of security warnings.  The investigation begins at the general level, 
encompassing all aspects of information security considerations that are applicable to 
security warnings, before proceeding to identify a more specific technical approach and 
describing the conduct of practical evaluation. This thesis comprises nine chapters, the 
details of which are as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 discusses users’ interactions with security tools and technologies.  The 
security, usability, trust, relationship between HCI and GUI are discussed in further 
detail. Then it reviews the warning research background and approaches from other 
scholars. It presents the warning contexts and processes, as well as the problems and 
issues of warnings implementation, approaches to warning studies and finally, the 
direction of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 provides an examination of comprehensibility of issues in information 
security, using a survey study.  Moreover, it provides general insights into the solid 
foundation to assess end-users’ views about information security aspects in general. It 
also comprises 2 main warning scenarios to better understand users’ perception and 
decision upon receiving these warnings.  
 
Chapter 4 proceeds with wider evaluation of perceive security warnings, where users 
have the opportunity to capture what they believe a security warning to be (i.e. 
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capturing manually using installed application).  A questionnaire is embedded together 
in the application to gather useful information from users. 
 
Chapter 5 builds from the previous chapter to further appraise computer warnings in 
real-time contexts.  It gathers the need to provide more information on each warning 
presented.  Moreover, it supports the previous evidences and later leads to the creation 
of proposed architecture in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 proposes Automated Security Warning Interface (ASIA) architecture, a novel 
framework in improving security warnings.  It describes the components and databases 
involved and describes in detail each of the functions.  This chapter reveals how 
adaptation takes place in user’s computers and the detailed interaction between the 
entities involved.  
 
Chapter 7 evaluates and validates the proposed ASIA architecture, using a prototype 
system.  It makes use of interview and questionnaire techniques to probe end-users’ 
understanding and preferences in terms of the warnings presented.  Details analysis is 
conducted in this chapter.  A detailed comparison will be made to focus on the usability 
aspects of warnings, based upon users’ experiences of the warnings presented to them.  
In addition, the results highlight the detailed interview process on user’s decision 
process, with the warnings that they encounter (i.e. reasons for their actions, their 
understanding, difficulty levels).   
 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises findings from the earlier chapters, highlighting the future 
development of this research. 
 
This thesis also includes a number of appendices, containing a variety of additional 
information in supporting the main discussions.  This includes the research publications 
used throughout the completion of this research study.  
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2 Users Interaction with Security Tools and Technologies 
2.1 An overview of security tools and technologies 
 
Security tools and technologies are used to provide significant protection to end-users 
whilst using computer.  In order to cope with technological change, there is a need for 
people to strengthen their related knowledge and skills so that they are able to manage 
technology accordingly.  Computers have now become the medium of communication 
in the cyber world.  Applications that are installed in computers provide many functions 
to cater specifically for user needs in terms of the tasks they need to resolve.  For 
instance, antivirus software is one of the most popular tools that end-users dealing with 
on day to day basis.  In order to use this tool, users need to understand how it works, so 
that it can be used in a secure manner.  Antivirus software is generally a piece of 
software that is installed to protect end-users, and functions as a shield from any 
computer menace (i.e. potential malicious attacks).  Normally, in their workplace, this 
software will be installed by default by organisations, whilst at home, users need to do 
this by themselves (i.e. unless if the computer is pre-installed with antivirus on the first 
hand).  Therefore understanding the security features of this tool are essential so that 
users know when and how to use it (Ben-Asher et al. 2009). 
 
In different scenarios, web browsers for instance became a platform for end-users to use 
the Internet.  In using this platform, users are able to search for information, 
communicate within distances, make banking transactions and download or upload 
information at their convenience.  In these contexts, security features and functions must 
be available for users to use so that the communication or transactions become fully safe. 
Therefore, understanding the functionality provided within the current technologies is 
both crucial and challenging.  
 
Nowadays, having security software on one’s computer is deemed to be a necessity.  A 
key reason for this is the volume and range of threats.  For example, according to 
Symantec (2012), there were 42 billion computer spams (i.e. estimated global spam per 
day).  In addition, it has been reported that 5.5 billion malicious attacked were blocked 
in 2011, as compared to 3 billion in 2010.  On the other hand, Potter & Waterfall (2012) 
reported that users infected by malicious software were considered high as compared to 
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similar reports in 2010 (i.e. two-fifths in small businesses and three-fifths on larger 
organisations).  This indicates the need for the use of security tools to protect users from 
any threats. In order to understand users’ interaction with security tools and technology 
in further detail the next two sub sections consider security and usability, and end-user 
perception and trust. 
 
2.2 Security and usability 
 
Security and usability are two different domains, but can be linked in some way. Such 
concepts are also known as usable security. Smetters & Grinter (2002) claimed that 
designing usable security technologies, led to the design of useful secure applications 
from the end-users perspective.  They discussed the three types of traditional “users” of 
security technologies; the developer – that integrates security in system, the 
administrator – who maintain the security policy and finally the end-users – who follow 
the policy.  As more software can be used freely from the Internet, end-users must 
understand how to use it correctly so that they are able to protect their own device.  
Therefore, it is a challenge for the developer to create and implement a usable and 
secure system which end users can interact with accordingly.  For instance, most users 
will need to interact with antivirus or Internet security packages that often present 
security decisions for users to make (Smetters & Grinter 2002 and Furnell et al. 2006b).  
Even though some products offer functionality to automate these responses (i.e. choose 
default settings) there is still a need for user intervention to use it in secure manner.  In 
other words, end-users are likely to be their own systems administrator (Edwards & 
Grinter 2001).  Balfanz et al. (2004) examined the traditional PKI deployment and 
found out that the setup for wireless network and PKI by Microsoft XP involved thirty 
eight steps when it only needs eight steps to take when they produced the manual in 
their study.  This revealed that providing security and usability at the same time is a 
challenging task for developers.  Thus, aligning both elements is necessary to avoid 
conflict especially in the early stages of the design cycle (Yee 2004 and Dewitt & Kuljis 
2006).  Later, end-users would be able to use the products correct and securely and the 
goal of computer security can be achieved. 
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The goal of computer security involves three main aspects of any computer related 
system that comprised of confidentiality, integrity and availability.  According to 
Pfleeger & Pfleeger (2003) and Bishop (2003) confidentiality can be defined as the 
concealment of computer–related assets or resources from unauthorised parties (i.e. 
secrecy or privacy), whilst integrity refers to trustworthiness where only authorised 
parties are able to undertake any changes or modification in authorised ways.  On the 
other hand, availability refers to the ability to use computer-related assets or resources 
when needed.  Bishop (2003) stated that to implement computer security controls was a 
complex task and cumbersome.  Security practitioners and developers should find a 
solution to ensure that the goals of computer security can be achieved.  In order to 
achieve this, Yee (2004) suggested that security and usability should be aligned.  He 
believed that security and usability shared common goals in accomplishing end-users 
expectations.  He further claimed that when security and usability were not addressed as 
add-ons, conflict between it can be suppressed.   
 
On the other hand, people involved in software engineering begin to realize tardily that 
information security is important for software development, even where the primary 
function is not related to security (Tondel et al. 2008).  Many aspects have to be 
considered to create applications, software and systems, and one essential element is 
usability.   
 
Wright (1991) defined usability as a measured by how easy and effective for the 
computer to be used by set of users.  Brinck et al. (2002) defined usability as the degree 
to which people manage to perform a set of required tasks.  Nielsen (2003) referred to 
usability as a quality attribute which evaluates how user interfaces are used.  He stated 
in his study that usability needs to be defined by five quality components, namely 
learnability, efficiency, memorability, errors and satisfaction.  A further definition by 
ISO (1998) is as follows: 
 
“…the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified 
goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use.” 
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It may be noted here that usability covers various elements such as functionality, 
efficiency of usage and even error tolerance.  Usability should, indeed, be regarded as 
an essential element for products, especially when it is related to end-users.  Having 
fulfilled all of aforementioned components by these authors, the ease of use of the 
products may be achieved.  Having experiences in multiple usages of applications and 
browsers in computer, it may be noted that usability and security play an essential role.  
If usability of such aspects were disregarded, the function and presentation of security 
warning would be unusable.  Thus, security and usability must be able to complement 
each other.  The ideal trade-off is to ensure that the design of one product (i.e. security 
warnings) have enough security functions without disregarding elements of usability.  
For instance, the concept of using design principles has been introduced to improve the 
security of computer systems (Saltzer & Schroeder 1975).  They introduced eight 
examples of design principles that can be applied particularly to the protection 
mechanism.  One essential finding of their research was the term of psychological 
acceptability, which stated that human interface was designed for ease of use, and users 
should apply the protection mechanism correctly.   
 
Therefore, it is obvious that security and usability serve a vital purpose.  By addressing 
the importance of security and usability, an indication is given as to how both elements 
may be aligned so that end-users can use the application in a secure manner, without 
having problems with implementation.   
 
2.2.1 Usability problems 
 
According to Furnell et al. (2006), many applications in computer contained security 
features for end-users to choose from and configure.  Simultaneously, there is a 
potential for them to make a security-related decisions.  However, with regard to 
features that were implemented to guide or help end-users, it was actually disregard 
them to use it accordingly.  In addition, end-users have different knowledge and 
capabilities when using such technologies, especially those who are not sufficiently 
experienced with computers (i.e. customizing features, updates patches, run antivirus 
and handling security warnings).  Figure 2.1 shows an example of security features 
available to users of the built-in Windows firewall.  Not all users were able to 
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understand the options presented in this dialogue, as the information presented was not 
written in an accessible/understandable form.  A similar scenario is illustrated in Figure 
2.2 where the use of the technical terms “Script” and “Active X” might be confusing to 
some users and may cause them to make incorrect security decisions.  This section thus 
describes some problems that occur with regards to the usability of security tools and 
technologies.    
 
 
Figure 2.1: Windows Firewall settings (Furnell et al. 2006) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Security warning in Internet Explorer that used a complex language 
(Furnell et al. 2006) 
 
Problems occurring in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 5.0 (see Figure 2.3) constituted one 
of the earliest studies on usability issues, as this tool was not sufficiently usable to be 
effective in the context of security (Whitten & Tygar 1999).  They revealed that the 
design of the PGP application was not appropriate for end-users without a security 
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background.  One third of them (out of twelve) were unable to correctly sign and 
encrypt an e-mail and one quarter even exposed the secret key.  Another line of research 
by Proctor et al. (2000) found usability problems existed in third party authentication 
methods, whilst Wool (2004) found usability problems in configuring firewalls to 
selectively filter traffic.  Lacking usability thus causes users to change from a secure 
system to an insecure system.  In terms of ease of use, users will not be able to use the 
products accordingly, or to satisfy their needs.   
 
 
Figure 2.3: PGP keys display where users unable to correctly sign and encrypt e-
mail in a specified task (Whitten &Tygar 1999) 
 
On the other hand, Good & Krekelberg (2005) conducted a laboratory study with 
regards to KazaA file sharing user interface.  They found out that their respondents were 
unable to tell what files they were actually sharing, and sometime they assumed that 
they were not sharing anything, although in reality, they shared all files in their hard 
drive.  They revealed that KazaA sharing interface had usability problems which led to 
privacy issues.  Most software developers were not primarily interested in security and 
usability issues (Coffee 2006 and Mouratidis et al. 2004).  Their main intention was to 
implement as much functionality as possible, rather than making it easy to use (Meier 
2006).  This led to the weak implementation of usable interface on applications to deter 
end-users from unsafe behaviour.   
 
Issues of usability were also highlighted as one of the major research challenge (CRA, 
2003).  In this report, “human error” is often cited as the main cause of configuration 
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errors.  In assessing their fundamental research problems with regard to understandable, 
deployable, and usable security, they highlight one example as mentioned below: 
 
“Encryption is one specific instance that deserves special mention.  Well-encrypted 
messages can move safely through dreadfully weak systems. Encryption is well 
understood, but not widely employed. There is a ‘usability gap’ that translates directly 
into a ‘usage gap” (CRA 2003). 
 
Based on the examples given in this section, it is important to view usability and 
security beyond these contexts.  Even if a particular application provides the required 
functionality, the overall achievement may be considered unsuccessful if users are still 
unable to understand and to use it correctly.  For instance, most applications, operating 
systems and web browsers use security warning as a tool to let end-users know 
something is going on or that actions need to be taken.  Indeed, some of the most crucial 
decisions may occur when such warnings are issued (i.e. security updates, antivirus 
protection and downloading application) and solely on end-users to respond 
appropriately.  In this context, users’ decision making are really crucial because it could 
lead to good or bad consequences.  Therefore, the usability aspects should be fully 
considered so that they can support users to make effective decisions.  The importance 
of understanding security is to ensure that users are able to use the tools and 
technologies (i.e. from the perspective of security) in secure manner which later will 
promote a safe behaviour. 
 
From one perspective, usability made the WWW (World Wide Web) successful 
(Berners-Lee et al. 1994).  Usability helped developers to make better decision and 
made their task became more efficient and effective (Radle & Young 2001).).  It was 
proposed that by identifying the users and their requirements, usability can be 
incorporated in the early product life cycle and therefore organisations can increase 
productivity, user satisfaction and accomplish usability goals without having problems 
using security tools.  The failure to consult with end users will have annihilating effects 
on the products (Faulkner, 2000).  This is why every feature that developers would like 
to implement should meet users’ requirement on the first hand.   
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In addition, Nielsen (2003) identified usability as a requisite aspect in websites, e-
commerce transactions and Intranet.  If it failed to address proper information and 
clearly stated the products, people would get rid of it.  Since then, there has been 
increasing interest in security and usability studies, as demonstrated by the vast number 
of researchers (Cranor & Garfinkel 2005, Yee 2004, Hoegh 2006, DeWitt & Kuljis 
2006 and Macaulay et al. 2009).   
 
As the growing research and developments in this area encourage developers to pay 
more attention on usable security, security should be embedded as part of the product 
cycle, instead of implementing it after that.  By integrating security during the life cycle 
able to improve overall web application security (Meier 2006).  Usability should be 
viewed as one of the fundamental concepts in products creation, so that it can works as 
expected (i.e. comprehend end-users).  On the other hand, there are some challenges to 
integrating both elements because of the difficulty of finding a subset of security and 
usability.  However, Yee (2004) proposed a method regarding how to align these 
elements, so that usable security can be achieved. 
 
2.2.2 End-users Perception and trust 
 
End users often claim that they understand the usage of one particular application or 
tool, but in reality, they actually do not.  Therefore, understanding end-users perception 
and trust with regards to the usage of security tools and technologies is essential (Morris 
1997).  Confidence and a trustful relationship are essential to reduce possible threats in 
the electronic commerce perspective (Ratnasingham 1998).  When users experience a 
particular website or application, they develop their trust value in that process (Phippen 
& Furnell 2007).  According to Lacohee et al. (2006) users decided to choose trusted 
company or website which they have used before.  The branding process is able to 
generate trust by using logos and company names which their integrity is well respected 
(Shneiderman 2000).  Similar results are portrayed in Furnell et al. (2008), as users 
claimed they only used trusted websites, but they still failed to demonstrate their 
knowledge to learn more about security features in the trusted websites.  Users regularly 
tend to accept any security features in website (such as the lock symbol, trusted 
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company logos and verified by a certain established company) without taking further 
action to investigate (Schechter et al. 2007 and Whalen & Inkpen 2005).   
 
When no factual basis or detailed information can be referred to, users’ perception will 
be based on the emotions (Havana & Roning 2004).  Decisions based on the emotions 
will then lead users to take risky actions, with potentially catastrophic end results.  This 
was the reason Murayama et al. (2009) justified the importance of the “Anshin” concept 
as an emotional trust that incorporated a sense of safety, reliability, privacy and 
availability.  This concept may be applied to end-users decision making processes so 
that they are able to act in secure manner.      
 
In order to examine the level of severity, users need to strengthen their knowledge at 
first hand.  The level of knowledge became an indicator to ensure people had the ability 
to evaluate the risks, and at the same time users gained trust that based on the amount of 
knowledge that they have had (Havana & Roning 2004).  The laypersons often take 
vigilant action with regard to information security when problem starts to occur (Furnell 
2004).  When nothing much can be done, they will rely on other people to help mitigate 
the problems.  The more steps involved in a specific task, the more difficult the task to 
perform and the more error user pruned to produce (Schultz 2007). The development of 
software and application must be parallel with user’s requirements.  Armed with 
appropriate knowledge, the developer can create a better design and people get used to 
using it. 
 
On the other hand, to obtain trust will involve users in understanding the risks.  Risk 
and uncertainty are essential concepts for people to evaluate and to understand, even 
though it may be difficult to do so (West 2008). Understanding the risk provides the 
basis for end-users to evaluate their decision making actions.  Hence, users will be able 
to gather some evidence based on their experiences, perception and trust towards 
decisions related to security and usability. 
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2.3 Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and the Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
 
This section emphasizes the need to understand human computer interaction and 
graphical user interface contexts.  Both of these contexts need to be discussed because 
they collaborate in the sense of providing interface and information to end-users (i.e. 
with respect to end-users and developers).  Every interface in computer systems (i.e. 
security tools and technologies) involves both of these contexts.  To be more precise, 
from the developers’ perspective, they create programs or software that are able to 
present features that would be able to help users to comprehend any possible actions 
that users have to take, or to provide useful information with regard to the problems 
they face.  Hence, when they design such programs, the principle of human computer 
interaction (HCI) will generally be adapted, and the final products will be presented in 
user-friendly graphical user interface (GUI).  It is anticipated that such final products 
would be able to be used in secure manner by the end-users.  In general, and on balance, 
Shackel & Richardson (1991) viewed human computer interaction (HCI) as Human-
Systems Interaction (HSI).  They define it as: 
 
“HSI is concerned with methods, media and mechanism for enhancing cooperation 
between people and systems in an interactive organisational environment”. 
 
On the other hand, Hewett et al. (1996) defined human computer interaction as: 
 
“a discipline concerned with the design, evaluation and implementation of interactive 
computing systems for human use and with study of major phenomena surrounding 
them”. 
 
Therefore, it may be argued that human computer interaction (HCI) is a discipline 
comprising requirements with regard to the mechanism, evaluation and implementation, 
based on the interaction between human and systems.  In order to improve the design of 
computer system interface, HCI can be used as a basis or reference point, as it integrates 
all fundamental elements that are needed in one particular interactive system. 
 
According to Faulkner (1998), there are two main methods in which the users 
communicate with computer (i.e. linguistic manipulation and direct manipulation).  
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Linguistic manipulation also known as command line interface where users need to type 
some command line to interact with computer systems.  Direct manipulation is also 
known as iconic interface or Graphical User Interface (GUI), where users interact 
directly with computer via tools such as keyboard, touch screen and mouse.  Therefore, 
the direct manipulation method (i.e. GUI) seems to be more relevant within the current 
contexts of computer usage.  It is clear that nowadays, every application or software is 
presented in such a way that it is easy to use and user friendly (i.e. appropriate with all 
level of users).  As users’ interactions are directly with the computer, it is important to 
understand the GUI concept in a bit detail.  The concept of GUI had been introduced by 
Douglas Englebart when he demonstrated his system called oN-Line System (NLS) 
based on his work on “augmentation of man’s intellect” (Baecker et al. 1995b).  Since 
then, the GUI has been widely used by many computer developers for applications or 
products.  GUI may be defined as graphical interface of one particular computer that 
allows users to do some actions (i.e. click and drag objects) via mouse instead of 
command line (Pc.net 2012).  Linfo (2004) has claimed that GUI is human computer 
interface that used windows, icons and menus that can be manipulated using mouse and 
keyboard.  In addition, Bétrancourt & Bisseret (1998) claimed that interface which 
integrated text and picture were able to improve learning.  Therefore, this indicates that 
GUI can be seen as an intermediary between end-users and computer so that input and 
output can be delivered between them. 
 
Having understood the relationship between these concepts, a basis has been provided 
to further understand how end-users interact and reflect with the security tools and 
technologies they have.  Therefore, the next sections will explain the needs and 
potential direction of this thesis. 
 
2.4 The needs for understanding usability for security and protection contexts 
 
Usability aspects can be viewed as one of the most significant elements, especially 
when users want to make a decision.  Before the decision process, users are normally 
presented with an interface which explains the current circumstances and possible 
options (e.g. security warning, notification, banners, and balloons).  Therefore, it is clear 
that the ease of the decision making process can be aided through the usability or the 
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clarity of the interface (i.e. sufficient information and useful features).  The following 
examples support how decision making is linked to the essential nature of usability of 
such features. 
 
For instance, Tognazzini (2005) has described an example of a security device called 
“Tresor” (i.e. file encryption application).  In order to make it usable for end-users in 
terms of the decision to key in their password, the application was able to offer users 
whether to veil or unveil the password based on their preference (e.g. base on users’ 
location or users’ privacy) which made them to use the Palm’s Graffiti System in a 
much easier way.  Hardee et al. (2006) conducted experiment with regard to computer 
security decision making, an found that  in order to achieve successful decisions, the 
warning presentation must be improved to be more usable and effective by altering the 
wordings or the decision frames (i.e. explicit wordings and highlighted the risks and 
potential losses).   
 
West (2008) explained the difficulty of making a decision with security warning 
dialogues, as it looked similar and none too outstanding in relation to any other.  He 
suggested that the design of the warning message should be enhanced and made it 
usable (i.e. looked and sound differently), so that users were able to differentiate, were 
likely to read and later to consider the options provided to them in secure manner.  Stoll 
et al. (2008) proposed “Sesame” as a tool to help users make security decisions by 
showing details of the background process step by step until the user was able to make a 
decision.  They made use of the concept of direct manipulation of the graphical 
interface to help non-experts make informed decision as shown in Figure 2.4.  It helped 
users by revealing the system’s hidden security state using a graphical illustration that 
facilitates users’ understanding in making decisions.    
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Figure 2.4: Behind the scene of Sesame where user able to view the process before 
making a security decision (Stoll et al. 2008) 
 
All of this evidence illustrates the importance of usability from the context of the 
decision making process.  Usability significantly helps users to make a better choice, 
and most importantly, navigate them from making a wrong choice that could impair or 
compromise their computers to computer menaces.  With the rapid expansion of 
computing technologies day to day, the needs of usability become more dominant and 
as every products would need to be easy to use (i.e. usable) and works effectively.  
From the contexts of computer security, the decision making processes that carry the 
most risks are often associated with security warning messages.  These indicate that 
security-related events have occurred or have been detected.  Therefore if the wrong 
decision is made by users, this has a number of negative implications for security and 
protection of the user’s computer.  In addition, the goal of computer security (i.e. 
“secure level”: confidentiality, integrity and availability) will be difficult to achieve. 
 
One of the classic cases with regard to the implications of making wrong decisions was 
the assessment of PGP 5.0 (i.e. encrypted email) where two thirds of participants 
incorrectly thought they had encrypted data (Whitten & Tygar 1999). This resulted in 
serious consequences as the information had been breached within computer security 
contexts.  Stool et al. (2008) also claimed that when wrong decisions was made, users 
were exposed to many attacks such as phishing, bot infestations and other forms of 
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malware. Egelman et al. (2008) revealed that 97% of the 60 respondents in their study 
became victims of phishing attacks, based on the decision they made, because they were 
unable to differentiate between authentic and bogus website.  They mentioned that 79% 
of their participants heeded the active warning as shown in Figure 2.5.  In contrast, only 
one user obeyed the passive warning (i.e. as passive warnings were often ignored) as 
shown in Figure 2.6.  Jagatic et al. (2007) on the other hand found out that 72% of 487 
participants revealed their personal credentials to the phishing websites.  The impact of 
the wrong decisions significantly affected users in monetary terms, and even 
psychologically speaking.  For instance, a similar situation occurred when users decided 
not to update his or her antivirus program in computer with the latest patches and 
decided to download software from peer to peer file sharing (e.g. Torrent).  
Simultaneously, he/she did not realise that a new computer malware was propagated 
within the computer network.  Without realising the consequences of the implication, 
the user’s computer was attacked or compromised as a results of wrong decision that the 
user had made earlier in time.  This resulted in the computer virus being spread in the 
user’s computer and likely to the entire system (Bellissimo et al. 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: The active Firefox 2 phishing warning (Egelman et al. 2008) 
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Figure 2.6: The passive Internet Explorer 7 phishing warning (Egelman et al. 
2008) 
 
The most serious implication has been highlighted by Potter & Waterfall (2012), who 
indicate that individuals and organisations have suffered from direct and indirect 
financial loss and even damage to reputation especially for major organisations.  They 
claimed that it can be estimated the total cost of incidents roughly around £15,000 - 
£30,000 for small business and £110,000 to £250,000 for large organisations.  It had 
been reported by Symantec (2012) where 232.4 million identities were exposed and it 
was sum-up altogether to 5.5 billion attacked in 2011.This striking information indicates 
the potential danger if the wrong decisions are made that impair end-users as a whole.  
 
Based on all of the evidence with regards to general users’ interactions with security 
tools and technologies, one of the most significant areas that end-users are still facing 
difficulties is around the issue of specific interaction with computer tools or application, 
and more particularly, when the tools try to warn them about something is going on.   
Therefore, users’ experiences the significance of security warnings as a medium to warn 
them before decisions can be made.  Security warnings may be seen as the main 
medium by which to give warnings or even information about potential problems or 
risks at a specific time.  Before any action can take place on the part of users, the 
security warning is presented as a reminder for them.  The most crucial part, when users 
are offered more than one option and at the same time there were no specific functions 
or features to help or guide them to make a secure decision currently available.  In these 
circumstances, any false decision making may lead to catastrophic results.   This could 
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jeopardise the fundamental issues of computer security to ensure the goal of computer 
security can be achieved.  At any stage, warning messages became prominent to users 
whilst using their security tools and technologies.  Before the wrong decision is made, it 
is better to counter the problems in the initial phase and find possible methods to 
improve it.  Therefore, based on the assessment with regards to the interaction with 
security tools and technologies, this thesis will take a particular look and covers the 
issues of security warnings from the computer context. 
 
2.7 Guidelines 
 
According to W3schools (2012), Microsoft products were used by the majority of users, 
especially the operating system and web browser.  As their guidelines provided more 
details about the usage of features as mentioned in the earlier section, the author use 
Microsoft guidelines as the main reference to further explore how every feature on 
security warning can be improved and utilised.  This provided the author useful input by 
understanding how every feature are implemented in different contexts that will be able 
to suit it purposes.  Hence, the author is able to investigate and to evaluate current 
implementation of security warning based on this guideline.  Later, it is anticipated that 
any potential gap or common ground would be found in the recent implementation.  
Having clarified the gaps or common ground, an effective approach will be introduced 
to implement more usable security warnings.  
 
In the aforementioned Chapter 2, this thesis has explained the relationship between HCI, 
GUI and usability.  The rationale behind this was that the Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
was introduced to accommodate the interaction between users and computers in a 
simpler and appropriate way, specifically in the fourth generation of the computer.  
Prior to this, presenting a security warning during that time was very limited because 
the interaction between users and computer was based on linguistic interaction style.  If 
this occurred, warnings were usually presented through the wordings on the computer’s 
interface, which was obviously not a user friendly type of interaction (e.g. MS-DOS 
prompt).  HCI was used as standard principle so that inter-communication between 
human and computer could be achieved in a secure manner.  Since graphical user 
interface (GUI) was introduced as part of HCI implementation, the author believed that 
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it was the era when security warnings started to evolve.  Simultaneously, issues 
regarding usability of computers started to be highlighted as one of the major issues. 
 
2.7.1 Purpose of warnings 
 
According to Wogalter (2006), warnings may be defined as safety communications that 
are used to inform people about hazards and protect them from any harm.  Rogers et al. 
(2000) and Tuchscheerer et al. (2010) defined warnings as anything that is able to alert 
an individual’s attention towards potentially dangerous circumstances.  Thus, a warning 
is a means to inform users about potential risks or problems that might occur in the 
future, and may protect the user from any possible harm.  A similar definition can be 
applied in warnings in computing contexts.  Applications or operating systems present 
warnings as the medium to inform and to warn about the possible consequences of an 
action by the end-user.  This explains that risks that might occur and possible 
precautions should be considered before users proceed with a potentially risk action.    
 
Fundamentally, Wogalter (2006) pointed out four main functions of warnings in general 
context (i.e. consumer products, equipment and services): 
 
i. To communicate important safety information 
ii. To influence  people’s behaviour in a way that will improve safety 
iii. To reduce or to prevent health problem, workplace accidents and property 
damage 
iv. To act as a reminder of something that people already know but may have 
forgotten about. 
 
Based on these main purposes, the essentiality of warnings may be indicated so that 
users can be informed about the potential risks and provide safety information to avoid 
on such incidents.  In addition, warnings are able to influence users to act accordingly 
when facing difficulties.  Based on the information provided in the warning, users learn 
how to differentiate how and what to avoid, so that later it will prevent them from such 
hazards (i.e. malware, phishing).  Warning was used widely regardless of any locations 
that suited its purposes (i.e. road - to warn pedestrian or the drivers and product labels - 
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to warn about the contents of products).  Viewing warnings from a computing 
perspective, they can be posed as a reminder when users are potentially facing any type 
of risks.   For instance, an antivirus program pops up a warning upon detection of 
malicious activity in users’ computers.  Warnings thus become the first point of contact 
to remind users that attention is needed.  In this scenario, some of the users might 
already know what is happening and the next steps to take.  Regardless of this, warnings 
have still been presented as a reminder, so that any possible actions can be taken.  
Wogalter (2006) also introduced the warning hierarchy as part of the hazard control 
hierarchy, as shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Hazard Control hierarchy 
 
The first step in the hierarchy is to get rid of the hazards (i.e. try to eliminate or to 
minimize it).  He claimed that alternative design was generally the best method to 
eliminate hazards.  After trying to eliminate the hazard via the design, the next step is to 
guard against all possible hazards.  This to ensure that people or property had limited 
contact with the hazard.  The third line of defence was to warn where warning can be 
viewed as the third priority, and not always reliable to prevent contacts with the hazard.  
Wogalter (2006) also clarified that where all of these three steps are still not effective, 
the additional last step is to remove the product or the environment from use.   
 
From the author’s point of views, one particular product (i.e. software or application) 
cannot be removed from the end-users as the last resort of action, but an appropriate 
warning should be put in place so that it will be able to navigate users to make a secure 
decision.  The author believes that the implementation of products should be reviewed 
(i.e. in computing context it can be reviewing the implementation of security in system 
development cycle).  Mouratidis et al. (2004) & Tryfonas et al. (2001) claimed that 
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security is often considered after the completion of the system, instead of integrating it 
in the earlier stage.  This has often led to problems when the system cycles had to be 
repeated again to integrate the changes.     
 
Consider Google Chrome as one example.  It is a browser or a platform for the user to 
seek more information, to upload and download software and medium of 
communication.  If any problem occurs at any stage whilst using this browser, the 
warning is still used as a medium to inform users about what is currently happening.  In 
this context, a warning can be viewed as the first source of information that keeps users 
aware about current problems which they encounter.  If the problem persistently occurs, 
one particular product should be reviewed back in the product cycle (e.g. system, 
analysis and development).      
 
On the other hand, Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011b) have argued that in certain situations, 
designing or eliminating the hazard and guarding against the hazard might not be 
feasible.  He gave the example of the sharp edge of the knife.  To make a knife safe, 
none of the edges should be sharp to stop the user from cutting their fingers and 
hands.  Designing a knife with blunt edges is not practical, as the main purpose of a 
knife is to cut objects.  Moreover, placing a guard on the knife (like a metal shield) 
would be not being practical as it would restrict the use and capabilities of the knife.  A 
similar scenario in computer security incidents that risk of being attack by malware 
cannot be completely removed as to design particular software that is fully secured is 
also impossible.  
2.8 Warnings in computer contexts 
 
By understanding warnings in general contexts based on the aforementioned sections, it 
may be seen that there is a need to further understand how previous warning 
implementation can be applied in the contexts of computing.  Most of the features based 
on the descriptions on warning history such as using signal words influenced directly to 
the current implementation of computer security warning.  In order to suit the context or 
circumstances, the regulators and industry adapted the best approach to warning, to 
change community standard and guidelines, citizen pressure, technological innovations 
or even new scientific knowledge (Egilman & Böhme 2006).  Based on the guidelines 
CHAPTER 2: USERS INTERACTION WITH SECURITY TOOLS AND 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
 
 
28 
by Microsoft (2010), warnings alert users within five different user interface contexts, 
as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
User Interface Contexts Suitable Usage 
Dialogue Box Used for critical warnings that includes 
confirmation.  Users must respond to the warning 
instantly (Modal dialogue box) 
In-Place Used to provide information that possibly 
prevents a problem.  It is useful when users are 
making choices 
Notifications Used with significant circumstances or status that 
can be safely ignored by users (at least 
temporary) 
Balloons Used as a control in a situation that affects the 
input.  This state is likely to be unintended and 
users may not realize that the input is affected. 
Banners Used to provide information that may prevent a 
problem.  It is useful upon users completing a 
task 
Table 2.1: Five different user interface warning contexts 
 
 
Dialogue Box 
 
In-Place 
 
Notifications 
 
Balloons 
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Banners 
Figure 2.8: Examples of warnings in various contexts of user interface 
 
It can be noted from Figure 2.8 presented the examples of security warning 
implementations based on the contexts of the warnings.  In Microsoft (2010) guidelines, 
there is a detailed explanation, especially with regard to the design concept and how one 
particular element should be used (e.g. icons, colours, fonts and texts).  This provides a 
clear context to explain the different usage and with the help of image.  The differences 
in presentation of one particular warning might have a different impact in terms of how 
the user perceives it.   
2.9 Problems and issues with security warnings 
 
Having looked at the general context, this section highlights useful evidence with 
regards to warning studies relating to security tools and technologies.  Security features 
on warning messages help users to mitigate the risk by providing protection from 
potential threats.  This provides information and options that would encourage users to 
take or to be more cautious.  For instance, the usage of signal cues such as colours, help 
function and useful links.  These features are generally notable because they have been 
used in most of the operating system and applications in web browsers.  Molich and 
Nielsen (1990) claimed that a good warning dialogue provided carefully phrased 
information on messages in various situations especially when the user needed helped.  
Johnston et al. (2003) suggest that user interfaces were designed to help end-users to 
understand the usage of computer technology and later they were able to increase the 
efficiency to complete the task.  Nowadays, the challenges for the end-users are not only 
in terms of understanding the complexity of interfaces on one particular application, but 
the external factor is far more challenging which comes inconspicuous and cause harm 
to people.  
 
Infection by viruses or malicious software were among the highest incidents recorded 
(Potter & Waterfall 2012, GoCSI 2010 and Potter & Beard 2010).  In one recent study 
by Symantec (2012), variant of malware were 286 million in 2010 and increased to 403 
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million the following year.  They also claimed that the “website malware” was among 
the most popular cyberspace issues where 61% of malicious sites were actually regular 
websites that had been compromised.  In addition, Symantec (2012) also categorized the 
five most infected websites (i.e. blogs and web communications, hosting/personal 
hosted sites, business/economy, shopping and education).  The results from these 
findings indicate that end-users were exposed with many cyber-threats whilst they dealt 
with computer on daily basis.  These also provided the essentiality to further probe and 
clarify on what users’ understand about warning and how to better support users’ to 
make better decisions. This is supported by Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011b) who clarify that 
to understand what users think and believe about warnings in order for them to make 
safer choices needs an attention to further clarify and solve the problems.          
 
As warning communicates to inform people about hazards, it has been used widely in 
the software and applications context (Microsoft 2010).  It had been implemented in 
web browsers, operating system and applications.  Users were notified with regards to 
warning in various mechanisms such as dialogue box, balloons and notification.  Some 
of these notifications might directly interrupt the user’s current task and some might just 
pop up for a while (i.e. active and passive warning).  Böhme & Köpsell (2011) pointed 
out that the average users made several dozens of decision per day to respond with the 
pop-up dialogues that interrupted their primary tasks.  The author believed that for 
general or laymen users, this task would be a daunting one especially when it involves 
with security elements and usage of technical terminology.  This is supported by 
Norman (2009), who similarly discovered users were afraid to make a decision 
especially with regards to security as it was very difficult to distinguish the legitimate or 
illegitimate source.  
 
As a medium of communication to warn users, warning presentations should be able to 
give users with enough information and guidance.  In this particular section, the author 
highlighted literature reviews on the problems that users’ usually encountered with 
computer security warning studies.  This would clarify the problems that users 
encounter whilst dealing with warnings.  For the past ten years, computer security 
warnings have been investigated in many domains such as virus alerts and active 
browser warnings (Dhamija et al. 2006, Egelman et al. 2008 and Sunshine et al. 2009), 
online banking context (Mannan & Oorschot 2008 and Weir et al. 2009), privacy and 
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policy (Reeder et al. 2007 & Lampson 2009) and fake security warning (Sharek et al. 
2008 and Stone-Gross et al. 2013).  On the other hand, Symantec (2012) also claimed 
that web browsers were a popular target for the criminals to exploit the vulnerabilities of 
browsers (i.e. Opera, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome and Safari).  
With respect to the mentioned evidences, it is obvious that there are needs to investigate 
and to gather evidence on how people views security warning in general contexts.  It is 
useful to gather some evidence to understand the problems that users encounter whilst 
assessing security warning.  The following sub sections highlight the underlying 
evidences on the reality of what end-users had experienced with security warning in 
general contexts.  It is useful to gather this evidence to show the need for further 
research in this field of study.  
 
2.9.1 Attention towards warnings 
 
A study by Whalen et al. (2005) investigated insights from visual security cues using 
eye tracker and found out that participants did not pay attention to web security cues 
warning.  Users have demonstrated that smaller icon warnings can be easily 
misidentified, certificates are seldom used and understood and people tend to stop 
searching for security information once they log in to the websites.    
 
Wu et al. (2006) conducted user studies with 30 participants to prevent phishing attacks, 
and revealed that participant were fooled 34% of the time.  These participants ignored 
the warning especially when the web content looked legitimate. 
 
Seifert et al. (2006) conducted a web based survey with 114 users to evaluate the 
effectiveness of security warnings in a web browser setting.  They revealed that some 
users still ignored the warning as it did not encourage them to take secure action.  They 
argued that the warning displayed did not have enough information regarding the 
implications of such action by users.  Their findings also suggested that users’ decision 
as to whether to install or not the “ActiveX components” were driven by the display of 
security warning they had.   
 
Schechter et al. (2007) conducted a study with 67 bank customers to evaluate security 
indicator warnings and how they affected participant behaviours.  They found that users 
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ignored the HTTPs indicators and site-authentication images were found to be 
ineffective as 92% of participants still entered their credentials (i.e. username/password) 
to access their online bank service even though the warning image had been removed.  
 
2.9.2 Understanding of warnings 
 
Egelman et al. (2008) conducted an empirical study related to the effectiveness of 
phishing warnings and found that 20 out of 47 users did not understand the meaning of 
the warning that been presented.  97% of overall participants fell into at least one of the 
spear phishing messages they received.  They provided some recommendations to 
improve the warnings, and stated that indicators needed to be distinct, from less serious 
warning to more danger and warnings indicators, so they could only proceed to the 
phishing website after reading the warning message.  
 
In a different scenario, 72 individuals were unable to identify a secure browser 
connection via extensive two hours semi-structured interview that included drawing 
task about web security warning evidences (Friedman et al. 2002).  They also point out 
the surprising finding that technology savvy participants did not always have an 
accurate understanding of these warnings, as compared to other users. 
 
On the other hand, Sharek et al. (2008) conducted a study to evaluate end-users 
behaviour upon receiving fake Internet pop up warning.  Their study revealed that 73 % 
of respondent (out of 42) incorrectly responded to fake warning pop up.  The results 
indicate that end-users did not even realise the potential of the negative consequences of 
their actions.  42% of total responses claimed they prefer to get rid of the warning as it 
was annoyed them.  This finding reveals that end-users were lacking of knowledge to 
differentiate the characteristics of real and fake warning.  It also suggests that warning 
presentation should be made clear by using unique features that able to comprehend 
them.       
 
Sunshine et al. (2009) conducted a survey of 400 Internet users to examine their 
understanding of SSL warning effectiveness in two versions of Mozilla Firefox and 
Internet Explorer browsers.  They pointed out that 62% of the respondents did not 
understand the warning contexts that had been displayed (i.e. expired certificate, 
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unknown certificate authority (CA) and domain mismatch warnings).  In terms of users’ 
comprehension and risk perception, they revealed that some of the respondents claimed 
they were not at risk because they used operating systems liked Macintosh, Linux and 
FreeBSD.   
 
2.9.3 Use of technical wording  
 
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011b) conducted an open interview with 30 respondents related to 
computer security warnings and reported that novice users often did not understand the 
technical terminology.  They claimed that these participants had heard about it, but they 
struggled to comprehend the meaning of the terminology been used.  
 
Furnell et al. (2006b) conducted a survey with 340 end-users with regards to the 
usability of end-users security software.  They found out that understanding technical 
terminologies became common problems in end-users security features where only 35% 
of overall respondent knew the meaning of the ActiveX control in Internet Explorer 
browser. 
 
2.9.4 Evaluation of risks from warnings 
 
Downs et al. (2006) claimed that users were unaware of cues and information provided 
to warn them.  Therefore, they were unable to identify phishing threat and unlikely 
installed program albeit it cause harm to their computer.  On the other hand, Nodder 
(2005) studied on users’ behaviour in trust situations and revealed that users’ did not 
think about the consequences of their actions. As a result, they made one-off decision 
making and might fall in bigger consequences such as became victim of malware.  
 
Raja et al. (2010) also revealed that most of their respondents (i.e. 30 participants) 
specifically with low level of security knowledge unable to make informed decision 
based on the context of firewall warnings.  They claimed that these users were unable to 
use the protection accordingly, unable to understand the factors that affects their 
decision making and how it may affect them in the future.         
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2.9.5 User’s motivation towards heeding warnings 
 
West (2008) suggested principles to improve security behaviour, and pointed out that 
users’ generally unmotivated with regards to security-related decisions.  He highlighted 
that users did not read all information that relevant to them and did not consider all 
possible consequences of their actions.   
 
On the other hand, Herley (2009) claimed that users ignored security warnings and 
security advice because it offered a poor cost-benefit trade off and was a burden to them.  
This made users become demotivated, with too little benefits or incentives for too much 
cost they needed to manage.  He suggested a better understanding of actual harm to 
users and prioritized the advice given to influence good security decisions and motivate 
them.     
2.9.6 Users’ assessments of the implication of warnings 
 
Zurko et al. (2002) conducted a study with 500 people in an organization with regard to 
the security of the Lotus Notes client against unsigned active content.  They found that 
users often did not understand the impact of their security decision enough to be able to 
make an informed choice albeit the warning was presented.  Their study revealed that 
44% of respondents executed the unsigned content regardless of warnings.  They 
concluded that the more frequent security warning been presented in daily use, the more 
users learned to click “OK” without initially thinking about their action.    
 
2.10 Gathering Evidence on the need for research into security warnings 
 
From the highlighted works, it may be seen that end-users are still facing difficulties in 
assessing security warnings.   Even though Wolgater viewed warnings as a third line of 
defence, from the author’s viewpoint, it can be considered to be more important than 
this.  This similar views agreed by Johnston et al. (2003) and Stoll et al. (2008) when 
they considered warning as the “first line of defense" especially to non-experts.  To be 
precise, non-experts generally view warnings slightly differently, as they do not have 
much experience and knowledge of warnings.  Therefore, most of the time, their 
decision will be based on their belief or their previous experienced.  The necessity to 
understand further details about warning is when the decision of warning that users have 
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to make might impact the security and protection directly.  Providing this evidence 
indicates that end-users still face problems with security warning specifically in 
computer applications.  A security warning must be able to present sufficient 
information to warn users about risky circumstances and be able to promote safe 
behaviours with regards to decision making process. 
 
On the other hand, the problems of security warning were not entirely because of end-
users and consideration should be given by developers as well.  Software designers are 
still leaving some decision for end-users to make that included important security tasks 
(Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011b).  In addition, many options were provided on security 
warnings for users to rely on but unfortunately the information provided was still not 
sufficient to comprehend users with safe actions.  On the other hand, Amer & Maris 
(2007) claimed that very limited standards exist in computing and computing 
professional literature related to the parameters that should be included in warning 
messages.  In order to get deeper understanding whilst searching for the solutions, 
further investigation would be needed to examine end-users perception and attitudes 
towards security warning.  In addition, further evidence should be gathered from users 
to assess security warning specifically with regard to the elements that they understand 
and elements that made them baffled.  The following section presents useful 
frameworks and approaches that have been used to improve security warnings.   
 
2.11 Overview of warnings process and other frameworks 
 
There are many different conceptualizations and division of warning process.  
Overviews of warning process are discussed from the warning science literature to the 
specific method with regards to security warning in computers.  Lehto (1991) developed 
hierarchy of operator performance that consisted judgment, knowledge, rule and skill-
based behaviours that based from human information-processing steps.  Simultaneously, 
different forms of information such as signs, symbols and values were used at every 
level performance that allowed the effectiveness of different warning message to be 
inferred.  Rogers et al. (2000) introduced an integrative perspective warning process as 
shown in Figure 2.9.  In order for the warning to be effective, four steps with 
interactions of person and warning variables are involved, as follows:  
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i. Notice the warning – users’ attention is given towards the warning 
ii. Encode the warning – users used external information to internal representation 
iii. Comprehend the warning – users understood the meaning of the warning 
iv. Comply with warning – users’ behaviour worked in accordance with the 
warning 
 
They defined person variables as individuals that interacted with the warning, whilst 
warning variables can refer to the characteristics of the warning or the context in which 
the warning appeared.  From the context of computer security warning, to ensure its 
effectiveness, the security warning should be notice on the first hand.  Then users will 
use any information (i.e. experience or knowledge) to encode the warning.  This can be 
done by understanding the meaning of the features on the security warning itself such as 
icons, words and colours (i.e. comprehend).  Once users able to understand everything 
and gathered enough information, they will be able to comply the warning.  Therefore, 
it would be useful for the developers to understand this warning process and the 
variables involved in the overall interaction so that warning can be implemented 
accordingly.  The following sub sections introduce the frameworks and the approaches 
to improve security warnings.   
 
 
Figure 2.9: Four main components of warning process via repetition variables 
(Originally derived from Rogers et al. 1999) 
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2.11.1 Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP) 
 
After understanding the overview of warning process, this section explains the related 
framework to security warning process in more detail.  Wogalter et al. (1999), Wogalter 
et al. (2002) and Wogalter (2006) introduced the Communication-Human Information 
Processing (later will be used as C-HIP in this thesis) framework that involved steps in 
warning processing and as diagnostic tools to identify reasons for the failure of 
warnings as depicted in Figure 2.10.  By using this framework as a tool, a specific area 
of the warning implementation may be identified, and a correction can be made 
accordingly.  
 
 
Figure 2.10: Communication-Human Information Processing Framework (C-HIP) 
based on Wogalter et al. (1999). 
 
Wogalter et al. (1999) explained the framework in further details beginning with the 
source as the originator of the risk or hazard.  It will then be channelled to the receiver 
using sensory modalities such as visual, auditory and kinaesthetic.  In the receiver group, 
attention would be the first point of contact.  The risk or hazard should be able to have a 
context or background, so that it will enable the warning to be more prominent.  The 
next stage is comprehension that facilitates the understanding of the risk or hazard (e.g. 
the usage of symbols and words).  It will then affect users’ attitudes and beliefs.  Later, 
it goes on to consider the motivation elements that relate to users’ compliance with the 
risk involved.  Lastly, is the essential part namely behaviour.  It is expected that safe 
and correct behaviour will be achieved based on one particular warning that user 
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receives. From this framework, the author has learnt that the security warning problem 
can be identified in the early stage.  This is useful, as early assessment on how security 
warning can be improved later on.  
2.11.2 Human in the Loop (HITL) 
 
Cranor (2008) was among the first researchers to use C-HIP model to develop the 
Human in the Loop (HITL) security framework.  She used a similar approach but 
constructed her framework to be more specific based on security tasks.  It provides a 
systematic method to design out security problems and help to understand end-user 
behaviours when they perform security-critical functions as depicted in Figure 2.11.    
Both of the C-HIP and HITL models explained the sequential steps that users will deal 
with but HITL is different in the sense of it focusing on security-related actions.  
Security related actions normally actuate through security-related communication (e.g. 
warning, notices, status indicator, training and policy).  The stages that have been 
presented in the model were improved with some additional information, as listed in 
Table 2.2.  By using this framework, she claimed that it is likely to act as a checklist to 
analyse and to understand human role in secure systems.  There are four main features 
(i.e. communication, communication impediments, human receiver and behaviour).  She 
classifies communication impediments with environmental stimuli and interference and 
grouping elements in human receiver accordingly (i.e. personal variables, intentions, 
capabilities, communication delivery, communication processing and application).  The 
final stage of this model will lead to the aim of security communication, which is to 
ensure a safe behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Human in the Loop security framework (HITL) by (Cranor, 2008) 
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Table 2.2: The main components based on Human in the loop security framework 
(HITL) by Cranor (2008). 
 
Simultaneously, Cranor also proposed a four-step iterative process, whereby human 
threats to system security are identified and mitigated, as shown in Figure 2.12.  She 
claims that HITL framework to be used as part of this iterative process.  Based on 
Figure 2.12, task identification step would involve system designer to identify whether 
the systems rely on human in order to perform security functions and task automation 
step deal whether security functions would be able to partially or fully automate.  On 
the other hand, the failure identification step focuses on identifying the failure of 
security functions (i.e. by using HITL and user study) whilst failure mitigation step 
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finding method to prevent failures by determining how users can be supported to 
perform these task.  In order to assess this framework from security warning views, 
Cranor (2008) gave an example by using anti-phishing tools to apply to  this framework 
(i.e. passive warning indicators in web browsers were not effective to prevent users 
from phishing sites).  She concluded from her findings that one failure identification 
step revealed the need to find ways to correct users’ imprecise mental model about 
phishing, and she proposed to focus on the links to educational materials to improve 
anti-phishing warnings. 
 
Figure 2.12: Human threat identification and mitigation process originally by 
(Cranor 2008) 
 
Having understood the human threat identification and mitigation process, Cranor (2008) 
has recommended three high-level strategies to build a secure system for human beings 
to use, as follows: 
i. To find ways to ensure human out of the loop and build systems without involve 
human in security critical functions; 
ii. To build systems that are intuitive and find method to make it easy to use; 
iii. To teach human on how to perform the security critical task. 
She argues that to ensure the effectiveness of the proposed strategies, we cannot rely 
only to one strategy but a combination approach must be adopted.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, the author has decided to use the combination approach.  This thesis seeks to 
combine strategy two and three.  Strategy one is not chosen, because the author believes 
that to build a system security without human intervention is cumbersome and cause 
many problems especially when the mechanism failed.  This is agreed by Belloti & 
Edwards (2001) and Isbell & Pierce (2005) who revealed usability issues occurred and 
users were exposed to incorrect threat assessment. On the other hand, combination of 
strategy two and three seems to be more practical and reasonable.  Therefore, the next 
sections are expected to provide evidence of these combined strategies.   
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2.11.3 Security automation for security warnings 
 
According to Edwards et al. (2007), security automation can be defined as a system or 
technology that effectively removes the end users decision process.  Therefore the 
decision making is made by others such as the system administrator or a suitable expert.  
This is supported by Nielsen (2004) when he mentioned that users should not be 
burdened to defend themselves.  From the perspective of information security 
management, security automation would reduce the human intervention and thus it 
increases the cost and complexity of security (Montesino R and Fenz S, 2011).  With 
this approach users should not need to make security critical decisions and should not 
encounter distruption whilst completing their regular tasks. 
 
Edwards et al. (2007) introduced “the Spectrum of automation approaches” that 
explained the range of strategies on how security automation for end-users can be 
implemented as shown in Figure 2.13.  The fixed policy indicates where security 
decision policies are comprised in tool and application (e.g. Karberos server – security 
kernel implementation).  The customise policy allows the policy to be customised (e.g. 
control by the system administrator) whilst the dynamic policy works in a flexible 
manner with dynamic policy adaptation (e.g. Bayesian spam filters).  
 
 
Figure 2.13: The Spectrum of automation approaches 
 
From the scope of security warnings, it can suit the spectrum when the security 
warnings are identified.  In one particular system, end users do not have to make any 
decision with regards to the security warnings when the system itself is able to do it for 
them.  However, there are many challenges that limit automation such as the social and 
environmental contexts of security and the effects of security automation on users.  It 
can be argued that at the end of the day, users are the ones who use the system and they 
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should be able to understand the current context of event they are dealing with.  Thus, a 
users’ intervention is still compulsory in most of the scenarios.  
2.11.4 System visualisation for security warnings 
 
System visualisation is used as a tool to provide more information to end users to bridge 
the gap of understanding of how each process works in the computer system.  However, 
not much focus has been given to system visualisation in a security warning perspective.  
Stoll et al. (2008) introduced “Sesame” an interactive visualisation concept in order to 
help non-expert users make informed security decisions.  It provides a clear picture by 
utilising the desktop metaphor in order to show the background process when users 
wants to make security decision.  The result of system visualisation is pretty convincing 
as system activity, configuration and action can be seen in an understandable form (De 
Paula et al. 2005). 
 
Generally this system works to cater for two groups of users, namely expert and non-
experts.  For experts, visualisation tools and text-based tools are used whilst for non-
experts, tools for specific activities and for specific threats are used.  This suggested that 
the system visualisation caters for the needs based of end-users in a way that suits their 
understanding and technical capabilities.   “Sesame” implemented a direct manipulation 
model that helped users comprehend scenarios (i.e. leveraging end-users knowledge).  
From a security warnings context, users will be able to understand the process from the 
beginning of receiving security warning, the process when the decision is going to be 
made up until the informed decision is made.  All visual elements with step by step 
flows will be revealed so that users realise what is happening (i.e. foreground and 
background process).  System visualisation presented encouraging results but it is more 
useful for non-experts.  To implement this in a computer system is a challenge as there 
are various types of warnings derived from the operating system, browsers and other 
applications.  It will also involve security and privacy issues. Thus, these challenging 
scenarios suggest that more research is needed to reveal the suitability of system 
visualisation within this context. 
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2.12 Evolution of security warnings studies 
 
Computer security warnings become part of the development process as they provide a 
method to warn users of possible threats in the system.  Thus, the security warning also 
shared similar impacts in the sense of having changes to suit its current purposes and 
context.  Normally changes will reflect the design or layout, the colour schemes and 
additional functions to fix the previous problems (e.g. fixing bugs and usability issues).  
The previous section introduced frameworks and approaches that have been used to 
improve security warnings.  However, the trend to improve security warnings varies as 
there is no standard method that has been used.  Thus, it opens opportunities to explore 
how security warnings can be designed to accommodate the needs of end-users.  This 
section highlighted the previous and current developments of how to improve security 
warnings mainly on the usability aspects and also other related approaches in warnings 
design. 
 
2.12.1 Improving the usability aspects of security warnings design 
 
Nodder (2005) highlighted a Microsoft case study on types of dialogues in security 
warning contexts (i.e. consent dialogues, ActiveX dialogues, file download dialogues 
and pop up blocking).  He proposed a design solution based on users’ behaviour based 
on usability studies that he had conducted.  He argued that the previous version of 
Windows XP and XP SP1 as depicted in Figure 2.14 did not help user to make decision 
as the question presented mislead the users.  He further explained the text “You are 
downloading the file:” took over the main content of the dialogue which was the 
question “Would you like to open the file or save it to your computer?”  
 
 
Figure 2.14: The original File Download dialogue (Nodder, 2005). 
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He then pointed out that Microsoft adopted the positive approach of improving previous 
warnings by enhancing the warning dialogue (i.e. button defaults, button labels, primary 
text, evidence and assistance text) as depicted in Figure 2.15.  It may be noted that the 
question and information were available straight away, as compared to the previous 
security warning.  This version of security warning is able to comprehend users more 
easily especially when it related to trust decision process.     
 
 
Figure 2.15: Redesigned File Download dialogue (Nodder, 2005). 
 
Raja et al. (2009) introduced a new version of the Windows Vista firewall by revealing 
the hidden context to end-users.  The prototype was designed to provide contextual 
information so that they realised the security state of the current network connection in 
their computer system to make them better understanding.  Their study utilised 30 
participants from the university and general public.  The results suggested that a correct 
design interface in respect of usability (firewall) helped users to develop a correct 
mental model and it also increased users’ understanding of the firewall configuration.   
 
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011b) used examples from 29 security warnings from operating 
system and application software and conducted open-ended interviews with advanced 
and novice users in relation to usability of security.  Their results produced a clear 
mental model of novice and advanced users perceptions of warning dialogues.  Their 
study revealed that warnings design should also deal with the wrong diagnosis (i.e. 
novice users always tend to over diagnose the computer virus problems).  
 
Hardee et al. (2006) conducted a survey with 56 respondents to understand the 
differences of how they made decision with regards to computer and non-computer 
security domains (i.e. an examination of computer security decision making)..  Their 
study revealed that users’ perceive gain-ratio consistently and not in loss-ratio in both 
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domain (i.e. time/convenience, protecting information, protecting property, 
social/emotional, protecting self and others).  They suggested utilising attributes or 
features in security warnings (i.e. explain the potential loss explicitly and usage of 
explicit text). 
 
2.12.2 Related approaches to improve security warnings design 
 
This section describes useful methods that have been implemented by other research 
communities in security warnings implementations.  Thus, understanding how end-users 
perceive and understanding the warnings is fundamental in order to design and to 
develop features that end-users use.  It can be noted that various techniques had been 
used.  However, based on the author observation, none had used one specific approach.    
 
Keukelaere et al. (2009) conducted a study with 32 non-technical participants (i.e. any 
person that had no significant with computer security expertise, engineering or 
computer background) by implementing an e-mail client simulation known as Adaptive 
Security Dialogues (ASD).  ASD worked by matching the complexity of one particular 
dialogue with the risk associated, as shown in Figure 2.16.  The study revealed that with 
ASD, fewer people immediately open the attachment file and the majority of people 
spend more time considering their decision.   
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Figure 2.16: Five types of dialogues boxes namely warn and continue, multiple 
choices, security training, blank filling and clarification (Keukelaere et al. 2009). 
 
Edwards et al. (2007), meanwhile, introduced the concept of security automation where 
user security decision process is removed from one particular system.  Using empirical 
evidence from social and technology perspective, they suggested guidelines for 
automating appropriately albeit there are some obstacles that developers need to cater 
on the first hand.  They realised that this technique is worthwhile in theory, but in 
practice there are many limitations.  
 
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) conducted an online survey study that involved 733 
participants using four contexts of warning (i.e. encryption warning, attachment 
warning, address book warning and certificate warning) based on low and high risk 
scenarios.  Then they created two groups of redesigned warning (i.e. warning based on 
mental model and warning based on guidelines) and improved the four contexts of 
warning that had been presented. Their study revealed that the design changes were able 
to improve understanding, motivation and the tendency for end-users to choose better 
option, but further work need to be done so that users are able to differentiate between 
low and risk conditions.   
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Kauer et al. (2012) conducted a laboratory study and a survey with different certificates 
browsers security warnings (i.e. Firefox 2, Firefox 4, Internet Explorer 6 and Internet 
Explorer 9) whilst accessing websites which involved 30 participants.  They revealed 
that in order to improve the warning, the risk should be communicated clearly to the 
end-users.  The communication of risk (i.e. wordings) is very important to deliver the 
message.  Therefore, they suggest that it should be formulated in terms of technical 
risks, and also personal risks, to make it more convince.    
 
On the other hand, Raja et al. (2011) made use of the comparison between the 
Comodo’s original warnings and their improved version of warnings with 60 
participants using computer user study and questionnaires.  The design of their 
improved version warning was based on the physical security metaphor and humans in 
the loop framework (HITL) as discussed in aforementioned section.  Their study 
revealed that the majority of their respondents preferred to have the improved version of 
warnings, because it were more understandable, and that it was better to communicate 
the risks and promote users to make safe decisions.  
 
Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón (2007) introduced polymorphic and audited 
dialogues to improve security warning decisions.  Twenty participants who had 
previous work experienced participated in this role-played laboratory session.  All 
conversations and processes were recorded.  Their study revealed that these techniques 
helped users to make better security decision, as these dialogues were easy to 
understand and provided good guidance).  Polymorphic dialogue changed the order of 
the layout and delayed options provided every time the user encountered warnings, 
whilst audited dialogue warned or penalised users’ based on the decision provided by 
referring it to auditor. 
 
Villamarín-Salomón and Brustoloni (2010) proposed security reinforcing applications 
(SRAs) that rewarded users based on their secured behaviours using 24 participants in 
role-played laboratory studies.  They demonstrated that SRAs are able to improve users’ 
secure behaviours by accepting justified risks and rejecting the unjustified risks. 
 
Maurer et al. (2011) introduced a new concept of warnings, which appeared at the same 
time as user wanted to enter data in online forms.  To be more precise, the warning only 
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appeared if the data type was critical (e.g. credit card and password) in order to prevent 
phishing websites.  24 respondents were involved in this computer role-based lab study, 
in two groups (i.e. experimental and control), in which a special plugin was installed.  
The results indicate that this concept was promising especially to non-expert 
participants.  They claimed that this was the first step to reducing the frequency of the 
warnings and minimizing habituation. 
 
Stoll et al. (2008) conducted a user study and interview with twenty non-expert 
participants with regard to the security decision making process and introduced Sesame.  
Sesame used system visualisation to show to end-users the background process of one 
particular incident until users able to make decision.  Their study revealed that majority 
of respondents able to make better informed security choices.      
 
Based on all of these findings it may be suggested that there are many methods to 
improve the presentation of security warnings in order to comprehend end-users.  It may 
be noted that various techniques have been used to assess end-users’ understanding 
about computer warnings in various contexts (i.e. web browsers and dialogue box).  
Having understood these useful techniques, this thesis now highlights the classification 
of improving security warnings based on the identified findings. 
 
2.13 The classification of security warnings approaches 
 
Previous sections provided evidence of how security warnings design can be improved 
in relation to usability and other suitable approaches.  It is useful to get a clear picture of 
how each approach can be grouped or classified based on the techniques that had been 
used.  It can be concluded that the similarities among all of the findings to improve 
security warnings were based on these four classifications: 
 
i. Redesign the warnings by utilising the features and available information in the 
warnings 
ii. Redesign the warnings by behaviour modification. 
iii. Redesign the warnings by changing the presentation or layout  
iv. Redesign the warnings by the adaptation of warnings 
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Figure 2.17: Classifications approaches to improve the security warnings 
 
Based on Figure 2.17, four classification approaches were used to improve security 
warnings.  These classifications were based on the observations and understanding of 
how each study had been conducted.  It can be noted that most of these findings were 
focusing on redesign warnings to ensure that the interface of the warnings was more 
understandable by utilising the features, available information and changing the layout 
or presentation.  However, focus was given to “redesign the warnings by changing the 
presentation or layout”.  It can be noted that findings within this classification had used 
the same methodology which had been explained in the earlier sections.  On the other 
hand, four findings determined to focus on usability aspects of security warnings as 
depicted.  With regards to “redesign the warnings by the adaptation of warnings” only 
one study had been found.  Keukelaere et al. (2009) focussed on improving security 
warnings dialogs by producing a new architecture in order to promote a new type of 
interaction called “Adaptive Security Dialogs” (ASD).  As the underlying cause of the 
security warnings problem had been addressed, it indicates a necessity to design 
security warnings in a way that can work within all of these classifications.  The next 
section explains the opportunities which need further research and focus.   
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2.14 Warnings potential directions 
 
In reality, end-users are confronted with many challenges in using the computer and 
applications.  As the technology evolve rapidly, not every user able to cope with its fast 
momentum.  This poses difficulties to end-users to use computer and its application in 
secure manner.  For instance, most organisations kept their applications and software 
updated with the latest version.  This impacts end-users, especially to laymen groups, as 
they might only familiar with the previous version they used instead of the most recent.  
As a result, end-users are still baffled when faced with the new changes.  They must 
therefore learn about new features or functionality which will impact their decision 
especially when it related to security decisions.  On the other hand, developers still left 
the decision making specifically security decision to the end-users.  This also posed 
potential threats of becoming the victim of malicious attack if users choose 
inappropriate decision.  Hence, to design one particular security warning is not an easy 
task.  The warning should be able to explain the possible risk and able to convey users 
so that they behave in secure manner.    
 
Evidence in Chapter 2 highlighted the need for further research in this field of study by 
emphasizing six issues or problems in security warnings implementation (i.e. attention 
towards warnings, understanding of warnings, use of technical wording on warnings, 
evaluation of risks from warnings, user’s motivation towards heeding warnings and 
user’s assessment of the implication of warnings faced by end-users.  Research 
communities highlighted these as common problems when users interacting with 
security warnings.  It gave early indications on the importance to investigate and further 
probe how security warnings can be improved to meet end-users needs.  Therefore, it is 
useful and essential to understand the methods or suitable approaches to improve the 
security warning implementation.  In order to understand and to compare on the 
approaches, Table 2.3 describes summary of studies that focus on how security 
warnings can be improved as described in the aforementioned section. 
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Authors Methods/Techniques 
Nodder (2005) Proposed a new design of warning 
based on users’ behaviour 
Raja et al. (2009) Proposed a new design of firewall 
interface that helped users to develop 
a correct mental model and increased 
users’ understanding on firewall 
configuration.   
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011b) Introduced the concept of mental 
model on how novice and advanced 
users assessed security warnings. 
Keukelaere et al. (2009) Introduced Adaptive security dialogues 
(ASD) by matching the complexity of 
warning dialogues and the risk 
associated 
Edwards et al. (2007) Introduced security automation 
concept where decision is made by the 
system 
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) Proposed that design changes able to 
help end-users to make better decision 
in relation to warning interaction. 
Kauer et al. (2012) Proposed that the risk should be 
communicated clearly in warning in 
order to deliver the message in secure 
manner, 
Raja et al. (2011) Proposed a design solution based on 
the physical security metaphor and 
Human In the Loop (HITL),  
Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón 
(2007) 
Introduced Polymorphic and audited 
dialogue to improve security warning 
decisions. 
Villamarín-Salomón & Brustoloni Introduced security reinforcing 
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Authors Methods/Techniques 
(2010) applications (SRAs) which rewarded 
end-user based on their behaviours. 
Maurer et al. (2011) Proposed new concept of warning 
design where it appeared together 
when user wanted to key in the data 
online. 
Hardee et al. (2006) Suggested that attributed or features  
should be utilised in security warnings 
Stoll et al. (2008) Introduced Sesame – visualisation 
system which showed to end-users the 
background process which always 
hidden from them. 
Table 2.3: Summary of studies on how to improve security warnings 
 
Whilst the preceding sections within this chapter highlighted useful techniques to 
improve security warnings, apparently, there is no complete version of security 
warnings which are able to solve every single problem experienced by the end users.  
Table 2.4 summarises the previous research mapped to the common problems. 
 
Common problems 
with security 
warnings 
Proposed solutions 
Attention towards 
warnings 
Bravo Lillo et al. (2011b), Raja et al. (2009), Nodder 
(2005), Keukelaere et al. (2009), Raja et al. (2011), 
Maurer et al. (2011) and Hardee et al. (2006). 
Understanding of 
warnings 
Bravo Lillo et al. (2011b), Raja et al. (2009), Nodder 
(2005), Keukelaere et al. (2009), Kauer et al. (2012), 
Edwards et al. (2007), Bravo Lillo et al. (2011), Raja et 
al. (2011), Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón (2007), 
Hardee et al. (2006) and stoll et al. (2008). 
Use of technical Bravo Lillo et al. (2011b), Raja et al. (2009), Nodder 
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Common problems 
with security 
warnings 
Proposed solutions 
wordings (2005), Keukelaere et al. (2009), Raja et al (2011) and 
Hardee et al (2006). 
Evaluation of risks 
from warnings 
Bravo Lillo et al. (2011b), Raja et al. (2009), Nodder 
(2005), Keukelaere et al. (2009), Kauer et al. (2012), 
Maurer et al. (2011), Raja et al. (2011) and Stoll et al. 
(2008). 
User’s motivation 
towards heeding 
warnings 
Bravo Lillo et al. (2011b), Bravo Lillo et al. (2011), Raja 
et al. (2011) and Stoll et al. (2008). 
User’s assessment 
of the implication of 
warnings 
Bravo Lillo et al. (2011b), Raja et al. (2011), Brustoloni & 
Villamarín-Salomón (2007), Villamarín-Salomón & 
Brustoloni (2010) and Stoll et al. 2008). 
Table 2.4: Common problems with security warnings and proposed solutions 
 
In general, there are four classification approaches of how security warnings can be 
improved.  The first classification is “redesign the warnings by utilising the features and 
available information in the warnings” in which security warnings are enhanced with 
suitable used of icons, words, colours, technical jargon and useful information to 
comprend the meaning of the warning.  Most of the researchers realised that the 
available features on security warnings should be utilised and used accordingly 
(McDougald & Wogalter 2011, Hardee et al. 2006, Whalen & Inkpen 2005 and Kauer 
et al. 2012).  However, this approach is unlikely to succeed by itself due to the issue of 
habituation where users have been exposed to similar warnings.  The second 
classification is “redesign the warnings by behaviour modification” aimed at enganging 
users to make more appropriate secure decisions.  Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011b) claimed his 
mental model warning response behaviour is useful to differentiate between how 
advanced and novice users think about security wanrnings.  Camp (2009) also agreed 
that it is important to understand the mentak model so behaviour could be modified to 
improve communication about computer security risks.  Although it is essential to 
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modify the behaviour, it is better if it can be done with other approach to support one 
and another.  
 
The third classification is “redesign the warnings by changing the presentation or 
layout”.  Raja et al. 2009 improved firewall warnings by revealing the hidden context 
with their interface design.  Later, they produce a novel approach to designing firewall 
warnings using a physical security metaphor in which it conveyed the risks and 
encouraged safe behaviour when compared to standard warnings (Raja et al. 2011).  
Stoll et al. (2008) introduced a new dimension of security user interface called Sesame 
where the background system is visualised to end-users so that they can see the 
background process for better understanding.  However, the layout or interface changes 
can only work in best condition providing that the attributes involved are understood so 
that users will be able to comprehend the risk involved (Hardee et al. 2006 and Sharek 
et al. 2008). 
  
The final classification is “redesign the warnings by the adaptation of warnings”.  
Instead of changing the layout or presentation, the warnings can be adapted to match the 
end-users requirements.  Keukelaere et al. 2009 introduced a new approach which 
combined a new architecture and a new method to communicate using security 
dialogues called Adaptive Security Dialogs (ASD).  To the best of their knowledge, no 
previous study had addressed the various level of user risk and correspondingly adapted 
to their dialogues implementation.  In Adaptive Security Dialogs (ASD), the adaptation 
of warning dialogs was based on the level of user risk.  Security warning dialogs layout 
were presented differently based on the type of the file.  For instance files with an .exe 
extension will be treated differently to those with a .pdf extension (i.e. where in this 
case the adaptation involve was based on the risk of file type). 
 
Although most of these proposed solutions were proved to work effectively, none of 
them were perfect.  They either required a combination approach from others to support 
or it can only solve the problems at that particular time (i.e. only during their 
experiments or users study).  Given the problems and proposed solutions regarding 
common security warning issues as shown in Table 2.4, suitable approach from Figure 
2.17 should be determined to further this research.  The state of the art in security 
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warnings study is to ensure that warnings play a vital role in order to warn users about 
possible dangers and to promote safe actions.  In addition, it should be able to advise the 
users on the current contexts of the warnings which users are facing.  It can be seen that 
as a possible solution to further this research is the combination of approaches in the 
preceding sections.   
 
The absence of a focus on the design of a meaningful approach as a mean of a new way 
interaction (framework/architecture) to provide an effective security warnings design to 
suit end-users need is clear.  Only one previous study has highlighted this and focused 
on security dialogs.  Given the facts that the author shared similar underlying intention 
to improve security warnings in the security dialogues context, the author will produce 
his own architecture based on the previous implementation of ASD as the basis of study.   
As the security warnings in dialogue boxes continue to be used as the medium of 
interaction to deliver warnings and information, this context is adopted as the main 
focus of this study.  McGrath et al. (2006) argues that dialogue boxes tend to be 
ineffective in informing the user about threat and practicing safe behaviour.  Krol et al. 
(2012) conclude that security warnings in this form are largely ineffective.  Whilst the 
continuous problems still exists, to date, warning dialogue box are still used as a vital 
form of context (Microsoft 2010).  In addition, end-users encounter many versions of 
dialogues boxes via web browsers that became a popular target for criminal to exploits 
the vulnerabilities (Symantec 2012).  The impact of users’ decisions and choices in 
response to such dialogues may significantly impact the security and the protection of 
computer systems.  If a wrong decision is made, then it could jeopardise the security of 
the computer as a whole (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availability).  From the 
author’s experiences and observations, most security warnings presented whilst using 
computer are in dialogue box contexts, regardless of any software or applications used.  
Users are likely to be more familiar with dialogue box contexts, as they appear more 
frequently than other types of context.  As the dialogues boxes are particularly prevalent 
for computer users, this are will be further investigated as the focal point of study.   
 
To be precise, in Adaptive Security Dialogs (ASD), the adaptations of warnings 
dialogues were based on the level of user risks.  However, in the new proposed 
architecture more information is given to users by utilising the help function on security 
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warnings.  Thus, warnings will be presented to users based on their preferences rather 
than having a standard version unless it has been chosen by users in the first place.  This 
work opens a new dimension of how security warnings can be improved by addressing 
their own design principle and creating warning interface based on end-users needs.  
The issues that need further research and focus can be listed under the following areas: 
 
i. Understanding the current trend of security warnings  
ii. Usability aspects of security warnings 
iii. Utilising the available features and available information 
iv. Usable help technique 
 
Although many problems faced by the end-users in relation to security warnings have 
been highlighted in the preceding section, it is useful to gather some more evidence to 
see the latest trend from the end-users and to determine if the problems still persist.  
This also gives more opportunity to ask alternative questions and to aim for different 
types of participants (i.e. can be based by gender, age, location, nationalities and 
security experiences).  Then, an exploration on usability aspects will be given to the 
more specific types of warnings (i.e. security warnings dialogues) to assess users’ 
understanding, effectiveness and efficiency of warnings and finally users’ satisfaction.  
This should provide solid evidence of how end-users perceive warnings in daily routine 
activities in relation to usability. 
 
One of the possible classification approaches is to utilise the available features and 
available information.  At this stage, all features in the security warning must clearly 
communicate to the end-users especially in relation to the risk they they encounter.  
Probing end-users’ thoughts about what features or information are easily understood or 
cause confusion will help to find a possible way of improving security warnings.  
Finally, to provide a proper help which will be better than the available conventional 
help function in current security warnings (e.g. via link or button).  It can be seen that 
little effort has been invested or given to the usage of help function in one particular 
warning.    Normally, upon clicking this function, users will be guided with some useful 
information about current state of the applications.  According to Herzog & Shahmehri 
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(2007) online help is among the prominent user help techniques in many applications.  
When pressing the help button, users will be presented with a dialogue box window 
with useful information.  As this states, the only guidance that users can rely on is the 
help function.   Help functions become the only source available to help users in 
decision making process or comprehend them with current problems they encounters 
(i.e. in the dialogue box contexts).  Herzog & Shahmehri (2007) made a table 
comparison on usable help technique, as presented in Table 2.5.  They claim that these 
were the important criteria that arose in applications and from the context when one 
particular security system can be called usable.  The series of ten questions originally 
derived from Baecker et al. (1991) were used to answers questions that always 
pondering end-users mind upon receiving warnings.  These questions were normally 
asked by the users as generally were the sets of questions that always pondering in users’ 
mind when using one particular application.  
 
 
Table 2.5: Which user questions can be answered by which user help technique 
originally by Herzog & Shahmehri (2007). 
 
Table 2.5 was amended with the additional field of “combined approach”.  The grey box 
indicated as unable to answer the question whilst the white colour box indicated as “Yes” 
or “Maybe”.  On the right hand side (i.e. in a blue colour box) is the additional 
information noted as “maybe” which is one of the focus of this thesis.  This thesis made 
use of all possible approaches to answer the listed questions, based on the new security 
CHAPTER 2: USERS INTERACTION WITH SECURITY TOOLS AND 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
 
 
58 
warning presented in the evaluation and validation process later on.  The possible 
approach here can be referred to method to improve warning layout in order to provide 
all answers based on the depicted questions.  It is not necessarily rely on the questions 
and answers type of interaction.  However, some other useful techniques are considered 
(e.g. expressing the warnings using signal words and icons, usage of colours to get 
attention, explained technical jargons to avoid confusion, tooltips information to 
provide quick information and explaining resources using a simple expression).   
 
By using the new approach, it is expected that it can covers all questions features as 
presented, and even be able to improve the quality of warning presentation and usability 
of security warnings.  As presented on Table 2.5, the “combined approach” field was 
highlighted with blue colour background with “Maybe” wording to indicate the 
possibility of the proposed technique is workable (i.e. which will be conducted at the 
final stage of user studies). 
 
Evidences suggested that changes on warning design significantly able to improve 
warnings implementation.  The design changes can be a novel solution to provide users 
with information and secure decision making process.  Therefore, enhancing usability in 
the context of security warnings is needed.  This is because problems with usability will 
identify the difficulty to interact with computer system from the end-users perspective 
in relation to the cause, location and the explanation that derived from the interface 
(Cockton et al. 1999).  Therefore, this thesis seeks to investigate further all four 
elements mentioned earlier.  A series of user studies is presented in the next few 
chapters to further clarify, answers and improve the current implementation of security 
warning (i.e. thus answer the “combined approach” as mentioned). 
 
2.15 Study approach  
 
This thesis seeks to focus on security warning dialogues in web browsers.  Having 
assessed all evidences in the preceding sections, the author made use the ‘Human threat 
identification and mitigation process’ (Cranor, 2008) as initial guidance, as depicted in 
Figure 2.12.  In this process, Human in the Loop (HITL) framework was introduced in 
the Failure Identification process.  As HITL was developed to focus on security 
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communications (i.e. warning dialogue, notices, status indicators, training and policies), 
it similarly suit with author focus on security warning dialogues.  Thus, this thesis will 
use a similar approach as the basis to identify problems that users encountered whilst 
dealing with system security and then mitigate the risks using a propose technique.  
Based on Cranor’s approach in the aforementioned section, some amendments have 
been made in order to suit the aims of this study, as presented in Figure 2.18.  The 
amendments were based on the rationale that on every task involves it should be at least 
user study been conducted (i.e. except in task automation).  This is to ensure that there 
are sequence and consistency in conducting the research study.  In addition, usable help 
technique and Microsoft Guideline also had been used as the basis and to support the 
user studies.  The author believes that these two additional elements are essential in 
order to provide some guidance on elements that should be considered in improving 
security warnings. 
 
Figure 2.18: Amendments of human threat identification and mitigation process 
Table 2.6 further explains the approach that has been taken based on four conducted 
user studies:  
 
Phases Descriptions 
Task Identification This stage identifies systems that rely on humans to 
perform security-related function.  User study 1 was 
conducted to understand in more detail the problems 
that end-users can face related to usability and 
perception of information security issues.  Further 
details are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Task Automation This stage tried to find methods to partially or fully 
automate the security-related function.  As this research 
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Phases Descriptions 
focuses on security warning dialogues where user 
intervention is necessary to make a secure decision, 
this stage will not form part of the focus.    
Failure Identification This stage tried to find ways on how end-users can be 
better supported in terms of handling security warnings.  
HITL here is basically the framework that been 
proposed by Cranor (2008).  This thesis determines to 
use this framework by asking users’ series of questions 
(i.e. as shown in Table 2.2) in user study two and three.  
Based on the compilation of evidence presented from 
user studies one to three, the author is able to identify 
the problems of computer warnings and proposed 
possible solution in Chapter 6.   
Failure Mitigation  This stage tries to find method to prevent problems 
occurring.  One useful approached was presented in 
Table 2.5.  Using this approach and the proposed new 
method (i.e. automated adaptation of security 
warnings), this thesis seeks to improve the presentation 
of security warnings (as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).  
Table 2.6: Human threat identification and mitigation with the propose study 
 
2.16 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has highlighted users’ interactions with security tools and technologies and 
approaches related to security warnings studies.  It covers the overall background 
studies of security, usability, perception, trust, HCI and GUI.  Security and usability 
becomes the focal point when assessing the users’ interactions with security tools and 
technologies.  With many new threats, it indicates the need to ensure that end-users are 
able to interact with such tools in a secure manner.  It can be concluded that most of the 
researchers have used various method to improve security warning and even some 
relatively propose a new concept (i.e. matching complexity of risks, security automation, 
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rewarded security behaviour, mental model).  Thus, there is no specific single method 
that has become mandatory for developers to use.   
 
Problems with regard to usability remain one of the concerns that affect users’ 
understanding upon dealing with security tools and technologies.  The fast pace of 
technological growth has forced users to keep up to date, which is generally 
cumbersome for laymen or non-technical savvy groups.  Therefore, Human Computer 
Interaction with the usage of Graphical User Interface (HCI) is readily available as a 
mediator between user and machine (i.e. present instruction and information in acquit 
manner).  A significant aspect of usability is when users have to make a decision.  A 
significant type of decision that they have to make is when the system issues them with 
computer warnings, because their impact on the decision may be significantly greater 
where security and protection of the system and information are concerned.   
 
Motivated by the results from other researchers to improve security warnings, this thesis 
makes use of the approach in the aforementioned section, and conducted series of user 
studies to further explore security warnings in details.  User study 1 is presented to 
examine general understanding in terms of usability and perception as a basis of study 
(i.e. explained in Chapter 3).  Even though in the earlier section, the problems with 
security warnings had been highlighted, the author would like to conduct again a survey 
(user study 1) with the aims to gather the latest evidences from end-users experiences.  
In addition, the survey will be able to cater different demographic and scenarios facing 
by them.  On the other hand, user study 2 and 3 focus on assessing users’ understanding 
about security warning in practical and wider contexts (i.e. explained in Chapter 4 and 
5).  To be precise, user study 2 is focused on the experiences that the users had with the 
software to capture the security warning (i.e. dialogue box context) manually and 
gathered evidence on what they understand about the features of particular security 
warnings.  It can be confirm that based on the author knowledge, this approach has not 
been conducted before by researchers in security warnings.  The author uses this 
approach with the rationale to gather real exposure on what end-users belief on security 
warnings.  This would be useful to strengthen the findings on the problem that end-users 
encountered with security warnings.  User study 3 confirms whether information 
presented on the warnings are enough for them to make a decision in real-time context.  
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It gives end-users real-time experience to express their satisfaction whilst dealing with 
security warnings.  Finally, based on the outcomes of the series of user studies, the new 
architecture namely Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) was developed to 
enhance current security warning implementation with the similar underlying as in the 
ASD implementation (i.e. explained in further detail in Chapter 6) and later, the 
evaluation with regards to the usability will be conducted as a final stage (i.e. further 
discussion in Chapter 7). 
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3 Examination of Comprehensibility of Issues in Information 
Security  
3.1 Introduction 
 
It is useful to gather information from an end-user’s perspective when dealing with 
computer tools and technologies so that a clear understanding of their perception and 
knowledge on issues of information security in general can be gathered as the 
foundation of this research.  In general, people tend to think that they are not at risk 
from any particular hazard and they choose what to fear and how much to fear with it 
(Oltedal et al. 2004).  A survey study has been the preferred research tool of many 
scholars for initial research to establish the basis or foundation in most user studies 
(Stanton et al. 2005, Furnell et al. 2006, Jones et al. 2007 and Mannan & Van Oorschot 
2008).  To determine the nature of the difficulties encountered by users, this chapter 
presents a survey study aimed at examining the perception and usability of information 
security, with security warning contexts being the focus of scenarios (i.e. phishing 
warning and dialogue box warning).  This survey then became the basis for conducting 
practical trials in the later stages of the research. 
  
This chapter describes a general investigation on the general and specific issues of 
computer security issues.  The issues raised include the general usage of the computer, 
operating systems, usability, computer protection and case studies using a security 
warning dialogue interface from different web browsers.  These identify insights 
regarding the problems that end-users usually face, and some potential solutions.  Some 
users demonstrated that they knew how to make a decision, whilst others did not.  Users 
are the people who use security technologies and a standard should be implemented that 
are usable and works efficiently.  Having said this, many issues were raised in terms of 
how users reflect on the usage of such features, for instance security notification for 
users to make decisions.  Security notifications are used to inform users about any 
possible computer problems that users need to address.  In order to avoid incorrect or 
dangerous decisions, end-users need to understand the context of the problem before 
they make a decision as a wrong decision could jeopardise the security and protection of 
the computer.  Furnell et al. (2006b) listed a series of common problems with regards to 
the usage of security features such as usage of technical terminology, unclear 
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functionality, lack of visible status, forcing uninformed decision and lack of integration.  
This highlighted that end-users face real difficulties caused by the design and 
implementation of security warnings.  
 
Every web browser has a different method to present warnings.  Thus, people who use 
different web browsers have to deal with different types of security warnings.  Laymen 
will often face a dilemma when they are forced to make a decision that they do not 
understand.  They use Internet security packages to protect their computer from 
malicious attacks, but managing the application by themselves is not an easy task.  
Whilst they may be aware that security updates/patches are available for them to 
download manually or automatically, they may refuse this, as they do not know how to 
do this or they do not realise the importance of doing it.  By explaining such incidents, 
this study seeks to clarify potential problems that users face, based on the scenario study 
presented in the survey, in terms of how they perceive the security features, the decision 
making process, and the usability of such technologies.  It is seen as essential from the 
author point of views to understand end-users’ preliminary insights, so as to identify 
potential issues that can be raised for further investigation.     
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
This study emphasizes issues regarding perception and usability in information security.  
For the purposes of current research, an online survey using a questionnaire has been 
used to analyse and to understand usability and people’s perceptions with regard to 
information security issues.  This method was easy to implement and it was easy to 
gauge people’s attention on such issues.  Indeed, the Internet was regarded as a suitable 
platform, as the survey could be conducted online.  The target population of this method 
was based on people who used the computer and Internet anonymously, given the facts 
that people use the Internet everywhere, and at any time.  Once the survey was 
promoted to the intended recipients in general, individuals were able to respond to the 
survey by accessing the website.  From another perspective, the survey method research 
aimed to gauge the subjective feelings of people with respect to specific studies (Fowler 
1993).  In addition, the survey was seen as useful where information could not be 
observed directly (Balnaves & Caputi 2001).  Thomas (2003) claimed that the survey 
CHAPTER 3: EXAMINATION OF COMPREHENSIBILITY OF ISSUES IN 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
 
 
 
67 
was a method to gather information from the target variables within a particular 
collectivity and then reporting a findings summary.  According to Oppenheim (1996), a 
questionnaire may be considered to be an important instrument of a research where it 
became a tool for data collection.  Many previous studies have used the questionnaire as 
a method to gather information, using self-administered, postal questionnaires and even 
an online version.  Having said this, it may be noted that a questionnaire using the 
Internet was not expensive, leading to quicker feedback and less missing data (Nowack 
1997, Stanton 1998 and Weible & Wallace 1998).  This method may be seen to measure 
data quantitatively, and respondents were directed to answer section by section.  With 
respect to the previous study conducted, it is fair to consider the survey as a practical 
method for this study purpose.            
 
The survey in this chapter was designed for adult participation, targeting participants 18 
years old and above only.  The survey was approved by the Ethics Committee of 
Plymouth University to ensure the confidentiality and respondents were treated 
anonymously during collection, storage and publication of material.  The ethical 
principle governing data collection was that no harm should come to the respondents as 
the outcomes of their participation in the study.  The subjects were recruited via an e-
mail, predominantly targeting students in Plymouth University as well as friends and 
relative.  The Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
and International Student Advisory Service (ISAS) website had advertised the survey.  
In addition, a news entry for the staff and student portal had been used to inform general 
users to participate in this study.  The target population of this study was based on 
people that used Internet.  The survey was conducted using online questionnaire with 
open and closed-ended questions with multiple choices of answers.  However, in order 
to analyse certain issues in depth, the study will also be conducted using open-ended 
style of questions to address some issues, especially users’ ideas in taking certain 
actions.  (Please note that all details of this particular survey are provided in Appendix 
A). 
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3.3 Study design 
 
In order to determine users’ perceptions relating to issues of information security 
usability issues in information security, a survey was conducted to investigate 
preliminary insights from users regarding their level of understanding of particular 
issues in relation to the security of their computer systems.  The survey was conducted 
online between February-March 2010, and promoted to the end user community via e-
mail, word of mouth and news entry information on the university’s intranet website.  
This survey consisted of 41 questions, offering both open and closed responses.  
Respondents were not obliged to answer all the questions, as some of them were 
conditional.  The survey was divided into 4 sections: 
 
i. Section 1 
Background/demographic - Overview of users' background (i.e. gender, 
education background, occupation, computing skills and perceptions of 
computer security). 
ii. Section 2 
General usage of computer and operating systems - Analysis of users’ 
experiences in using the Internet and operating system, as well as more general 
computer security concerns 
iii. Section 3 
Usability and protection - Analysis of users’ understanding of issues of 
usability and protection in relation to malware, security applications, security 
updates and trust.  This section required respondents to identify features from a 
diagram in order to determine what they understood about those features. 
iv. Section 4 
Computer scenario study – Analysis of users’ understanding of computer 
security issues was based on their past experience and their knowledge of how 
to deal with information security by using a security warning dialogue box.  
 
(Note: All figures and tables within this chapter had been analysed using a 
descriptive statistical analysis) 
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3.3.1 Study participants 
 
Overall, 784 responses were submitted to the website; however, only 564 were fully 
completed, representing a 72% completion rate.  This provided a good basis for the 
subsequent analysis, although it should be noted that due to rounding, the values 
presented in the study and some of the later discussion do not total 100%.  All of the 
figures and percentages reported were based upon the proportions of respondents in this 
study.  Participants in this study were required to fill in the consent form and agree to 
participate in this study.  The responses were treated as confidential at all times, and 
data was presented in such a way that users’ identity could not be connected with 
specific published data.  Participants were free to withdraw from the survey at any time. 
 
3.3.2 Section 1: Background and demographic 
 
This section consisted of 7 questions.  The survey resulted in almost an equal split 
between male and female, with a range of ages as depicted in Figure 3.1.  In terms of 
age, 67% of the respondents were below 30 years old, which indicated they were likely 
to have  grown up in the information, communication and technology era, 26% aged 31-
40 and only 7 % aged above 50.   The education profiles of the group are shown in 
Figure 3.2.  It should be noted that more than 90% of overall respondents demonstrated 
a high level of achievement in their education.  This suggests that a large proportion of 
studies have been conducted within academia pathways.    
 
 
Figure 3.1: Age profile of the respondent group 
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 Figure 3.2: Respondents by educational background 
 
With regard to their computing skills, the respondents rated themselves as advanced 
(47%), intermediate (39%), expert (12%) and the remainder as beginner (2%).  Users 
demonstrated their awareness of the usage of computing in general and this correlated 
with their educational background.  As pictured in Figure 3.3, the vast majority of 
respondents were very familiar with computing technology, with over 95% of the 
respondents claiming to have been using their computer for more than five years.  This 
was not a surprising finding, as users are now using the computer and Internet in their 
daily live for working purposes and online transaction, amongst others. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Computing experience 
 
Before focusing upon the specific issues in information security, the questionnaire 
attempted to gauge the respondents’ level of concern with respect to computer security.  
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Based on Figure 3.4, the majority of respondents were seen to be very concerned about 
the issue of computer security.  23% claimed to be mildly concerned and 1% showing 
‘uncertain states’.  It would perhaps have been more useful if this study had been able to 
probe what made them choose this option.  On the other hand, 5% of respondents were 
not concerned with the issues, with the majority of them claiming to be intermediate and 
advanced level respectively.   
 
Figure 3.4: Level of concern on computer security 
 
3.3.3 Section 2: General usage of computer and operating systems 
 
The Internet has become a new form of communication, source of information and tool 
of entertainment.  Having understood that, this survey examined end-users patterns in 
terms of usage of the Internet.  This revealed that 84% of respondents demonstrated a 
high level of experience in using Internet for more than six years, 5-6 years (11%), 1-4 
years (5.3%) and less than a year (0.1%).  When considering the respondents’ primary 
operating system, the majority claimed to use Windows XP (44%), Windows Vista 
(30%), Windows 7 (17%) and others as depicted respectively in Figure 3.5.  It may be 
noted here that Microsoft products were still among the most popular operating system 
among end- users (representing over 90%).  Surprisingly, some users still used a 
“previous windows version” such as Windows 95, 97, 98 and 2000.  To this extent, 
users demonstrated their ability to identify their operating system, as this was a vital 
component for any computer.  Indeed, it became an interface between computer and 
supporting hardware and software.  Without it, the computer would malfunction and 
users would be unable to use it accordingly.    
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Figure 3.5:  Primary operating system. 
 
Users were likely to be exposed to many potential threats if they did not update their 
security patches.  As Figure 3.6 shows, 68% of overall respondents ranked this as “it is 
important” and “it is very important” whilst 25% considered that “it is mildly 
important”.  It should be noted that whilst the majority of respondents showed their 
concern about this issue, 7% of respondents’ claimed it was “not important at all” and “I 
don’t know”.  This finding also suggests that most of these respondents were from the 
intermediate and advanced group.  Even though users claimed that they were at a high 
level of expertise on computing skills, they were likely not to be concerned about taking 
action to update their operating system.  It is essential for users to update their security 
patches in order to fix bugs or any security issues before problems start to occur.  
 
On the other hand, users demonstrated that they were more aware of any issues relating  
to computer security in general as portrayed in Figure 3.4, compared to specific issues 
liked operating a system update.  This may be viewed in Figure 3.6 where the 
percentage of “important” and “very important” was slightly lesser.  7% of respondents 
chose “not important at all” and “I don’t know”.  It may be assumed that end-users 
might assume that operating system did not have direct impact on security issues, as it is 
something that operates in the background.  However in reality, the operating system 
serves a core function in order for the computer to operate.          
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Figure 3.6:  Concern on updating operating system 
 
After understanding their concern regarding updating the operating system, the 
following question determined how users updated them.  This updates helped users in 
dealing with bugs, security vulnerabilities and secure critical infrastructure (Bellissimo 
et al. 2006).  As depicted in Figure 3.7, the results revealed that 89% of respondents’ 
updated automatically and manually, 9% did not update at all and 2% did not know.  
The minority of 9% who did not update at all were from intermediate and advanced 
users.  Surprisingly, there was a user that claimed to be an expert, but still did not know 
his/her method of updating the operating system.      
 
Figure 3.7:  Method to update their operating system 
 
Using security software is vital for users, whether at home or within an organisation.  
According to Richardson (2008), more than 95% of organisations use security 
technologies (i.e. anti-virus and Internet security package) to scan for malware, filter 
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incoming e-mail, and protect their website from any possible threats.  A similar line of 
research by PWC (2008) also presented similar results based on organisations in United 
Kingdom.  Therefore, it was important to ask respondents for their acceptance and 
usage of security software products.  The majority 86% of respondents used security 
software in their computer, while 14% of respondents claimed that they were not using 
security software, or did not know about it.  A vast majority of the 14% of respondents 
were intermediate, advanced and even expert users.  Some users argued that they did not 
use security software, as they were not using a Microsoft operating system such as 
Linux and Mac OS X.  They claimed that by using this version of the operating system, 
they would not have to be afraid of becoming victims of malware attacks.  Their 
behaviour might lead them to catastrophic results (i.e. by becoming a victim of malware 
attack).   This was a somewhat interesting finding in terms of how users perceived the 
acceptance of the importance of security.         
 
The next question asked users about their security vendor.  Based on the current trend, it 
can be noted that Kaspersky, AVG, McAfee, Norton, Avast and Avira were amongst the 
most commonly used security software.  With regard to the survey findings, Kaspersky 
became the most popular vendor, with 30% of respondents choosing it.  One reason that 
led to these results was that this survey was well promoted within the university 
environment.  More specifically, Kaspersky was used as the main security software for 
the university, which might reflect positively in the outcome of the survey.  One 
noteworthy findings based on Table 3.1, was that 7 respondents in which represented 1% 
claimed they were unsure of their security software vendors, with 5 of respondents 
claiming to be advanced and expert users.  Based on this scenario, the majority of 
respondents were able to identify their security vendor, which indicated their knowledge 
of knowing one particular security vendor in the market.  However, it did not guarantee 
them to use the security tool effectively.  It may be noted that users were allowed to 
choose more than one security vendors.  Therefore, the overall total of participants and 
percentages did not represent 564 respondents and 100% respectively.     
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Table 3.1: Preferred security vendor 
 
For the following question, users responded in regards to the type of security products 
they used (i.e. they were allowed to choose more than one option).  Overall, 70% of 
respondents used antivirus software, 51% used Internet security packages and 38% used 
anti-spyware software, 9% used zone alarm firewall, 4% used mobile security, with the 
remainder as depicted in Figure 3.8.  As users were able to choose more than one option 
with this particular question, they might not realise that choosing an Internet security 
package meant that they were obliged to choose antivirus and antispyware.  Most 
security software vendors embedded many other security tools in a bundle or package 
so that it would be easier to use, rather than purchasing separately.  Further assessment 
with regards to the usage of Internet security will be discussed in section 3, based on 
Figure 3.15.    
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Figure 3.8: Usage on types of security software products 
 
Having established the idea of security protection for users’ computers, the survey 
asked the respondents about their usage of their preferred web browser.  Various web 
browsers are on the market, and each of the browsers has a different method of security 
implementation.  The survey used six main web browsers as sample case studies (i.e. 
Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer 8, Internet Explorer 7, Opera, Safari and Google 
Chrome).  The study revealed that 47% of respondents used Mozilla Firefox as their 
preferred web browser, compared to 12% of Internet Explorer 7 and 17% of Internet 
Explorer 8 respectively, as depicted in Figure 3.9.  Interestingly, 1% of users suggested 
Flock as his/her preferred web browser (i.e. a new web browser which specializing for 
social networking).   
 
From these results, it may be noted that 2% of respondent still did not know their 
preferred web browser.  It may be speculated that these respondents did not prefer to use 
one specific browser, and might indeed use different browsers at any time.  According 
to W3schools (2010), Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer remain among the most 
popular website chosen by the users.  Interestingly, this study presented a similar pattern 
of results.  It may be noted that the survey was well promoted in Plymouth University 
surrounding, so that the result might reflects the outcome of high percentage of users 
using Internet Explorer (i.e. 39% of respondents chose Internet Explorer 7 and 8).   
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In the previous section, the majority of participants also demonstrated that they 
preferred to use Windows operating system.  This might reflects the 37% of Internet 
Explorer browsers chosen by the participants as well, because this browser was 
automatically embedded in the computer system.   
 
From different viewpoints, it may be seen that even though this survey was well 
promoted in the university’s environment, surprisingly majority of respondents did not 
choose it as their preferred one but Mozilla Firefox became more dominant.  These 
results also indicate that end-users (i.e. which is not from university’s environment) 
significantly contributed to the overall results, which covered other distinct overall 
population.       
 
Figure 3.9:  Preferred web browser 
 
3.3.4 Section 3: Usability and protection 
 
In this section, focus was accorded to the usability of security warning and issues on 
computer protection.  Having established the idea of preferred web browser, the survey 
then asked respondents, based on a scenario study with regards to the e-mail, to activate 
a banking account (i.e. phishing warning).  Every respondent received a different 
security warning based on their chosen web browser in the earlier questions.  When they 
received this message, they had to make a decision by choosing their response to the e-
mail message.  (as shown in Appendix A).  The majority of respondents (67% on 
average) decided to close the web browser.  Generally, it was a good approach to deal 
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with this scenario.  It was expected that users would be aware of what was going on and 
had their own rationale based on their decision (i.e. security awareness).  Trying to find 
more information about the meaning of the message became the second most popular 
question answered by most of respondents.  It may be noted that users had the 
capabilities to gather further information about the problems or risks that they 
encountered before decision was made, and this indicated that they would be able to 
behave in a secure manner.  
 
A somewhat surprising finding here was that in every type of web browser, a small 
percentage of respondents claimed that they ignored the warning and proceed with the 
transaction.  In real scenario, this warning was actually derived from a real phishing e-
mail.  The message might look as though it came from a legitimate source.  Users 
became a victim once they responded to the e-mail link (i.e. provided they give their 
details to activate their online banking).  The e-mail usually would inform the users that 
they are facing problems with their bank account, and would later direct users to take 
remedial action by entering personal information on the illegitimate website (Irani et al. 
2008).  On the other hand, some respondents stated that they did not click the link at all, 
and called the bank to get clarification, finding ways to report the problem and shut 
down their system/network.  Even though the percentage of end-users’ misbehaviour 
was not really high, it still indicated that they might become the victim of such attacks.  
These findings were also able to reveal that users demonstrated an ability to use other 
medium to ascertain the problem that they had encountered, so that possible precautions 
could be put in place.     
 
After assessing users’ responses towards phishing warnings, the next question attempted 
to assess users’ general understanding on the security warning that appeared in previous 
section (i.e. phishing warning).  Picking up from the findings, 75% of respondents 
understood the information provided in the security warning, whilst leaving a quarter of 
them with the dilemma of “No” and “I don’t know”.  Having established the general 
understanding of information, the questionnaire attempted to reveal the reasons for not 
understanding the information provided on the security warning.  
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It is essential to gain a clear perspective from the end-users in order to improve the 
warning presentation in general.  This study reveals that 62% of respondents who 
answered “No” claimed they were facing difficulties understanding the security warning 
information provided because of technical terminology, the nature of the event being 
described and the available choices, as illustrated in Figure 3.10.  A further line of 
research highlighted similar finding regarding the obstacles to understanding security 
technologies that rely on language and terminology being used (Furnell et al. 2006). 
 
Figure 3.10: Reason on difficulty to understand the security warning 
 
The questionnaire then revealed users’ belief as to the reasons why the security warning 
would have appeared.  This question was based on previous security screenshot on 
phishing warning.  People who answered on their preferred web browser were 
compulsory to answer this question.  The finding revealed that 73% agreed that the 
website is linked to fraudulent activity, 30% said that the website contained viruses, 23% 
said the website contained inappropriate materials and the remainder as pictured 
accordingly in Figure 3.11.  Even though only 4 % of total respondents said they did not 
know about the reason why the message appeared, this small percentage indicated end-
users can simply be the potential victims of the threats. Furthermore, this fraudulent 
activity became more popular, as the e-mail message presented tended to look 
legitimate and end-users were baffled as to how to make a decision on such incidents.   
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Figure 3.11: Belief regarding the security warning that appeared 
 
The next question sought to gather evidence as to users’ experiences of malware attacks.  
According to Noreen et al. (2009), computer malware became a major threat to 
computer network and systems since 1990s and malware sophistication had 
significantly improved to trick the end-users. Seven types of malware/threats were 
presented, as depicted in Figure 3.12.  The majority of the respondents have had 
experience with spam (93%).  Surprisingly, 4% of those who had used computers did 
not know about spam.  A vast number of percentage (more than 70%) of respondents 
had also had experienced with viruses, worms, trojans and spyware. However, it was 
completely different for phishing, as indicated only 48% of respondents had 
experienced with it.  In spite of the fact that phishing was a simple social engineering 
attack, it proved to be surprisingly effective, as a number of phishing scams continually 
grow and the costs of resulting damage was increasing (Raffetseder et al. 2007).  A 
somewhat surprising findings on experienced with unauthorized access attempt as it was 
equal to 37% respectively for people who have experienced with and not experienced.  
Almost one third of respondents also claimed that they never heard of it.  It may be seen 
that some of the malware terminology sounded technical and odd, which might 
contribute to uncertainty where a particular threat was encountered.  
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Figure 3.12: Experienced with malware/threats 
 
The end user is the locus of threats.  They are the people who are always baffled, face a 
dilemma and end up by becoming victims.  After understanding respondents’ 
experience on malware, the questionnaire attempted to reveal how users’ response by 
possibility of becoming a victim of malicious attack or cybercrime.   Overall, 50% of 
respondents agreed that they were only visited the website that they familiar with, 49% 
used Internet security package, 21% not changed their attitude, 3% went online less 
often and the remainder as depicted in Figure 3.13.  It can be noted that even only 3% 
said that they went online less often, it did not solved the problem from possibility 
becoming a victim in cybercrime or malicious attack.  Without knowledge and 
awareness to deal with the threats, they are likely to be the victims again in future.  This 
survey had similar findings based on a study conducted by Symantec (2009).   
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Figure 3.13: Behaviour towards the usage of computer security through the 
possibility of becoming a victim of malicious attack or cybercrime 
 
In the aforementioned question, the survey asked respondents about their usage of 
security software.  It was significant to ask them type of security software which they 
used to examine their understanding level of its usage.  In aforementioned question 
section 1 on usage of security software, 86% of respondents were using security 
software. Having said this, most of respondents agreed they have installed with 
antivirus application compared to other security software as pictured in Figure 3.14.  
Interestingly, whether users realized it or not, most of mentioned security software had 
been embedded in the Internet security package and even some in Antivirus software.  
The mean value (average) of users who installed all of these security applications was 
59%.  This revealed that even though 86% of total respondents knew they had installed 
security software in their computer, only 59% of them really realised types of security 
application they have in their usage software.  From the figure as well, it can be noted 
that 73% of respondents did not know about parental control features.  From author 
observations, mostly parental controls had been embedded in the Internet security 
package instead of general Antivirus product.  Among all of these security applications, 
intrusion detection system and anti-phishing were the most popular choice for the 
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respondents attributing “I don’t know” and “never heard of it”. The terminology for the 
intrusion detection system was somewhat difficult for non-technical savvy users so it 
was not a great surprise as the results showed that majority of respondents did not know 
about it.  In general and on balances, intrusion detection system involved in all security 
applications processes.  However, due to its major roles in a critical component in 
network architecture, it even became a foreign concept to many security practitioners 
and systems administrators (Koziol, 2003).  Based on these findings, end-users 
generally demonstrated that they were able to behave accordingly, but some users were 
still unable to act in secure manner (i.e. learn to bypass attack, take risk if necessary, go 
online surfing less often and not committing to any financial or personal information 
related).  To get a better understanding on usage of security software and its application, 
the study determine to ascertain whether users understand on the usage of their security 
software.  Hence, this study made use of the tabulation between usage of security 
software and security applications as depicted in Figure 3.15. 
 
Figure 3.14:  Usage of security applications in their computers 
 
Prior to the findings on Figure 3.8, 60% of respondents used the Internet security 
package as their preferred security product.  The three most popular security 
applications have been compared to the usage of Internet security package.  If users had 
used the Internet security package, all of these three security applications were already 
embedded in the software.   As expected, highly percentage with 99% of respondents 
claimed using Internet security package and had installed anti-virus albeit only 1% said 
no.  For anti-spyware application, 86% had Internet security package and anti-spyware 
application installed in their computer, whilst 14% claimed otherwise and did not know 
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about it.  On the other hand, the results on anti-phishing were not convincing, whilst 
only 54% who claimed to use Internet security package had installed anti-phishing 
leaving 46% with other available options.  
 
Based on these findings, it indicated that some of users still did not understand their 
usage of security software and its functionality.  They claimed they used the security 
software but were failed to demonstrate the usage and presence of specific tools.  Then 
again, users might not aware the existence of this specific tool as the terminology being 
used was cumbersome for them.  When it involved a rigorous process, users chose to 
opt out of learning or aware about it.  As a result, even users claimed they had used 
security software, but in reality they were still in a dubious position about what specific 
tools they had as security software.        
 
Figure 3.15: Users’ claimed using Internet security package vs. claimed installed 
security applications 
 
Having established the usage of security applications, the next question attempted to 
assess method of updating users’ anti-malware tools.  Most of the security applications 
were updated automatically as depicted in Figure 3.16.  However, respondents 
demonstrated that they still wanted to update their anti-malware tools manually as 
depicted accordingly.  It can be noted that most of these anti-malware tools were 
embedded in the Internet security package where once users updated their software; it 
updated every other component as well.  On average, 15% of respondents chose not to 
update their anti-malware tools.  This action was not advisable, because anti-malware 
tools needed to be updated regularly with the most recent security patches.  Failing to 
comply with this might open possible menaces to users.    
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Figure 3.16: Method of updating their anti-malware tools 
 
Finally, the survey assessed users’ awareness in regards to the importance of updating 
their anti-malware protection tools as illustrated in Figure 3.17.  It may be noted here 
that 80% chose “it is very important” and “important”, 12% claimed “mildly important” 
and “not important” and “I don’t know” with 3% and 5% respectively.  In the 
aforementioned question regarding concern on updating operating system, 68% users 
demonstrated that “it is very important” and “important” whilst with anti-malware tool 
the percentage proportion was slightly higher with 80%.  In contrast, a surprisingly high 
proportion of respondents expressed different levels of importance in regards to two 
main security applications, namely the operating system and anti-malware tools.  This 
indicated that many people still did not understand the importance on updating security 
patches on their security applications, regardless of the operating system or anti- 
malware tools.  Securing a computer with updated patches did not guarantee users the 
best security.   However, it promoted good security practice, which might help end-
users reduce the risk of becoming victims of computer threats.     
 
Figure 3.17: Level of concern on updating their anti-malware protection tools. 
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3.3.4.1 Further evaluation – Independent reviews 
 
The author conducted independent reviews, comparing the layout presentation based on 
6 web browsers contexts presented (i.e. Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Safari, 
Internet Explorer 7, Opera and Internet Explorer 8), as shown in Figure 3.18.  Generally, 
this survey presented two types of security warning study (i.e. phishing warning that 
was explained in section 3 and dialogue box warning that was explained in section 4).  
The basis of this review was to assess how security features been presented and used, 
elements that might attract or mislead users and any missing elements.  This was to 
contemplate if current security warnings are able to perform its function, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
 
 
Mozilla Firefox Internet Explorer 7 
 
Internet Explorer 8 
 
Opera 
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Google Chrome 
 
Safari 
Figure 3.18: Screenshot from various web browsers showing a security warning 
having detected a possible phishing website. 
 
It may be noted from Figure 3.18 that the ways in which warning information was 
delivered differed in terms of wordings, colour scheme, available options, technical 
jargon and the design of the warning.  For example, Microsoft improved the phishing 
warning to ensure that end-users were able to comprehend the message accordingly (i.e. 
Internet Explorer 7 to Internet Explorer 8).  Instead of using “This is a reported phishing 
website” terminology, Microsoft changed it to “This website has been reported as 
unsafe”.  This piece of information was presented using simple, plain language without 
using any technical jargon.  The background colour of the warning was also changed to 
red and the option “Continue to this website (not recommended)” was hidden from 
users.  The colour was also able to convey the severity of the risk, whilst recommended 
action was highlighted as the main option.  The author did not further assess the 
effectiveness or efficiency of the changes, but highlighted the different methods of 
presenting phishing warning from different web browsers, as depicted in Table 3.2.  
Based on the author’s knowledge and observations, no other such comparison table has 
been produced. 
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Table 3.2: Comparison of the security warnings from various web browsers (Zaaba et 
al. 2011) 
 
This table comprised five features as the basis of comparison.  These features were 
chosen based on the features commonly presented in security warnings, as referred to in 
Microsoft (2010) guidelines.  It may also be noted that most of these warnings used 
technical terminology to explain the problem that users faced (i.e. phishing, fraud and 
web forgery).  In addition, three common security warning icons were used (i.e. no 
entry, error and warning) and a red background colour predominantly conveyed the 
risks.  Surprisingly 6.5% on average of respondents still decided to close the browser 
and proceed with the warning (i.e. possibility became the phishing attacks).     
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3.3.5 Section 4: computer scenario study 
 
One scenario study related to the security dialogue box (i.e. common security dialogue 
that users’ received.)  In the aforementioned question on section 2, the survey asked 
respondents as to their preferred web browser.  On that basis, the following question 
was asked in order to understand users’ decisions as to the security warning dialogue 
issues (i.e. when downloading application from the website).   According to Farago 
(2010), the BBC (2010), Schonfeld (2010) and the Daily Mail (2012) downloading 
applications, music or software is widely used by end-users whether using mobile phone 
or computer.  Thus, it was relevant to use the security warning dialogue as a scenario for 
examining users’ understanding of the current interface by assuming they would 
download any software from the websites.  In this second scenario, as depicted in 
Figure 3.19, users were presented with a security warning dialogue, with this question: 
 
“You would like to download a new free application from your web browser. When you 
click the link to download the file, the following pop up appears. What would you do 
next?” 
 
The majority of respondents commented that they saved and scanned the file for viruses 
as depicted in Appendix A.  A somewhat surprisingly finding by Internet Explorer 7 
respondents where the majority of 29% of respondents chose to cancel and quit from the 
process.  Although this action hindered users from downloading the file, possibly with 
malicious contents, users might learn to get rid of this kind of security warning in the 
future (i.e. habituation effects). 
 
On the other hand, a small group of respondents decided to run the application directly; 
10% from Internet Explorer 8, 9% from Internet Explorer 7, 3% from Mozilla Firefox, 
17% from Opera, 11% from Safari and 7% from Chrome.  This revealed that users were 
not afraid to take the risk of downloading the application, even though they did not 
know about the authenticity of the provider or software.  On the other hand, 19% on 
average of all respondents decided to cancel or quit the process upon receiving a 
security warning.  It may be noted that this action might prevent them from the risks at 
that particular time, but in long term (i.e. if they encounter similar situation again), and 
they might fail to become a potential victim of malware.  A small percentage of 
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respondents suggested that their decision was based on their intuition, reviews about the 
application and only downloaded from a reputable source.   
 
  
Internet Explorer 8 Security pop up Internet Explorer 7 Security pop up 
 
 
Mozilla Firefox Security pop up Opera Security pop up 
 
Mozilla Firefox Security pop up 
 
Chrome Security pop up 
 
Figure 3.19: Security pop up according to various of web browsers 
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Having assessed the respondents’ decisions with regard to the security warning dialogue, 
as depicted in Figure 3.19, it was also relevant to consider whether respondents felt the  
information on the depicted warning was sufficient.   Respondents only answered this 
question if they had answered the aforementioned question on preferred web browser.  
Overall, 43% felt satisfied with such information on the depicted warning, while more 
than 54% said the information was not enough (i.e. we may take into account that each 
web browsers had presented with different security features for end-users to use and to 
understand).  A further 3% of respondents corresponded without any answer, 
representing seventeen respondents altogether (i.e. one beginner computing skill user, 
eight intermediate computing skill users, seven advanced computing skill users and one 
expert computing skill user).  Having understood this, it may be seen that there is a need 
to further investigate the level of information provided in security warning dialogues 
(e.g. security features such as icons, words and colours) which can be gathered based on 
end-users’ experiences.  It is useful to assess and evaluate how end-users understand the 
implementation of such features, and later, to be able to make them act in a secure 
manner. 
 
Prior to the previous question, where 54% respondents claimed that not enough 
information was provided, this survey asked respondents about their point of view of 
other information which they think should be there on the depicted warning.  As 
depicted in Figure 3.20, 38% of respondents said that they wanted the details of the 
consequences if they were to proceed in running the application, a quarter of total 
respondents said they wished to have confirmation of legitimate download, 27% 
commented that they wanted the application they downloaded to be free from any 
malware attack, 17% claimed to have a proper help function, while others remain below 
1% respectively.  Some respondents demonstrated useful ideas that suggested 
computers should have strict defending process, understandable features, an automatic 
virus scan and details of the application provider.  Users also suggested that the 
developer should cater for all issues of security before any system or application can be 
used by the end-users.  From these findings, the proposed solution was generally 
implemented by various usable help techniques (i.e. explained in Chapter 2).  However, 
none of these techniques were able to come up with one solution that comprised all 
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elements or features that users’ wanted.  A considerable number of research studies are 
needed in this area so that a better solution can be imposed.      
 
Figure 3.20: Point of view on other information that should be in the security 
warning. 
 
 
Figure 3.21: Level of concern after completing the questionnaire 
 
The final set of questions in this section asked users whether completing this study 
would change their level of concern about computer security.  In the early section, this 
survey asked users about their concern regarding computers (i.e. pre-question), with 37% 
of respondents being ‘very concerned’ about the security of their computer, as pictured 
in Figure 3.4.  In contrast, it was notable that 45% of total respondents were ‘more 
concerned’ after completing the survey as portrayed in Figure 3.21.  Users demonstrated 
a small increased level of concern, albeit 51% said their level of concern had not 
changed.  A somewhat surprising finding was that 3% of total respondents said they 
were less concerned.  Even though this represented a small percentage, it showed that 
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these groups of users had the potential to become a victim of malicious attacks.  They 
did not see the unpredictability of the danger while dealing with computer.  At least 
some knowledge, awareness and experience can ensure the best thing to do or act 
accordingly.  One user also stated that he/she would always be concerned, with or 
without this study.    
 
3.4 Feedback comments 
 
In addition to answering the pre-set questions, respondents were also given the 
opportunity to leave free-text comments if they had any further thoughts or 
clarifications to share.  It may be noted that this question was not compulsory.  
Although not fully representative, below are some selected responses: 
 
i. “Antivirus should be embedded together with the operating systems to provide 
security so that users do not need to install too many things in their computer” 
(User 102). 
 
ii. “Information presented to inform users about the current problems should use 
simple explanation and less technical terminology” (User 14). 
 
iii. “The problem of malware is on the people and not the technology.  People are 
responsible with anything because they are the one who make a decision” (User 
204). 
 
iv. “User interface should be more user-friendly so that it helps user to comprehend 
the possible actions to take” (User 291). 
 
v. “Although I use the computer on a daily basis, this is only when at work, I do 
not use a computer at home.  Therefore, the IT department do any necessary 
upgrades and deal with any problems for me so I don't really worry about any of 
the problems that could occur” (User 355). 
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vi. “Most of my answers stated "I don't know" because am not very familiar with all 
the computer terms as am not a computer expert and not a heavy user unless for 
work related purposes” (User 38). 
 
vii. “Security information in the past has not been very well explained to the average 
user, leaving them confused or unsure, and vulnerable to attack” (User 144). 
 
viii. “What could I conclude here is we can’t control things on the internet, trust your 
feeling, directly ignore suspicious files or any and get yourself educate on the 
internet security on how to protect, defend and take action from the infection” 
(User 181).   
 
ix. “Again it is up to the operation system the user used. I am better off on Apple 
OSX. Others like Windows, users need all the security package available and 
need to understand them carefully. Finally better OS makes life easier” (User 
486). 
 
Based on these presented comments, users still experience significant problems whilst 
using their computer at home or organisations.  From the contexts of phishing warnings 
and security warnings on web browsers, users’ comprehension upon receiving such 
warnings was revealed.  Even though, these comments did not represent all of the 
respondents, it gave some indication as to the clarity of the issues presented. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
This study has provided a general overview of how end-users understand issues relating 
to information security, especially with regard to perception and usability.  Overall, it 
may be noted that end-users were concerned about issues of information security in 
general.  The majority of respondents were derived from a higher institution background, 
which reflected familiarity in using computers for more than six years.  From these 
findings, end-users demonstrated different kinds of experience and understanding when 
using their computer.  This may be summarised as follows: 
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i. Generally end-users demonstrated a good level of understanding in terms of the 
issues presented.  The majority of respondents decided correctly upon receiving 
phishing warning, although some of them still decided to proceed albeit there 
was a potential for risk.  In another scenario, upon receiving security dialogue to 
download application, the majority of end-users chose appropriate precautions 
instead of downloaded the software straight away.  10% of overall respondents 
still decided to download it straight away. 
 
ii. The majority of users had a good education background and the vast majority 
had used the Internet for more than six years.  
 
iii. From independent reviews and observation, it may be noted that the security 
warning presentations were presented differently based on the vendor’s and 
browsers’ version.  Clearly, the usage of terminology was too technical,  
especially for general users.  The level of information provided was sufficient, 
but might be improved (e.g. to explain the risk levels more clearly, give proper 
help functions).   
 
iv. Users still faced difficulties with regard to understand information available in 
phishing warning (i.e. 25% of overall respondents).  They agreed with the three 
main reasons, namely technical terminology, the nature of the event being 
described and the available choices.   
 
v. Users demonstrated that insufficient information was presented on the security 
warning dialogue (i.e. 54% of overall respondents).  They suggested some 
options to improve the current warning dialogue presentation which were able to 
help them to  better understand the warning they received (i.e. confirmation it is 
free from malware, confirmation on legitimate download, provision of help 
function, details of consequences if they were to proceed). 
 
vi. A high percentage of respondents claimed to use security software (i.e. anti-
virus, Internet security, zone alarm firewall, anti-spyware, mobile security and 
others).  Surprisingly end-users were unable to demonstrate full understanding 
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of the usage of Internet security software.  In using cross tabulation table 
presented in section 3, those who claimed to use Internet security in the first 
place and who claimed to have installed anti-spyware and/or anti-phishing 
surprisingly chose “no” and “I don’t know”.  This indicated that they did not 
really understand the usage of security technologies they had (i.e. they might use 
it but not really sure how this particular software functions and able to help 
them). 
 
3.6 Constraints 
 
This study was conducted online, and hosted on the Plymouth University server.  It may 
be noted that any individual was able to respond to this survey provided they knew the 
link.  There was no specific target in terms of users’ technology capabilities or 
background.  As the survey was well promoted within the university environment, this 
might be reflected in the results of the study in terms of percentage of users’ using 
Kaspersky, Internet Explorer web browser and educational background (i.e. as reported 
in this survey accordingly).  Most of the questions presented in this survey were closed 
ended type of question.  This limited the survey to probing more details from end-users.  
Therefore, some clarifications of findings were based on the author’s assumption (i.e. 
based on knowledge and experience).   
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
From the overall results of the 564 respondents, it may be concluded that there is a need 
to take action to improve the perception and usability specifically with regard to the 
design of the current security warning interface based on the early stage examination.  
This also shows that there is a need to better understand the ways in which end-user 
utilise the security features provided (i.e. icons, wordings, technical terminology, help 
functions and others).  This study provides some evidence to confirm some of the 
findings in the literature reviews in Chapter 2.   The study now proceeds with the next 
investigation and assessment in Chapter 4, which focuses upon users’ wider encounters 
with security warnings and the level to which these are felt to be understood and usable. 
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4 A Wider Evaluation of Perceived Security Warnings 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The prior survey study in Chapter 3 was conducted to assess end-users’ insights 
regarding information security issues with regard to the perception and usability and 
specifically of the security message/warning interface scenario study.   This provided a 
basis to further probe end-users’ understanding of the security features or security 
related events that they encountered on daily basis.  In Chapter 2, computer warnings 
dialogue box contexts were seen as the focal point of this thesis.  In this chapter, a more 
detailed investigation is given with regard to the practicality of security warnings, 
specifically considering dialogue boxes, in-place, banners, notifications and balloons.   
 
According to Seifert et al. (2006), security warnings successfully discourage users from 
encountering computer threats.  However, 16.92% participant in their studies proceeded 
to install an ActiveX component (i.e. ignoring the security warning).  This study was in 
line with Wu et al. (2006), namely that the security was not the users’ primary concern.  
Thus, the security warning was presented as distraction to end-users because it hindered 
the completion of their current task.  As presented in Chapter 2, end-users were not 
really understood and paid attention towards the warning and they even did not 
understand the implication of ignoring the warnings.  Based upon current literature and 
the author’s knowledge, there was a lack of research into evaluating and accessing users’ 
understanding of the features of the security warning specifically in dialogue box 
contexts.  However within this chapter, security warnings contexts can be viewed in a 
broader context, so that a comparison can be made of which of these contexts is more 
dominant.  Following this, a more focus study can be tailored to solve the problem later.      
 
The aforementioned study was unable to examine the effectiveness of the features 
available in security warning from end-users experienced dealing with it.  For instance 
signal icons, signal words, help function, technical terminology and available options 
(i.e. with the aim developing a meaningful feature to help users).  Hence, this chapter 
(i.e. user study 2) describes further investigation of how end-users dealing with security 
warning features on daily basis during practical tasks. The core of the study involved 
participants identifying perceived security warnings that were encountered during 
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normal system use, and then recording feedback regarding the extent to which they 
understood them.  It is anticipated that this finding will help to determine the features 
that are useful and important to make sure users comprehend the meaning of every 
security message that they receive, and are able to use the features accordingly. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
User study 2 made use of software prototype that had been developed as part of the 
practical assessment for participants (i.e. respondents were required to install and used 
the software for approximately fourteen days).  Fourteen days was considered to be 
appropriate to give participants ample time to capture what they believed computer 
warnings to be all about.  It is expected that users did not have to be rushed and they 
were able to undertake this user study at their convenient time.  In addition, based on 
the author’s knowledge and observation, most studies related to warnings research 
focused on trial experiment rather than gave them opportunity to use it at their own time 
(i.e. one-to-one session or user trial) (Sharek et al. 2008, Raja et al. 2009 and Kauer et al. 
2012).  Therefore, the author wished to explore this gap by using the proposed 
technique. 
 
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee, as with the previous user study.  The 
subjects were recruited predominantly from among Plymouth University’s students and 
staff, as well as friends and relatives.  Ten questions were provided in the questionnaire 
(i.e. based on human in the loop (HITL) framework which involved communication 
delivery, communication processing and application).  By using some elements within 
this framework, this study started by focusing on security communication components 
(i.e. the type of communication involves – warnings dialogues contexts).   
 
It may be noted that this experiment used a different approach to the methods presented 
in Chapter 2 in order to probe security warnings in further detail.  As there is no one 
specific method to be used,  the author believed that manually capturing the security 
warning would be more useful, because users have their own experience and beliefs of 
what a security warnings is.  Therefore, this provides more realistic evidences and 
insights from end-users.  Having used the software installed in users’ computer without 
any interruption from investigator also provided a new dimension in order to produce 
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more reliable results.  Users would no longer feel they were being watched and would 
possibly be able to show their true attitude (Oppenheim 1996). 
 
Users were required to capture the security warnings on a daily basis, and answered the 
questionnaire for every warning that they had captured.  These processes took 
approximately less than five minutes to complete (i.e. captured warning and answered 
questionnaire).  User also had been advised to capture two to five images per day.  
Users were reminded by the principal investigator when fourteen days were 
approaching.  Shortly after this, users were required to send the zip file within the 
installed software via e-mail. 
 
4.3 Study Design 
 
This study was promoted to the end user community via e-mail, news entry information 
on university’s internal staff and student websites and word of mouth among colleagues 
in April 2011.  The software prototype to support the experiment was developed using 
Microsoft Visual Studio Professional (2010), specifically using Visual Basic platform.  
This platform was chosen due to its suitability and the effectiveness on web and system 
development.  This software was divided into three main sections.  Personal details 
encompassed demographic details of respondents, capture utilized users’ action to 
capture for every security warning they encountered (i.e. it had been simplified by using 
short cut key) and questionnaire covered list of questions that users’ must answered 
based on every captured security message  (See Appendix B in guidance sheet on user 
study 2).  
 
4.4 Questionnaire 
 
There were four main sections to the questionnaire, as depicted in Figure 4.1.  The first 
section showed list of pending questionnaires which comprised of ID, date captured and 
image name.  This was the location where users were able to view the security warning 
that they had captured before.  By clicking any item on the lists, users were able to view 
the warning image on the image view section.  On the other hand, section three asked 
about the event details of the security warning that user had captured that comprised the 
event name and source of the browser.  Meanwhile, section four consisted of ten 
questions (i.e. questionnaire) that covered users’ understanding of security features such 
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as signal icons, signal words, technical terminology and available options (with the aim 
developing a meaningful feature to help users) as depicted in Figure 4.1.  Some of the 
questions presented related to perceptions and attitudes that related to the decision 
making process and risk.  These questions were created based on the Human in the 
Loop (HITL), which provides a systematic method to design security problems and help 
to understand end-user behaviour when they perform security-critical functions (Cranor 
2008). 
 
These questionnaires were used to further clarify from the aforementioned study in 
Chapter 3.  Five likert-scales have been widely used as part of questionnaire types 
(Faulkner 2000).  According to Oppenheim (1996), there were two main benefits on 
using the likert-scale.  Firstly, it provided more precise information and users were 
preferred to a simple agree/disagree method of response.  Secondly, it was able to 
explore and manifest content, with deeper ramifications of an attitude to be explored.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Questionnaire section 
 
The questionnaire made use of the components available in Human in the Loop security 
framework (i.e. personal variables, intentions, communication delivery and 
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communication processing).  In Figure 4.2, the questions were more specific to the 
usage of security features and level of information (i.e. elements that normally help 
users to comprehend warnings).  By assessing these ten questions, empirical evidence 
was provided as to the initial problems with security warnings and some potential 
suggestions as to how to improve it can be gathered. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: 5 likert-scales measurement with 10 questions 
 
4.4.1 Study Protocol 
 
In order to capture security message that users encountered, users used the short cut key 
(i.e. ALT-Z) instead of pressing the capture button on the main interface.  The rationale 
was to simplify the capture action without showing the main interface again (i.e. did not 
want to distract current users’ task).  For every successfully captured process, 
notification appeared from users’ system tray as depicted in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Notification upon successful captured every security warning 
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To ensure that users were able to access this page, they could double click the “U” icon 
or double click the notification from the system tray.  The capturing process took less 
than five seconds per image captured and less than five minutes to read and answered 
the questionnaire.  Users had been reminded that they were no right or wrong doing in 
this study.  After fourteen days, users were required to send results using the “send files 
back” function on the software (i.e. data will be automatically zip and send to author’s 
e-mail). These were the summary steps undertaken by users in order to complete the 
tasks: 
1) Firstly, users click any one item in the List of pending questionnaires until 
they see blue highlighted colour on the item   
2) Then, users can preview the image in the Image View that they have captured.   
3) Click on the image to zoom in and out (Note: once users’ mouse hovers inside 
the Image View, the border will change to blue and the mouse pointer will 
change to a magnifying glass icon).   
4) Then, control the panel movement (up, down, left or right) to see the specific 
warning/message that you have captured.   
5) Later, users answer the questionnaires with regards to the image that users have 
viewed.  If they decide to do it later, press the skip button (It will minimize the 
program back to system tray).  
6) If users decide to answer the questionnaire straight away, all questions are 
compulsory.  They have to answer all until the save button is clicked. 
7) At any time, if users would like to view again how many images are still 
pending in list of pending questionnaire, they double click icon U from system 
tray.  
8) After 14 days, users receive an e-mail reminder that they need to submit the 
results of the study by clicking “Send Files back” to researcher’s specified e-
mail. 
 
(Note: Details of instructions (i.e. research information sheet and guidance sheet) 
are given in the Appendix B) 
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4.4.2 Study Participants 
 
This study recruited 40 participants from both the university and public community (18 
males and 22 females).  It may be noted that from the previous study (i.e. user study 1 in 
Chapter 3), the total number of participants drastically decreased to only 40 participants 
with this user study 2.  This indicated the inconsistency between both users study. 
 
However, there were some rationale and considerations took place.  It was a challenging 
task to get a committed participant especially when it involved them to install the 
software and sent the results back.  Users were expected to give full commitment 
especially in regards to their time.  Therefore, 40 participants were considered sufficient, 
as most of other studies related to warnings domain used between 20 to 40 participants 
in their experiments (Brustoloni & Villamarin-Salomon 2007, Stoll et al. 2008, Sharek 
et al. 2008, Keukelaere et al. 2009, Raja et al. 2009 and Kauer et al. 2012).  However, 
from the author’s point of view, the greater the number, the better the results.  With this 
particular user study, only 40 committed participants fully completed the experiment.      
 
Users installed the software to be used for fourteen days.  All of the figures and 
percentages reported here were based upon the proportions of respondents in this study 
(i.e. due to rounding some of the presented results do not total 100%).  The user was 
also reminded that they had the right to withdraw from this study at any time. 
 
4.5 Results and findings 
 
The overall outcome of user study 2 was presented in Table 4.1.  It can be revealed from 
this finding that surprisingly, more female participants participated than male 
participants.  This result had a similarity with user study 1 which had been conducted 
and explained in Chapter 3.  The majority of participants were aged 26-35 years, whilst 
the minority group were from the age of 46 and above.  This result was not surprising, 
as the majority of participants had grown up in an information, communication and 
technology (ICT) era.  In terms of educational background, the majority claimed to have 
at least higher education, and only two respondents had a GCSE/O level education.  It 
may be noted that as this study was well promoted in the university’s environment, it 
might contribute directly to a higher percentage of educational background as 
mentioned.  
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On the other hand, none of participants claimed to be a beginner in computing skills, 
and the majority declared with advanced and intermediate of level instead.  As predicted, 
the majority of respondents demonstrated that they were using computer and Internet 
more than six years.  Thus, this supported the previous results that majority of the 
respondents were from the younger generation that were more technical savvy based 
users.  In terms of preferred web browser, the majority of users chose Google Chrome 
and Internet Explorer.  This result was totally different as compared to the results in the 
user study 1 (i.e. Mozilla Firefox was the most popular option).  Microsoft products (i.e. 
Windows 7, Windows Vista and Windows XP) were still the most popular choices for 
the operating system. With respect to the usage of security software, the majority of 
respondents demonstrated that they used antivirus or Internet security package as a 
precaution from malware attacks in their computer.  Surprisingly one user claimed 
he/she was not sure about the use of security software.   
 
This study also asked users about their perception of three issues (i.e. managing task 
using computer, satisfaction on layout of warning and level of concern on security of 
computer.  The results as shown in Appendix B.  It may be noted that most of the 
respondents found that managing task in computer was in the range of easy and very 
easy (i.e. equally split).  With regard to satisfaction of security warning, 53% of 
respondents claimed they were satisfied, 33% chose neither easy nor difficult whilst 
leaving 8% claimed that it was difficult.  Even though majority had claimed that they 
were satisfied but there were quite a high percentage (i.e. 33%) of responses unable to 
provide an absolute satisfaction with this issue.  On the other hand, 68% were 
concerned with the level of security of the computer, 25% being were mildly concerned, 
and 7% did not know. 
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Characteristics 
(n = 40) 
Frequency 
Distribution 
Percentage 
Distribution (%) 
 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
Age 
18 – 25 
26 - 35 
36 - 45 
46 - 55 
Above 56 
 
Educational Background 
Postgraduate 
Higher Education 
Diploma, Further Education 
GNVQ 
GCSE/ O Level 
 
Computing skills 
Expert 
Advanced 
Intermediate 
Beginner 
 
Years using computer 
<1 
1 - 2 
3 - 4 
5 - 6 
> 6 
 
Years using Internet 
<1 
 
 
18 
22 
 
 
6 
27 
5 
1 
1 
 
 
18 
19 
1 
0 
2 
 
 
4 
21 
15 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
2 
1 
3 
 
 
0 
 
 
45.0 
55.0 
 
 
15.0 
67.5 
12.5 
2.5 
2.5 
 
 
45.0 
47.5 
2.5 
0.0 
5.0 
 
 
10.0 
52.5 
37.5 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
0.0 
5.0 
2.5 
92.5 
 
 
0.0 
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Characteristics 
(n = 40) 
Frequency 
Distribution 
Percentage 
Distribution (%) 
1 - 2 
3 - 4 
5 - 6 
> 6 
 
Preferred web browser 
Google Chrome 
Internet Explorer 
Mozilla Firefox 
Safari 
Opera 
I do not know 
 
Preferred operating system 
Windows 7 
Windows Vista 
Windows XP 
Mac OS X 
Linux 
I do not know 
2 
1 
3 
34 
 
 
16 
13 
9 
2 
0 
0 
 
 
16 
4 
18 
2 
0 
0 
5.0 
2.5 
7.5 
85.0 
 
 
40.0 
32.5 
22.5 
5.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
40.0 
10.0 
45.0 
5.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Table 4.1: Summary table of user study 2. 
 
4.5.1 Classification of security warnings contexts 
 
At present, Microsoft (2010) provides the guidelines for design concept of security 
warning for Windows products.  For instance, the guidelines are applicable to Internet 
Explorer browser, operating systems and Microsoft Office packages that further explain 
the usage contexts (i.e. includes standard icons, dialog boxes, notification, warning 
messages and error messages).  In order to probe the security warnings accordingly,   
this chapter presents five contexts of security warnings based on what users had 
captured.  These five contexts are based on Microsoft guidelines as a basis reference for 
the study, due to its popularity and ease of use.  The classifications were summarised 
briefly and presented in Chapter 2 (i.e. dialogue box, notification, balloon, in place and 
banner).  Users were told that they had to capture security warnings in general (i.e. 
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without explaining specific contexts).  However, the author provided one example in the 
Guidance sheet as a reference. 
 
4.5.2 Misinterpreted scenarios 
 
As users were able to capture the screen images based on their understanding, various 
types of perceived security warning were compiled.  Users had their own interpretation 
of what they understood about security warnings, and they referred to guidance sheet to 
make sure that they did the right process.  However, some still had false interpretations 
what might constitute a security warning, as depicted in Figure 4.4.  It may be noted that 
users were unlikely to have captured these by mistake, as none of them reported this in 
any of their later feedback.  
 
 
User 1 
 
User 2 
 
User 2 
 
User 3 
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User 4 
 
User 4 
 
User 5 
 
User 6 
 
Figure 4.4: Dialogues that were misclassified as security warnings 
It may be noted that most of the captured warnings can be categorized in advertisement 
type instead of the real security warning.  Please note that respondents had been told 
about the definition and example of security warning in the guidance sheet.  From these 
results, it can be confirmed that some users were still in baffled to identify the real 
security warning.  For instance, user 5 and user 6 captured a dialog box of Avira anti-
virus.  This might be because they were aware of the brand name of Avira and the 
details on the dialog box related to security issues so that they considered it as security 
warning.  A surprising finding was that one of the user derived a postgraduate degree 
and claimed as expert for computing skills as depicted in Table 4.2 but still unable to 
capture the right security warning.  One possible reason that these is happening because 
respondents might interpret any type of pop-ups they received (i.e. with or without 
intention) on their computer as security warning.  Hence, they simply capture it without 
thinking about whether it is a real security warning or not. 
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User Education Level Computing skills 
User 1 Higher Education Expert 
User 2 Postgraduate Expert 
User 3 Postgraduate Intermediate 
User 4 Higher Education Advanced 
User 5 Higher Education Intermediate 
User 6 Postgraduate Expert 
Table 4.2: Comparison table on education level and computing skills 
 
These results reflected how end-users assessed and identified the security warning on 
daily usage of computer.  Having claimed themselves as advanced or even expert did 
not guaranteed that they really understood the real meaning of security warning.  
Overall, this indicated that some users had difficulty in identifying and understanding 
the security warning in the first place. 
 
4.5.3 Results of classification 
 
Overall, there were 234 security warnings images captured by participants, regardless of 
any context of warnings (i.e. dialogue box, in place, notification, banners and balloon).  
This section presented the results based on five classifications of warnings.  The overall 
cumulative likert-scale referred to the total of likert-scale values (i.e. the sum of scale 
value on every question).  Meanwhile, the average or mean referred to the overall 
cumulative likert-scale divided by total of security warning captured on each context 
(i.e. dialogue box, in place, notification, banners and balloon).  It may be noted that the 
outcome from the table presented in each contexts was derived in general overview 
instead of derived it from one specific type of security warning.  However, in certain 
scenarios (i.e. where more respondents captured the same security warnings) further 
assessment was discussed in greater details.  Users generally demonstrated a 
satisfactory level of knowledge with regard to event details (i.e. event name and source 
of browser).  However, in some contexts of warnings, they were still confused about 
how to classify it as presented in Table 4.3.  The results portrayed as follows were 
derived from responses to multiple views on event name (i.e. Different respondents 
might views each dialogue differently).  
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Table 4.3: Respondents’ event name classification based on the captured security 
warnings 
 
It may be seen from this table that some of the respondents’ classified the dialogues 
correctly whilst leaving the others in baffled.  For instance, dialogues box B was 
derived from Mozilla Firefox.  It was supposed to be a warning message, but some users 
classified it as an information message.  Based on the layout presentation, this security 
warning dialogue did not provide sufficient information to users.  There were no icons 
or specific wordings to indicate risk levels, and no help features to help users to search 
for more information.  By observing security warning C, respondents claimed that it 
was a warning message whilst some did not know about the event details.  
 
On the other hand, dialogue in D was captured by one user whilst using Internet 
Explorer.  He/she classified this warning dialogue as an information message.  
Surprisingly, based on the depicted dialogue, warning icon has been used.  However 
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when reading the main question on the message “Internet Explorer is not currently your 
default browser.  Would you like to make it your default browser?” it can be argued that 
by choosing “no” there was no bad implication at all, rather than having opportunity to 
use other browsers.  
 
According to Microsoft (2010), a warning icon can only be used when the warning  
present a condition that might cause a problem in the future which is not happen with 
this security warning.  Clearly in this scenario, there was a conflict on the usage of 
signal icon with the current context of warning.  It may be suggested that it is better not 
to use any icon with this dialogue box to avoid any confusion.  The information 
provided in the warning may convey the meaning of the message.   
 
With regard to dialogue box E, some respondents classified it as information message 
(i.e. users might think that question mark icon is related to delivering information) 
whilst one user was unable to make a decision.  Dialogue box in F clearly indicated the 
message as an error but surprisingly warning icon had been used.  Similar problem 
occurred in warning G because question mark icon had been used instead of warning 
icon.  In dialogue H, when users entered wrong username or password, users classified 
this as error message (i.e. in fact the right option).  However, a warning icon was used 
to indemnify the error.  On the other hand, one respondent was not sure about the event 
name of this banner albeit information was used.  Having understood these 
circumstances, it was seen that some users perceived security warning differently as 
they had their own mind set with regards to the warning that they captured.  It may be 
suggested that they just ignored some useful features available to help them make a 
better decision. 
 
4.5.3.1 Dialogue box 
 
Before going into further detail, each of the presented tables within this section refers to 
the questionnaire depicted in Figure 4.2.  There were 191 security warning in dialogue 
box context that users captured.  The likert-scale values were added together from the 
191 security warning dialogue box context to get the overall cumulative values.  Then, 
to get the mean values the overall cumulative likert-scale was divided with the total of 
warning (i.e. 191).  It can be noted that the majority of respondents demonstrated that 
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they were in the middle range between “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” with 
regards to their decision with almost all of the questions presented.  From these results, 
among two lowest mean values presented were on question 3 and question 9 (i.e. this 
did not apply to question 6 and 8 – the lowest means better).  This indicated that some 
improvements are needed with regard to helping function and information provided in 
the security warning.  None of the results presented showed that users were fully 
satisfied with the current context of the security warning (i.e. likert scale value = 4).  
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Overall 
Cumulative 
likert-scale 
697 737 676 691 700 531 700 494 632 702 
Mean 3.65 3.86 3.54 3.62 3.67 2.78 3.67 2.59 3.31 3.68 
Table 4.4: The mean respondents on answered questionnaire in dialogue box 
contexts.  
 
 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
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CHAPTER 4: A WIDER EVALUATION OF PERCEIVED SECURITY WARNINGS 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
E 
 
F 
Figure 4.5:  The most popular captured security warning demonstrated by 
respondents. 
 
The security warning presented in Figure 4.5 was among the most popular captured by 
respondents.  It may be noted that the combination of signal cues (icons and words), 
technical terminology, help options and available choices had been used in this context.  
For instance, two respondents had captured security warning A.  Again with this 
security warning, the similar lowest mean value were on question 3 and question 9 as 
presented in (i.e. similar results with overall as depicted in Table 4.4). 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Mean 4 4 3 3.5 4 4 4 2.5 2.5 4 
Table 4.5: Mean value of security warning A based on the likert-scale 
The author made a further assessment by evaluating the security features available to 
help users in this scenario.  It can be revealed that the header of the warning indicated as 
“security warning” however in the footnote area, shield error icon was used.  Based on 
Microsoft (2010), error icon should be used only to present error or critical but in this 
scenario, warning icon should be used instead to highlight a condition that might pose a 
problem in future.  Based on the author’s observation, an error icon was used because 
the computer system was unable to recognise the publisher and did not have a valid 
digital signature to verify the status.  The main question presented to users was “The 
publisher could not be verified.  Are you sure you want to run this software”.  In order 
for users to decide whether to execute or not, they clicked the link at the bottom (i.e. 
footnote area) to get more information.  From the authors’ view, having two separated 
details of information was not effective as users’ might thinking the information 
provides at the bottom is something that is not related to the main question.  It may be 
revealed that there was an issue with the clarity of information and that there were 
insufficient help features to guide user through.   
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 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Mean 4 3.67 3.33 3.33 3.67 3 3.33 3 2.67 2.67 
Table 4.6: Mean value on security warning B 
 
Three users captured similar security warnings, as portrayed in Figure 4.5 – B.  With 
this security warning, users demonstrated with 2.67 on average with question 9 and 
question 10 as presented on Table 4.6.  This indicated that the information and the 
urgency of this security warning should be improved.  The main question on the 
security warning asked “Do you want to open or save the file?” however, there were 
four available options for users (i.e. open, save, cancel/close and clicked the hyperlink).  
It was not clear how this security warning was able to help users in the decision making 
process as there were no clear direction on what to do after reading the main question.  
Albeit the footnote area was provided at the bottom to give some additional information, 
it presented similar problem as mentioned in security warning A.   
 
A comparison can be made between security warning B and C.  Both of security 
warnings looked similar but the main difference was on the header (i.e. file download 
and file download – security warning).  With security warning C, the name of the file 
was .exe and it reflected the usage of icon at the footnote area (i.e. warning icon) and 
the header of the warning.  .exe files (i.e. executable file) portray significant dangers in 
computer systems, as most of the malware are easy to propagate using this method.  
Surprisingly, both security warnings in B and C used the same information in the 
footnote area, but with different icons (i.e. it was not really clear how to convey the risk 
level).   
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Mean 3.14 3.29 3.14 3.57 3.43 2.57 4 2.57 3.29 3.86 
Table 4.7: Mean value of security warning D 
 
Security warning D was depicted from Mozilla Firefox browser by seven respondents.  
With this security warning, users demonstrated that they were aware of the risk if they 
ignored this security warning (i.e. question 7) but for the rest of the questions, the result 
were remain between the same range as previous security warnings.  It may be noted 
that on question 1 and question 3, users demonstrated among the lowest mean values 
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(i.e. available option and help function).  As presented in Figure 4.5 – D, this security 
warning presented very minimalistic features.   It asked users “Would you like to save 
this file?” instead of offered them to execute the file straight away.  However, no further 
information has been provided with regard to the risk or even more information about 
the file users wished to download.  In this context, there was no further guidance for 
users to rely on in making decisions as to whether to save the file or not.   
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Mean 4.5 4 4 3 4 2.5 4.5 3 2.5 4 
Table 4.8: Mean value on security warning E 
 
On the other hand, two users captured security warning as presented in Figure 4.5 – E.  
This security warning was straight forward as the header of the warning clearly 
indicated as “security warning”.  An exclamation icon was used to match the context of 
the message.  With regard to the overall mean values, mostly respondents demonstrated 
that they “agree” with most of the questions presented.  However, these two respondents 
demonstrated 2.5 on average with regards to the information provided as depicted in 
Table 4.8.  This might be because of the information provided in this warning using 
more technical wordings in order to explain the current circumstances which lead to the 
complexity for users to understand. 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Mean 3 4 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 3 2.5 2 
Table 4.9: Mean value on security warning F 
 
With security warning as depicted in Figure 4.5 – F, only two users captured the same 
warning.  The header of the warning stated as “Microsoft Office Outlook” instead of 
using one specific name.  These respondents agreed that the visual cues helped to attract 
their attention, but for the rest of the question, the mean values were not really 
convincing.  The lowest average value was on question 10 (i.e. the urgency of the 
warning).  These were similar results to the other warning which had been presented 
before, question 3, 4, 5 and question 9 portrayed among the lowest values with 2.5 on 
average as depicted in Table 4.9.  By viewing the warning in detail, no further detailed 
features was provided for users, and not enough information was depicted except to 
request that users allow or terminate the process. 
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4.5.3.2 In Place 
 
There were fourteen in place security warning context that users captured accordingly.  
As depicted in Table 4.10, the majority of users demonstrated their understanding of the   
in place context of security warnings.  This was not a surprising finding because it 
related to an e-mail log in scenarios.  It showed that users demonstrated that they were 
familiar with this context and most of these respondents might use e-mail services on a 
daily basis.   
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Overall 
Cumulative 
likert-scale 
61 60 59 62 57 30 58 27 56 58 
Mean 4.36 4.29 4.21 4.43 4.07 2.14 4.14 1.93 4 4.14 
Table 4.10: The mean respondents’ on answered questionnaire in in-place 
contexts. 
 
As presented in Figure 4.6 - A and B, most in place warning were captured from e-mail 
services.  As most of the respondents were familiar with e-mail usage, it was not 
surprising that most of the average values were in the range of “agree” to “strongly 
agree” (i.e. except in question 6 and question 8).  It may be noted that this context of 
security warning was not a frequent warning that users normally encountered, as 
compared to dialogue box contexts.  
 
 
 
A 
 
B 
Figure 4.6: In-place security warning contexts captured by respondents 
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4.5.3.3 Notification 
A documented guideline by Microsoft (2010) stated that notifications must be ignorable 
(i.e. at least temporary).  It did not require user to take an immediate actions as it only 
shows user with unrelated event to the current users’ activity.  If the users are not 
distracted or feel obligated to read it, then the notifications can be considered successful.  
However, in reality, designers created a notification to get users’ attention so that they 
will not ignore it.  Microsoft (2010) used its design pattern for notification 
implementation, as depicted below in Table 4.11. 
 
Pattern Descriptions 
Action success It will be used to notify users when asynchronous and 
users initiated actions completed successfully 
Action failure It will be used to notify users when asynchronous and 
users initiated actions fail. 
Non-critical system event It will be used to notify users on significant event that can 
be safely ignored. (temporarily) 
Optional user task It will be used to notify users of asynchronous tasks that 
they should perform. (Optional or required, it can be safely 
postponed) 
FYI It will be used to notify users of potentially useful and 
applicable information. (Notify users of information if it is 
optional and users opt in) 
Feature advertisement It will be used to notify users of newly installed, unused 
system or application features. 
Table 4.11: Design pattern for notification in Microsoft 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Overall 
Cumulative 
likert-scale 
40 42 41 43 41 39 37 26 36 41 
Mean 4 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.7 2.6 3.6 4.1 
Table 4.12: The mean respondents’ on answered questionnaire in notification 
contexts. 
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Overall, ten notifications had been captured by respondents.  It can be revealed that 
most of the respondents did not found much problem with this context of warning as 
depicted in Table 4.12.  The lowest mean value (i.e. except in question 6 and 8) was on 
question 9 with regard to the information provided.  One of the possible reasons that 
contributed to the high mean value (i.e. 4 or more) was that notification appeared only 
for few seconds, with rare frequency.  Therefore, most users might not realise it, and 
ignore the existence of such warning.  Based on the captured security warning 
notification contexts on Figure 4.7 (A-D), various levels of information and icons were 
used.     
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
Figure 4.7: The average respondents’ on answered questionnaire in notifications 
contexts. 
 
4.5.3.4 Banners 
 
This study reveals that eighteen banners images were captured.  According to Microsoft 
(2010) information icons can only be used in a banner context and not with other 
contexts.  The reason was that another context was able to communicate the information 
to end-users sufficiently.  However, results revealed that there were a variation of signal 
icons been used for banners as depicted in Figure 4.8 (A - F) (i.e. some of these were 
not from Windows platform).   Generally, users demonstrated their understanding with 
“neither agree nor disagree” with questions related to banner as depicted in Figure 4.7.  
This might be because of this context of security warning appeared occasionally.  In 
addition, it appeared in a tiny size to view and at a specific location on the web pages 
which made respondents unaware of their existence (i.e. below the toolbars and address 
bar).  It may also be noted that some of these banners using technical jargon such as pop 
up blocker, add-on and restore.  It may be seen that the least mean value (i.e. except 
question 6 and 8) was on question 5.  Respondents claimed that they were not really 
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sure about the visual cues (e.g. words, icons and colours) that helped them to understand 
the nature of the event.  
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F 
Figure 4.8: The average respondents’ on answered questionnaire in banners 
contexts. 
 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Overall 
Cumulative 
likert-scale 
64 58 64 65 57 55 61 52 60 67 
Mean 3.56 3.22 3.56 3.61 3.17 3.06 3.39 2.89 3.33 3.72 
Table 4.13: The mean respondents’ on answered questionnaire in banners 
contexts. 
4.5.3.5 Balloons 
 
Surprisingly, only one user captured security warnings in a balloon context as results in 
Table 4.14.  This might happens because users are not aware of the balloons as one of 
the security warnings contexts.  Therefore, even if they had encountered or experienced 
balloons contexts, they did not classify them as a security warning in the first place.  It 
can be noted that this respondents did not face many problems with regard to the 
balloon warning contexts that he/she had captured.  All of the questionnaire questions 
were answered without any level of difficulty.  The author’s believed that because the 
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existence of the balloon was very short-lived, users did not have much problem dealing 
with it. 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Overall 
Cumulative likert-
scale 
5 5 4 5 5 1 4 1 5 5 
Mean 5 5 4 5 5 1 4 1 5 5 
Table 4.14: The mean respondents’ on answered questionnaire in balloon contexts. 
 
4.6 Users’ feedback 
 
Users’ feedback was derived from an e-mail sent by responses upon completion of this 
user study.   This feedback was not a compulsory task for users.  Although not 
representative, below are the selected responses: 
 
i. “I have not experienced this concept of experiment before and I found it to be 
unique and useful (i.e. install in computer and send the zip file)” (User 5) 
 
ii. “Having manually captured security warnings is a good idea but sometime it is 
tedious job when you do it repeatedly” (User 12) 
 
iii. “I am not so sure what a security warning is. As long as it pops-up in my 
computer, I would assume it is a security warning” (User 23) 
 
iv. “Whatever it is I think that the presentation of computer should make it easy for 
users to use.  Warnings seems to look very similar between one and another” 
(User 31)  
 
v. “Some of the security warnings that I have encountered presented with technical 
details that I do not understand it at all.  and no further help for me to rely on” 
(User 38) 
 
Based on these comments, one user claimed that security warning was presented with 
some difficulties with the usage of technical terminologies (i.e. consistent results with 
user study 1).  The user also claimed that security warnings looked very similar between 
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one and another.  Hence, it made him/her baffled because of the difficulty of 
differentiating the problem.  It would be useful if this study could examine in further 
detail with the comments presented to further clarify the problems. 
 
4.7 Discussions 
 
Overall, this study has highlighted how end-users dealing with security warning features 
on daily basis.  Based on the five contexts of security warning presented in previous 
section, generally users demonstrated good understanding of the features provided in 
the warning, especially in three contexts (i.e. in-place, notification and balloon).  
However, with regard to the other two presented contexts (i.e. dialogue box and 
banners) significant attentions are needed (i.e. satisfactory level).  Based on the mean 
values presented on both contexts, users demonstrated their decision were in the middle 
range between “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree”.  There was no absolute answer 
(i.e. “agree” or “strongly agree”) chosen within these two contexts. A small percentage 
(i.e. 15%) of overall participants misunderstood what they believed security warning 
was in certain security warning which they had captured.  Albeit it only occurred among 
few participants, it indicated how end-users viewed and understood security warning in 
one perspective (i.e. end-users mental model).  This study also revealed that some users 
were unable to classify the correct warning classification upon presented event details 
(i.e. users chose event name from drop down list). 
   
It may be noted that security warning in dialogue context became the most popular 
context captured by all of the respondents.  This revealed that this context of warning 
became the dominant context to present warning from most of developers.  In addition, 
end-users were more aware of the existence and realised the concept of security warning 
in dialogue box context.  Thus, this reflected the less popular captured security warning 
in other contexts.  Based on some presented scenarios, it may be revealed that some of 
users were still having difficulties with current implementation of security warning 
especially with regard to help features and information provided in the warnings.  From 
the authors’ observations, some conflicts occurred with regards to the implementation 
of signal icon and signal word (i.e. inappropriate usage).  Some of security warning 
presented still use technical terminology to explain to users about current context of 
warnings.  In addition, there was no specific guidance available for users to rely on 
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before they able to make any decision except the link provided at the bottom in certain 
warning dialogues (i.e. footnote area).   
 
Therefore from the holistic investigation results, this study produced encouraging 
results, especially with regards to security warning dialogues and banners contexts.  By 
using this method of study (i.e. users identified and manually captured what they 
believed security warning was) provided an insight into how users comprehend the 
warnings in various contexts.    
 
4.8 Constraints 
 
The software that users installed was unable to detect the security warning 
automatically, as the task was set to be a manual task for end-user to identify the 
security warning, and later answer the questionnaire.  Users were able to capture the 
same security warning more than one time as the software unable to detect the 
duplication.  The questionnaire was created using HITL framework elements, but it did 
not came out with final results in regards to users’ behaviours as proposed in HITL.  
The user had to choose fixed answers instead of having open-ended type of answers on 
the presented questionnaire.  Hence, there was less flexibility in terms of providing 
some useful thoughts whilst experiencing what they believed security warnings were.    
 
4.9 Conclusions  
 
Having understood all of the evidences from this user study, it may be concluded that 
there is a need to improve the current implementation of security warning, especially in 
dialogue box contexts.  Some conflicts even occurred based on the aforementioned 
results presented based on the authors’ observation (i.e. end-users might not realised it 
as no specific questions were asked related to this).  None of the overall mean values in 
security dialogue context was recorded as more than four.  Most of the users within this 
contexts demonstrated that help function and information in security warning could be 
further improved (i.e. Users demonstrated overall mean value range was between three 
to four with regards to question 3 and 9).  Even though the mean value was not 
statistically significant, the presented value at least presented some indication how end-
users assessed the current features of security warnings.  It provided empirical evidence 
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to highlight the real problems encountered by end-users.  By understanding and 
evaluating the problems, this thesis helps to further appraise computer warnings in real-
time contexts in Chapter 5. 
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5 Further Appraisal of Security Warnings in Real-Time 
Contexts 
5.1 Motivation 
 
Having gathered all of the aforementioned evidence, it is useful to confirm from the 
end-users whether they really need to have more information with regard to the security 
warning dialogue that they received in real-time contexts.  In the aforementioned 
Chapter 4, the author focused on how end-users dealt with security related events 
warnings in the various contexts that they may encounter during the day-to-day use of 
their systems.  This involved practical tasks, in which security warning dialogues were 
manually identified and captured by the end-users.  This provided a basis for an 
understanding and assessment based on features that were useful and important so as to 
ensure that users comprehended the meaning of every security context they received and 
were able to use the features accordingly.     
 
After manually capturing what users believed a security warning was, they were 
required to answer the event details and questionnaire section.  Based on the findings, 
users demonstrated that they understood the overall presentation of warnings, especially 
in the in-place, notification and balloon contexts of warnings.  Users experienced 
significant problems with dialogue box and banners contexts (i.e. mean values in the 
range of 3 to 4).  Even though the results were merely at a satisfactory level, this gave 
some indication that users were still in a dilemma within the questionnaires presented.  
It may be revealed that within these two contexts, there was no absolute answer (i.e. 
“agree” or strongly agree”) based on the mean value presented.  15% of overall users 
misunderstood what they believed security warnings to be, mostly by capturing 
advertisement dialogues which looked like security warnings.  From the questionnaire 
results, end-users mostly had significant problems with regards to the help features and 
information provided in the warnings (i.e. Dialogue box mean values Q3 = 3.54 Q9 = 
3.31).  
 
If users are unable to understand the information provided (i.e. by using the help 
facilities provided) this may lead them to make incorrect decisions that may jeopardise 
security and protection on their computers.  Therefore, in continuation of the previous 
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investigation, this chapter seeks to reveal whether sufficient information was provided 
for end-users for each security warning dialogue received in real-time contexts, on a 
daily basis.  In order to achieve this aim, a software prototype was developed to detect 
the dialogue box pops-ups automatically.  Once this software detected the dialogue box 
(i.e. via class name/application name), a custom dialogue box automatically popped up 
shortly after users made a decision regarding the dialogue box they received earlier.  
Then users able to answer the survey via a custom dialogue box in real time contexts.  
In these contexts, the author focused only on the detection of dialogue boxes.    
 
5.2 Methodology 
 
A survey tool was developed to assess users’ understanding of whether enough 
information was provided on the current security warning dialogue boxes.  This 
software was designed to detect the header, class name, application type, dialogue 
received time and dialogue decision time.  However, the main detection process was 
based on the class name/application name of the dialogue box used on the first place.  
Based on the author’s knowledge, it was seen as difficult to detect one specific type of 
security warning dialogue, especially when this involved different web browsers and 
applications.  Therefore, a possible means of detecting security warning dialogue box 
contexts was by using the class name or application name, as depicted in Table 5.1.  For 
the purposes of this experiment, a security warning dialogue box from three main web 
browsers became the focal point of the investigation (i.e. Internet Explorer, Mozilla 
Firefox and Google Chrome).  However, dialogue boxes from operating systems and 
other applications that shared a similar class name were also captured.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Example of Class Name and Application name from three web browsers 
 
ClassName Application name (.exe) 
#32770 Explorer.exe 
Chrome_WidgetWin_0 Chrome.exe 
MozillaDialogClass Firefox.exe 
MozillaUIWindowsClass Firefox.exe 
MozillaWindowClass Firefox.exe 
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As the detection process of specific security warning was difficult to achieve, every 
dialogue box that users received was considered to be a security warning.  The rationale 
behind this was that most security warnings came in the form of a dialogue box.  
Therefore, end-users were more aware of the security warning within this context, rather 
than other forms of security warnings (i.e. results from user study in Chapter 4 for 
further details).  In addition, every dialogue box that users received involved many 
features to help them comprehend the meaning of the message (e.g. signal icons, words, 
help or guidance features), and this became one of the main investigation concerns of 
this study. 
 
On the other hand, Microsoft (2010) guideline was used as a reference or basis for this 
study.  The author realised that this guideline could only be used with Microsoft 
products but it is still relevant to use it as a main reference in order to compare on how 
other browsers implemented such features (i.e. as discussed in Chapter 2, 3 and 4) 
because no other guidelines was available as complete as Microsoft version (i.e. based 
from the author knowledge).  However, the main focal point of this user study was to 
assess the security warning dialogue that specifically involved with end-users decision 
making that impacted security and protection of their computer (e.g. downloading 
software, updated security patches, passwords).  To be more specific, most security 
warning dialogues within these scenarios presented at least two or more options for 
users to choose.     
 
If users encountered security warnings with one option, it is still useful for the author to 
analyse the effectiveness of current implementation of security warning dialogue with 
regards to the adequacy of information provided to help users.  Security warning with 
one option was inclined to focus on fixed decision such as “Yes” and “Ok” instead.  
Therefore, these contexts of warning tended to give instant information, rather than 
show the criticality of decision making that significantly impacted the security and 
protection. 
 
For every security warning dialogue that users received, they had to make a decision by 
choosing any available option given (i.e. by pressing any button or close).  After this, 
users were presented with a custom dialogue box (i.e. in real-time), and were asked 
about the sufficient level of information on the warning dialogue that users had just 
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received.  This software also captured the “receiving time” for every security warning 
that users received, and “action time” with regards to the time when users took any 
action on the security message (i.e. by pressing any button or close).  Later, the 
outcomes of this user study were sent via zipped file to the principal investigator by e-
mail or drop box application (refer to Appendix C). 
 
Based on the initial investigation by the author, no specific technique had to be abided 
by in order to conduct research into security warnings.  Therefore, the author made use 
in this study of assessing warning in real-time contexts.  This task was seen to be very 
challenging because the program needed to interact with the operating system and other 
application (i.e. in order to hook security warnings in the first place).  Further details 
will be provided in the next section.   
 
5.3 Study design 
 
The survey tool was developed using Microsoft Visual Studio Professional (2010), 
specifically using C# Programming language.  This platform was chosen because of its 
ability to interact with Windows application programs and other browser developments.  
Users installed this software for five days in their own computer and they were able to 
use their computer as usual.  All detection processes was conducted in the background.  
However, at some point, the custom dialogue boxes popped (i.e. for every dialogue box) 
as a distraction to end-users.  Thus, users had been explained about this and they were 
aware about it on the first place.  This user study was promoted using a similar approach 
with Chapter 4 (i.e. via e-mail, news entry information on university internal staff and 
student websites and word of mouth) in December 2011. 
 
5.3.1 Survey 
 
After the users had installed the software on their computer, they then needed to fill in a 
demographic survey.  This section comprised demographic information on users’ 
background and experience related to general usage of computer (i.e. age, gender, 
education, computing skills, years of using computer and Internet, preferred browser 
and operating system).  It may be noted that there were similarities in regards to the 
demographic details between this user study and the previous ones (Chapter 3 and 
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Chapter 4).  The final part of this section required users to answer specific question 
related to decision making upon receiving security message in general context rather 
than to one specific type of security warning.  This provided some basis for 
understanding end-users’ perceptions of the security warning in the period before the 
main user study began.  
 
5.3.2 Study protocol 
 
In this study, each dialogue box that popped up on the users’ computer was detected by 
a custom built-in program based on the Windows handle (i.e. class name, header and 
application name) from three main web browsers (i.e. Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox 
and Google Chrome) and from the other applications that shared a similar class or 
application name.  These three web browsers were chosen because the majority of users 
have indicated that they were their preferred web browsers in previous user studies (i.e. 
Chapter 3 and 4).  In addition, W3Schools (1999) also claimed that these three web 
browsers was considered to be the most popular choices.  Users firstly had to install the 
software as with the previous user study in Chapter 4.  Once the installation was 
complete, users received notification as depicted in Figure 5.1.  This indicated that the 
software was now running and that the detection process of the dialogue box may begin 
at any time. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Notification appeared once the software was installed 
 
For every single dialogue box that users encountered, they made a decision by pressing 
any of the available options provided (i.e. in this context, options were referred to 
buttons instead of the hyperlink).  Once the dialogue box popped up, the software 
captured the “receiving time” and later, when users clicked any buttons, “action time” 
was also captured.  In addition, the dialogue box image was captured and saved 
accordingly in a folder which pinned up a specific id in the database.  After users 
clicked any of the buttons available, they quickly received a custom dialogue box 
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asking them: “Did you have enough information to understand the security dialogue that 
you just answered?” with three options; Yes, No and Not sure as depicted in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Custom dialogue box 
 
Users received a custom dialogue box instantly or in real-time after took any action (i.e. 
by pressing any button or close) with previous security warning dialogue box.  All users’ 
decisions were saved in the database accordingly.  Once everything was completed, 
users were required to send the results using the Dropbox application, which had to be 
installed in advance (See guidance sheet in Appendix C).  This was a summary of the 
steps undertaken by the user to complete the tasks: 
 
1) Firstly, users received a standard security message/warning (i.e. dialogue box)  
2) Then, users made a decision (i.e. clicked any options)  
3) Subsequently, users were presented with custom dialogue box with the questions 
about security decision making process.   
4) Then, the user made a decision (i.e. clicked any options) and the results saved in 
database accordingly. 
5) After 5 days, users were required to send the results either by handing in the pen 
drive or via the Dropbox application. 
(Note: Details of instruction are given in the Appendix C) 
 
5.3.3 Study Participants 
 
This study recruited 36 respondents, which comprising 14 males and 22 females (i.e. 
almost consistent with previous Chapter 4).  Respondents were primarily staff or 
students from Plymouth University, and some were from the public community.  These 
respondents were allowed to use the software either in their workplace or home as long 
as they consistently used the same computer for five days.  It may be noted that all 
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figures and percentages within this chapter were based on the proportions of 
respondents in this study (i.e. due to rounding some of the presented results was not 
total to 100%).  Every user was reminded that they had the right to withdraw at any 
stage in the study. 
 
5.4 Results and findings 
 
From this user study, it may be revealed that 69% of total respondents were aged 26 -35 
years, with at least an undergraduate level of study as depicted in Table 5.2.  As this 
study was well promoted within the university’s environment, it reflected the high 
percentage of higher and postgraduate level of education.  In terms of computing skills, 
surprisingly, the majority claimed to be intermediate, albeit they claimed to have at least 
a higher education level.  All respondents claimed to have used the Internet for more 
than six years.  These results show that the majority of users were well versed in the 
usage of information technology. Interestingly, these results were similar to the previous 
findings, as discussed in Chapter 4.  This study also revealed that Internet Explorer, 
Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome were among the top choices in terms of their 
preferred web browsers.  The majority also preferred to use a Windows-based operating 
system (i.e. Windows 7, XP and Vista) whilst only one user preferred Mac OS X.   It 
may be noted that the vast majority of respondents demonstrated that they used security 
software (94.4%) whilst others were not using this, or were not sure (5.6%).  The last 
question asked of users related to their perception with regard to the ease of use of 
security warnings in general.  Users indicated here that they were able to make a 
security decision (44.4%), having difficulty (13.9%) and not sure (41.7%).  Hence, 55.6% 
of total respondents claimed that they were still baffled with regards to the security 
warning decision that they had made in general.  Based on this evidences, end-users had 
significant problems with regards to the decision making process that impacted the 
security and protection of their computers.  
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Characteristics 
(n = 36) 
Frequency 
Distribution 
Percentage 
Distribution (%) 
 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
Age 
18 - 25 
26 - 35 
36 - 45 
46 - 55 
Above 56 
 
Educational Background 
Postgraduate 
Higher Education 
Diploma, Further Education 
GNVQ 
GCSE/ O Level 
 
Computing skills 
Expert 
Advanced 
Intermediate 
Beginner 
 
Security software usage 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
 
 
Years using Internet 
<1 
1 - 2 
 
 
14 
22 
 
 
6 
25 
4 
0 
1 
 
 
16 
17 
0 
0 
3 
 
 
3 
13 
19 
1 
 
 
34 
1 
1 
 
 
 
0 
0 
 
 
38.9 
61.1 
 
 
16.7 
69.4 
11.1 
0.0 
2.8 
 
 
44.4 
47.2 
0.0 
0.0 
8.3 
 
 
8.3 
36.1 
52.8 
2.8 
 
 
94.4 
2.8 
2.8 
 
 
 
0.0 
0.0 
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Characteristics 
(n = 36) 
Frequency 
Distribution 
Percentage 
Distribution (%) 
3 - 4 
5 - 6 
> 6 
 
Preferred web browser 
Google Chrome 
Internet Explorer 
Mozilla Firefox 
Safari 
Opera 
I do not know 
 
Preferred operating system 
Windows 7 
Windows Vista 
Windows XP 
Mac OS X 
Linux 
I do not know 
 
Easy to make security decision in 
general 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
0 
0 
36 
 
 
17 
7 
12 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
18 
1 
16 
1 
0 
0 
 
 
 
16 
5 
15 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
 
 
47.2 
19.4 
33.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
50.0 
2.8 
44.4 
2.8 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
 
44.4 
13.9 
41.7 
Table 5.2: Respondents demographic background 
 
5.4.1 User interaction with various dialogue boxes 
 
Each user faced different type of dialogue box based on their usage of web browsers 
and applications on daily basis.  Overall, all 36 users captured 5923 dialogue boxes (i.e. 
that included the duplications).  This software minimised the duplication processed by 
allowing the duplication to occur only once.  If it occurred again, the dialogue box was 
ignored and no custom dialogue box would pop up.  This thesis will not discuss every 
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single dialogue box captured; however it seeks to highlight the most suitable and 
appropriate within the context of this study (i.e. focused were given to security warnings 
dialogues that involved end-users decision making that impacted the security and 
protection of their computer).    
 
Based on these findings, users experienced many types of dialogue box (i.e. some can 
be considered as security warning and some were actually not).  Even though all pop-
ups were treated as a security warning, the author later made their own classification, 
choosing the most relevant to be discussed in this chapter for further clarification.  With 
regard to dialogues boxes which did not  impact end-user security and protection, the 
author did not ignored or reject these, but used them  to further probe the effectiveness 
of the features available (i.e. signal icons, signal words, technical terminology and help 
options).  Table 5.3 presents some classifications of the dialogue box based on the 
application name.  These classifications were derived from the most popular application 
name which focused specifically on three main web browsers Internet Explorer, Mozilla 
Firefox and Google Chrome.  Therefore, the author believed that because of the 
familiarity of the dialogue box contexts by end-users, many security warnings dialogue 
box that users encountered would be derived from the mentioned web browsers.  It may 
be revealed that on average, 52% of respondents of the three web browsers (i.e. 
Chrome.exe, Firefox.exe and Iexplorer.exe) chose no and not sure with regards to the 
information depicted in regards to understanding the security message that they received 
on daily routine within five days of the conducted studied.  On the other hand, users 
demonstrated on average 33% with no and not sure with regards to the level of 
information based on four Microsoft Office applications (i.e. Excel.exe, Outlook.exe, 
Powerpnt.exe and Winword.exe).  In terms of other applications, Acrord32.exe was 
generally related to the Acrobat process.  Rundll32.exe, meanwhile, was related to the 
Dynamic Link Library files normally included in every application folder (i.e. open file 
and add/remove program) that can be accessed from multiple applications.  Both were 
presented with 31.3% and 41.6% respectively. 
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Application Name 
Quantity 
Detected 
Yes No 
Not 
Sure 
% No and 
Not Sure 
Acrord32.exe 272 187 55 30 31.3 
Chrome.exe 274 159 44 71 42 
Excel.exe 73 58 7 8 20.5 
Explorer.exe 679 416 110 153 38.7 
Firefox.exe 363 133 141 89 63.4 
Iexplorer.exe 422 214 108 100 49.3 
Outlook.exe 581 500 32 49 13.9 
Powerpnt.exe 47 21 10 16 55.3 
Rundll32.exe 221 129 28 64 41.6 
Winword.exe 503 292 66 145 41.9 
 3435     
Table 5.3: Results of the classification of dialogue box based on application name 
 
The results indicated in Table 5.3 provided evidence that users generally faced 
difficulties in regards to the information presented on every security warning dialogue 
that they encountered on daily basis.  The next following sections address the specific 
scenarios or cases that users experienced.      
 
5.4.2 Conflicts with guidelines scenarios 
 
In Chapter 4, the author used Microsoft (2010) as the basis or reference with regards to 
the guidelines that covered the design concept of security message contexts.  Therefore, 
the assessment conducted was based on the Microsoft Guidelines.   The purpose of the 
custom dialogue box presented after each dialogue box was to determine an answer 
from users based on the following question: 
 
“Did you have enough information to understand the security dialogue that you just 
answered? 
 
Whilst assessing users’ feedback, the author compiled a set of security warnings that 
were considered to have problem with the usage of signal cues (i.e. icons and words) 
and its context.  According to Microsoft (2010), there were four types of standard icons 
that had been used with a specific meaning: 
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i. Error icon – It presents an error or problem that has occurred 
ii. Warning icon – It presents a situation that might cause a problem in future 
iii. Information icon – It presents useful information 
iv. Question mark icon – It been used as a Help entry point 
By using this guideline as a reference for this study, it may be noted that conflicts 
occurred with the usage of icons in the dialogue box contexts, as depicted in Figure 5.3 
(A-F). 
 
A:Mismatch of Question mark icon  
B:Mismatch of Question mark icon 
 
C:Mismatch of Information icon 
 
D:Mismatch of Information icon 
 
E: Mismatch of warning icon 
 
F: Mismatch of warning icon 
Figure 5.3: Conflicts on security warning features 
 
Figure 5.3-A was derived from Mozilla Firefox.  It used a question mark icon, in line 
with the header “Are you sure?” which can be portrayed as a question.  Surprisingly, the 
other dialogues boxes were captured from Internet Explorer applications.  Figure 5.3-B 
used the question mark icon to ask question whether the user should proceed or not to 
clean up the disk space.  This clearly conflicted with the main purpose of the question 
mark icon that should be used as help entry point.  On the other hand, Figure 5.3 (C & 
D) used the information icon, but surprisingly, it presented a question statement to users.  
Based on Microsoft (2010) Guidelines, the information icon may only be used to 
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present information in the banners context, and not in the dialogue box context.  On the 
other hand, Figure 5.3 (E & F) used a warning icon to explain the severity of the 
message. However, the information provided in each warning had been described as an 
error (i.e. error whilst connecting and decompression error).  Clearly, this conflicted 
with the basic use of a signal icon in the first place.     
5.4.3 Consistency of warning dialogues 
 
This section presents the significant security warnings scenarios that users encountered, 
based on their participation in this user study.  Not all the security warnings captured 
will be discussed in this section, but the most suitable and relevant will be presented 
accordingly, case by case.  Security warnings with regards to file download were among 
the most popular experienced by the participants, as depicted in Figure 5.4.  It may be 
noted that this shared similar headings, but was presented with different options, 
information and signal icons.  These were the dialogues that were captured from the 
Internet Explorer browsers, as depicted in Figure 5.4 (A-D).  
 
 
A:Footnote with question mark icon 
 
B:Footnote with question mark icon 
 
C:Security warning with File Download 
header 
 
D:Security warning with File Download – 
Security Warning header 
Figure 5.4: Consistency of security warnings 
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The Table 5.4 was determined to highlight the comparison based on the header title, 
options available, signal icons, signal words and technical terminology.  More details of 
comparison had been discussed in a conference paper (refer to Appendix C).  
 
Differences Details of description 
Header All dialogue box using the same “File Download” header 
except on Figure 5.4-D using “File Download – Security 
Warning”. 
Options available There were three types of options presented, as follows: 
 Find, Save, Cancel and Close 
 Open, Save, Cancel and Close 
 Run, Save, Cancel and Close 
The available answers were provided based on the given 
question to users.  One interesting observation can be 
made from here, namely that even though the decision 
making process involved some potential risks (e.g. 
downloading malware), users still were allowed to 
proceed.  
Signal Icons In terms of signal icon usage, it can be noted that 2 
types of signal icons (i.e. question mark and warning) 
been used in the dialogues box (i.e. particularly in the 
footnote area).  It may also be noted that there were four 
other types of icons been used based on the type of files 
detected (i.e. top left corner).  For example, Figure 5.4 (B 
& C) were using Ms Excel and Word icon whilst the rest 
using unknown icon (i.e. white square background). 
Signal Words It can be noted that Figure 5.4-D used “security warning” 
signal word as compared to others as the file was 
detected to be .exe file. 
Technical terminology It can be noted that users were presented with different 
level of information upon detection the filename.  Some 
available features used technical expressions to explain 
to users (i.e. name of the file, type and from).  For 
instance, having presented with 87.248.114.86 URL was 
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Differences Details of description 
not useful at all for end-users.  They were unable to 
learn with regards to the decimal representation of URL 
without explaining what it meant and the purpose of 
having it in the first place.   
Table 5.4: Comparison on the features of the warnings 
 
In terms of the header title of the security warnings, only Figure 5.4-D used a different 
header name.  The main reason that “Security Warning” terminology was used was that 
the file name extension was detected as .exe by the computer.  This therefore posed a 
significant danger to users if they proceeded to execute the file (i.e. an executable file 
can easily propagate malware).  On the other hand, for other types of security warnings, 
it was of an identifiable type such as Excel and word files, whilst Figure 5.4-A was 
derived from an unknown file type, but surprisingly, the header remained the same as 
Figure 5.4 (A & B).    
 
From the perspective of the available options, both Microsoft files warnings (i.e. Excel 
and Word) offered three options (i.e. open, save and cancel): Figure 5.4-A with find, 
save and cancel and Figure 5.4-D with run, save and cancel.  Where the computer was 
unable to detect the file extension or type, the “find” option was available to users, 
whereas if the file was an executable file, the run option was provided.  For other types 
of file extension, as presented, the open option was used.  From these layouts, the 
primary question posed to the users was a question with two options for the user to 
choose, such as the following: 
 
“Do you want to save this file or find a program online to open it? 
Do you want to open or save this file? 
Do you want to run or save this file?” 
 
The security warnings presented required users to make a choice without further 
explaining the current contexts or problems that users faced.  It would be troublesome, 
especially to the laymen or general population, to make such decisions without proper 
knowledge of the computer.  It would meanwhile be interesting if all of these security 
warnings could be presented at the same time and then end-users would be able to share 
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their insights.  In terms of the signal icons, two observations can be made.  The first was 
the icon used in the content area, and the second was in the footnote area.  With regards 
to the icon on content area, Figure 5.4 - B & C used specific word and an excel file icon.  
However, with Figure 5.4 – A & D, an unidentified program icon (white background) 
was used that was not understandable.  On the other hand, a question mark and warning 
icon were used accordingly in the footnote area.  Surprisingly, even though two 
different icons were used, the information presented in the footnote area still remained 
the same.  Therefore, the users were not convinced the severity of the message (i.e. 
different icons had different impacts).  
 
In terms of signal words, only Figure 5.4-D used security warning jargon to indicate the 
severity of the message (i.e. executable file .exe).  For the rest of the security warnings, 
no specific signal word was utilised.  Finally, with regard to the technical terminology 
presented on each warning, the author focused on the information provided in the 
footnote area.  It may be noted that all four warnings shared the same information 
except for the signal icon used.  The way that information on the footnote area was 
presumably simple and understandable except users had to click the link to get more 
details (i.e. will pops-up help dialogue).  One critical observation may be made from 
this, namely that having a separated content and footnote area drew a distinction as to 
whether the information provided at the bottom was meant for the current problems (i.e. 
content area) or a separate document to explain general help functions.  For users who 
were able to explore more details, they might understand the use of this link.  
Nevertheless, for the laymen, it is difficult for them to understand that the link provided 
actually helps function for them. 
 
5.4.3.1 Warning dialogues case by case 
 
In continuing from the previous section, this section further explains the outcomes of 
the user study.  Eleven participants received warning dialogue boxes as depicted in 
Figure 5.4 (A-C) and on average they took five seconds to take any action (i.e. pressing 
any buttons or close).  Nine out of eleven participants had chosen no and not sure with 
regards to the custom dialogue box they received.  On the other hand, with regard to the 
security warning dialogue in Figure 5.4 – D, eight participants experienced it and it took 
on average twelve seconds to take any action (i.e. by pressing any button or close).  
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Three respondents did not encounter any problems and took less than three seconds to 
make up their minds,  leaving seven respondents baffled an replying  no and not sure.  It 
may be speculated that a security warning with an executable file had more impact in 
terms of user decision processes, as users demonstrated that a longer period of time was 
needed.   
 
 
Figure 5.5: Security warning from Microsoft Outlook 
 
On the other hand, four users had used Microsoft Outlook and received the same 
security dialogue with regards to opening a mail attachment, as depicted in Figure 5.5.  
It may be argued that the question mark icon was used in incorrect position as it 
supposed to be used as help entry point.  A warning icon should be used instead because 
the main content of this dialogue box stated that “you should only open attachments 
from a trustworthy source”.  Therefore, it warned users to take precautions before 
opening the file.  Based on this scenario, conflict occurred with regards to the usage of 
question mark icon.  Surprisingly on average, respondents took only three seconds to 
make a decision.  It may also be noted that there no proper help or guidance in this 
security warning dialogue was provided that users could rely on.   
 
 
Figure 5.6: Security warning to opening file in Google Chrome 
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Based on Figure 5.6, six respondents experienced this type of security warning.  Clearly, 
with the “warning” wording on the header and the warning icon in the footnote area, 
users were likely to be alerted to the severity of this warning dialogue box.  
Respondents took on average ten seconds to make a decision.  This might be because 
users needed to obtain more information as to whether to proceed or not, as it involved 
some risks. Two out of six respondents claimed that the information was sufficient, 
whilst leaving the rest as no and not sure.  Although the footnote area provided some 
useful information, it still used technical words to explain the context of the warning (i.e. 
publishers you trust).  With regard to this warning, one observation can be made, 
namely that Google Chrome shared almost the same method of presenting security 
warnings as Microsoft in terms of presentation of warnings (i.e. content and footnote 
area).  From the author’s assessment, in having a distinct separation between content 
and footnote area, users have to go down further to find the help link, instead of having 
it in the content area.  Even though information was provided in the footnote area, users 
may ignore it because they have to read all the details.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: Security warning on 
downloading file from Mozilla Firefox 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Security warning once users execute the 
save file on computer 
 
On the other hand, seven users encountered security warning regarding the download 
file from Mozilla Firefox, as presented in Figure 5.7.  This dialogue box looked very 
simple, insofar as no sufficient or useful information was given to user.  Neither was 
there any proper signal cues used to indicate to users the severity of the current security 
message except the “program icon”.  Respondents took approximately four seconds on 
average to take action in response to this security warning.  It may be noted that users 
can only preceded by saving the file or cancelling the operation.  Two of the seven 
respondents claimed that there were no further problems with regard to the information 
provided, whilst the rest decided on ‘no’ and ‘not sure’.  Interestingly, only one 
respondent actually clicked the saved file from the warning dialogue and received 
another security warning as depicted in Figure 5.8.  As this security warning was 
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derived from Mozilla Firefox, it clearly contradicted the Microsoft Guidelines.  For 
instance, the header title was depicted in the form of a question, and a question mark 
icon was also used in the primary area of the warning.  It may also be noted that more 
technical jargon was used within this dialogue (e.g. malicious, executable file and the 
file name) without proper guidance to help users.    
 
 
Figure 5.9: Security warning from Mozilla Firefox 
 
A further example derived from Mozilla Firefox was experienced by four respondents 
on Figure 5.9.  All of these respondents were not satisfied with the level of information 
provided in this dialogue box and took three seconds on average to make up their mind.  
The way information had been delivered was confusing.  It appeared that the question 
mark icon was used to ask the user a question instead of providing a help entry point, as 
mentioned in the Microsoft Guidelines.  
 
 
Figure 5.10: Security warning whilst 
opening link from Microsoft Office 
 
Figure 5.11: Security warning to view webpage 
Three users experienced security warnings as portrayed in Figure 5.10.  On average, 
they took three seconds to make a decision and all of them claimed they were not 
satisfied with the information provided.  It may be noted that the information provided 
in the content area used technical terminology (i.e. “viruses” and “trustworthy source”) 
and simultaneously, no further guidance was provided.  Surprisingly, users took a very 
short time to proceed with the decision.  It may be noted that the real impact if users 
were to proceed to open the file was significantly dangerous, because it might have a 
direct impact on the whole computer system (i.e. presumably the file contains malware).  
On the other hand, three users took three seconds on average with regards to making a 
decision based on the security warnings on Figure 5.11.  All of these users claimed that 
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there was insufficient information for them to understand the warning message.  The 
information depicted in the content area on the dialogue box used some technical jargon 
(i.e. “HTTPS” that indicates as Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure and “compromise 
the security”).    
 
Figure 5.12 portrayed three different types of security warning, with the usage of 
complicated information.  There were two respondents experienced on each of the 
dialogue, and on average, it took less than three seconds to make a decision. All of the 
users claimed no and not sure with regards to the custom dialogue box they received.  It 
may be noted that the level of information depicted in the warnings was too technical, 
and would be unable to allow users to comprehend the current context: for instance, the 
usage of technical terminology such as protected mode, debug, error report, and 
unresponsive script.  This might contribute to a quick decision process by the users (i.e. 
user might learn to visually dismiss the warning dialogue when they are not happy or in 
baffled with it).   
 
Lay users experiencing this security warning were likely to be baffled by the decision 
making process.  Furthermore, the look and feel of these warnings was complicated, 
with too much information being provided.  Figure 5.12 – C for instance depicted with 
long scripts URL which was totally confusing.  Users were unable to learn anything 
from this.  In terms of help function with these warning, it may be noted there was a 
link provided, as presented on Figure 5.12 (A & B).  Although the link was there, users 
demonstrated that it was still not sufficient (i.e. possibly with users attitude as 
demonstrated in previous findings where they neglected to read computer warning 
(Sunshine et al. 2009 and Bahr & Ford 2010), and implementation was too complicated 
for general users (Egelman et al. 2008 and Whitten & Tygar 1999) and they were unable 
to understand complex terminology (Zaaba et al. 2011, Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011 and 
Zaaba et al. 2012). 
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A 
 
B 
 
C 
Figure 5.12: Security warnings with complicated information 
 
 
5.5 Feedback comments 
 
User feedback was derived from e-mails sent upon completion of the study, which is 
similar to the previous user study.  It was not compulsory for users to send the feedback, 
but some did not hesitate to do so.  Whilst not fully representative, below are some 
selected responses: 
i. “This software captures many security warnings and sometimes it interrupts my 
current task” (User 5). 
 
ii. “It would be useful if this software able to ask more different questions such as 
providing a textbox where users can give some comments or opinions” (User 
13) 
 
iii. “I really like the idea sending the results using Dropbox.  Normally I send any 
experiment results just by e-mail. Having used the software, I able to learn 
something new and beneficial” (User 25) 
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iv. “The software is quite sensitive and able to detect most of dialogues box in my 
computer but it is very light program. I can understand the flow of the software 
easily especially with the help of guidance sheet” (User 28) 
 
v. “The overall information is mixed up between important and unimportant things.  
I cannot find any help unless I click the link.  It is frustrating because too many 
details were provided” (User 30). 
 
vi. “There were information provided most of the time but sadly I do not understand 
it” (User 32) 
 
vii. “I am ok with some of the information provided.  But it could be more 
meaningful if developers can explain it in a simple way” (User 35) 
 
Based on these comments, some users demonstrated that they had problems in 
understanding the information regarding the security dialogue, and they suggested that 
it should be presented in a simple way, and with clarity (i.e. enough explanation on 
technical terminology, useful features to communicate the risk).  In addition, users 
expressed their feelings with regard to the usage of Dropbox as a new tool (i.e. able to 
learn new thing).  Hence, it may be suggested that this method helped to open a new 
dimension of data collection for future research.  
 
5.6 Constraints 
 
The software can only be used on three specific web browsers (i.e. Internet Explorer, 
Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox) and on some other application that shared a 
similar class or application name. As mentioned before, all dialogue boxes that users 
received were treated as security warnings in  the first place (i.e. due to the difficulty to 
classify one specific type of security warning dialogue and the general classification 
was based on class name or application name).  With regard to the other dialogues box 
that were not impacted users’ decision (i.e. security and protection), this was not  
ignored directly, but assessed and selected if problems with security features existed (i.e. 
signal icons, signal words, technical terminology and help options).   
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5.7 Discussions 
 
This chapter presented the results of users’ understanding of whether enough 
information was available for them to understand the security dialogue that they 
encountered on a daily basis.  As discussed earlier, this user study was a continuous 
study from Chapter 4.  A software prototype was used as a tool to probe a sufficient 
level of information in a real time context.  A custom dialogue box pops-up on every 
security warning that users’ receive (i.e. after users took an action by pressing button or 
close).   
 
This chapter also highlighted several noteworthy similar contributions from the 
aforementioned Chapter 4.  It further revealed that technical terminology was widely 
used in dialogue box contexts, and that these might complicate users’ understandings of 
the warnings. In some circumstances, signal icons and words was used in the wrong 
contexts.  It can be noted that the help function was provided in some of the warnings, 
but that users still claimed the information was not enough (i.e. presumably the way 
information been delivered was not effective).  The main reference for users to rely on 
during the incident was the help function.  If these functions could not be comprehended 
and guided users in terms of decisions and explaining the current problems, it 
significantly impacted the wrongdoing decision.     
 
Based on the findings from 36 respondents, it may be suggested that end-users still 
faced significant problem with level of information in security warnings they 
encountered.  Evidences that had been gathered in this chapter (i.e. Table 5.3 and other 
presented scenarios) indicated the need for methods to guide users in terms of how 
information should be presented to help users understand the problem they encountered, 
the level of risk, the consequences of actions and any possible action to take.  In most 
tasks, users took on average less than three seconds to view the security warnings they 
received, then they quickly made decision.  The three seconds time frame was 
considered lower, and they possibly merely skimmed the overall warning message.  
These findings also support the results of Bahr and Ford (2010), namely that people 
quickly learnt to visually and cognitively dismiss the warning.  This current study 
confirms the previous findings in Chapter 3 and 4 regarding the fact that not enough 
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information was provided for users to make decision with regards to the warning that 
impacted user’s decision process, system and computer.   
 
5.8 Focus and direction of study 
 
The major concern that this thesis sought to highlight was the decisions that users had to 
make.  If they made incorrect ones, this might jeopardise the security and protection of 
users’ computers as a whole.  Therefore, in order to reduce the risks of becoming a 
victim of computer menace resulting from wrong decision, security warnings must be 
improved accordingly.  
 
Chapter 4 examined the comprehensibility of issues on information security in general, 
but particular attention was given to computer warnings in computer scenario study.  
From the results of the 564 respondents, it may be suggested that possible action needs 
to be taken to improve perception and usability, specifically with regard to the design of 
the current security warning interface.  54% of respondents claimed that not enough 
information had been presented with regard to the security dialogue.  They (25% of 
responses) also claimed that they had difficulties with regards to the phishing warning, 
especially in relation to technical terminology, the nature of the event being described 
and the available choices.    
 
Chapter 4 continued to investigate the wider evaluation of perceived security warnings 
contexts (i.e. dialogue box, notification, balloon, in place and banner) by giving 
flexibility to users to capture security warning based on their beliefs.  Focus was given 
to the usage of signal icons, signal words, help function, technical terminology and 
available options (i.e. consistent with previous findings).   The results from the 40 
respondents indicated that they still experienced significant warning problems, 
especially in term of dialogue boxes and banners. It may be noted that none of the mean 
values in warning dialogue box (191 captured) was designated as “agree” or “strongly 
agree” with regards to all the questions presented on the questionnaire (i.e. to indicate 
users are satisfied with the implementation).  Among the lowest mean values derived 
from question 9 “There are enough information in this security message” and question 3 
“the message (and any associated help) provides sufficient details to understand what to 
do next” with 3.31 and 3.54 respectively. This result indicated consistent problems 
CHAPTER 5: FURTHER APPRAISAL OF SECURITY WARNINGS IN REAL-TIME 
CONTEXTS 
 
 
 
 
153 
occurring with regards to the level of information provided in warnings in the 
aforementioned Chapter 3.   
 
Based on the two user studies (i.e. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) conducted, issues of 
information became prominent.  Crucially, if users are unable to understand the 
information provided (i.e. by using help facilities), the possible consequences can lead 
them to the wrong decision.  Later, this may jeopardise the security and protection of 
users’ computer.  Therefore, Chapter 5 looked in particular at probing end-users within 
a real context, specifically with level of information provided in a real-time context.  
Based on the 36 responses, it may be noted that 52% of overall respondents of three 
web browsers had chosen “no” and “not sure” with regards to the information depicted 
in warnings to help them understand the message.  Conflicts and inconsistencies with 
the guidelines still occur, especially concerning warnings from Microsoft products (i.e. 
signal icon, signal word, technical terminologies).  It may also be revealed that users 
took less than three seconds to view the warnings they received (i.e. time was measured 
based on the difference between the dialogue appearing and the time of users’ decision 
by pressing any button or closing).  Based on these overall results, it may be indicated 
that users consistently have difficulties in assessing the information available on 
security warnings.  A security warning dialogue box became the focal point of this 
thesis, based on the results presented in Chapter 4 (i.e. the most captured and identified 
as security warnings by responses).     
 
This thesis has made use of all of the evidence from the literature reviews (Chapter 2), 
the initial examination on comprehensibility of information security issues (Chapter 3), 
investigation of the practicality of the warnings context (Chapter 4) and further 
appraisal of warnings in a real context (Chapter 5) to confirm that end-users experience 
significant difficulties with security warnings, especially in regards to the information 
provided for them.  The problems encountered consistently were based on the empirical 
evidence presented in this thesis.  Therefore, this thesis draws a line by proposing a new 
technique to present warnings in a better way (i.e. improve version).  It is anticipated 
that the next study will utilise the information (i.e. via help function) so that users are 
able to comprehend the current contexts of the problem and able to guide them to make 
safe decisions with regard to the security and protection of users’ computer systems.  
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An Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) is introduced as a novel 
framework to improve security warnings, as explained in detail in Chapter 6, and the 
results of the evaluation and validation of the framework are presented in Chapter 7.  
 
5.9 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, Table 5.3 provides evidence that users generally face difficulties with 
regard to the information presented on every security warning dialogue they encounter 
on a daily basis.  In terms of time usage, most users took less than three seconds to view 
the security warning and then quickly made a decision to get rid of the warnings given.  
It may be noted that the information provided still did not reveal what was happening, 
and guided them to make a better decision.  It may also be noted that the usage of 
technical terminology still existed in the current security warnings.  However, there was 
a guideline (i.e. Microsoft), with conflicts still happening especially in the usage of 
signal icon and signal words.  In terms of consistency of warnings, it may be noted that 
there were some issues and confusion that could be highlighted (see conference paper in 
the Appendix E).  Having assessed the evidence, it may be suggested that the 
presentation of the warnings dialogue may be significantly improved in order to convey 
the meaning of the message, and promoted secure manner decision for end-users.        
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6 A Novel Architecture for Automated Security Interface 
Adaptation (ASIA) 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Having considered the positive empirical evidence from user studies (Chapter 3 – 
Chapter 5), it is essential to design a novel architecture to provide end-users with 
improved security warnings.  Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) has been 
introduced based on the rationale that end-users are still facing difficulties when 
encountering security warnings from web browsers as demonstrated in a series of user 
studies in Chapters 3 –5 (refer to the focus and direction of study section in Chapter 5).  
The results suggest that end-users consistently experienced significant problems in 
security warnings that they encountered especially in relation to the information that had 
been provided for them.  A series of user studies had been conducted to explore, to 
investigate and to probe for further details about the initial problems in terms of users 
understanding of security warnings via a survey, user trials and real-time study in 
relation to security warning dialogues that end-users encountered on a daily basis.  
Some of the results obtained through the user studies based on different types of web-
browsers, users background specifically education and types of security warnings are as 
the following: 
 
 Web browsers- In Chapter 5, it was revealed that on average, 52% of 
respondents that encountered security warnings in three web browsers (i.e. 
Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer) demonstrated that there 
was not enough information provided in the warning dialogues.  
 
  Users background- It can be noted that the majority of these respondents 
reported that they were educated to a higher education or postgraduate level.  In 
addition, they classified themselves as expert or advanced (44%), intermediate 
(53%) and beginner (3%) and all of them had been using the Internet for more 
than 6 years.  
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 Warning Types- In a more specific example, nineteen users experienced the 
“File Download” type of warnings (the most common warning that end-users 
encountered).  Fourteen of them (nine females and five males) had chosen No 
and Not Sure with regards to the custom made security dialogue pops-up for 
them with five claiming to understand the warning information presented.  On 
the other hand, six respondents (four females and two males) experienced the 
“Open File – Security Warning” type of warning.  It can be revealed in two out 
of six respondents indicated the information was enough whilst leaving the 
others (four females) with no and not sure.        
 
Therefore, this suggested that the participants were derived from people who had a good 
education background and were also demonstrating a level of familiarity in terms of 
using computers based on their reported skills and period of using the Internet.  Even 
though they had experience using the Internet for more than six years, it can be noted 
that a significant amount of end-users (especially female participants) had chosen ‘not 
sure’ or ‘no’ in relation to the information provided in the warning dialogues.  This 
reflects the need for further understanding on how the security warning dialogue would 
be able to improve by utilising the information that are expected to help and to navigate 
users in acting in a secure manner.  By gathering all of the presented evidence in the 
previous chapters, this thesis proposes a new architecture to present warnings that will 
caters end-users need based on the information provided namely “Automated Security 
Interface Adaptation (ASIA)”.    
   
6.2 Related Works 
In order to improve the current circumstances with security warnings, several 
approaches have been discussed in Chapter 2.  As most of the previous research focused 
on redesigning the warnings in order to improve the performance and understanding, a 
lack of focus had been given to developing an architecture or framework that would be 
useful as a guidance to improve warnings presentation.  However, based on the work 
outlined previously, only one of these studies had produced an architecture or 
framework as a new way of interaction for end-users with security warnings dialogues.  
Therefore, this chapter builds on the findings to develop a novel architecture.  The 
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comparison of several approaches had been discussed in Chapter 2 but in this chapter a 
specific comparison would focus on comparisons between the author’s architecture and 
the ASD architecture.  A more detailed comparison can be viewed in Appendix D 
accordingly.  The author’s work has similar underlying intention to improve security 
warnings as proposed by Keukelaere et al. (2009) with their Adaptive Security Dialogs 
(ASD).  Interestingly, both studies highlighted the important aspects of usability of 
warnings to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and users satisfaction 
 
However, a parallel to be drawn from both studies is very clear where ASIA improve 
security warnings (i.e. utilising 50 respondents) by encouraging users to use the help 
function in order to generate security warnings based on their preferences on how 
warnings should be presented in the whole systems.  In addition, it utilises the 
additional and useful functions (i.e. hover with quick information, risk level bar, 
guidance information and matching the signal cues with current context of warning) to 
ensure that warnings are presented in a presentable fashion.  On the other hand, ASD 
(i.e. utilising 24 respondents) improves the warnings based on the risk that users are 
exposed to in five fixed different types of dialogue box (i.e. warn & continue multiple 
choice, security training, blank filling and clarification) where it matches the complexity 
of security warning dialogues with the risk associated based on the decision that has to 
be made by users.  ASD adapted security dialogues to the risk that they had been 
exposed to.  Thus, when users received security warnings from opening text file and 
when opening pdf file will be different (i.e. to change the common scenarios on security 
warnings).  On the other hand, ASIA adapted security warning dialogues based on users’ 
choice of preferences on what type of information should be presented in security 
warnings.  Thus, based on their preferences, users will receive security warnings that 
cater to their needs rather than the default security warnings.  The common ground from 
both is that both warnings improved in respect of presentation and usability of security 
warnings from the standard version.  On the other hand both versions of warnings also 
worked differently in the sense that it caters to different goals.         
 
Based on the detailed comparisons, ASIA can be viewed as an improvement on ASD in 
the sense that it offered users the information that they wish to see rather than the 
standard version of security warnings.  A user would be able to view the security 
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warnings that satisfy their preferences and they can change their preferences at their 
convenience.  In addition, ASIA utilised many new features especially with regard to 
how the help function can be presented to end-users so that it would provide more 
useful information.  The new features (i.e. hover with quick information, risk level bar 
and signal cues matched with current context of warnings) had been introduced to make 
ASIA more intuitive and able to cater to end-user needs which had not been addressed 
clearly by previous studies.  The elements of novelty lay in how ASIA uniquely caters 
to end-users needs on how security warnings dialogues can be presented in more 
understandable manner.  As mentioned before, end-users are still experiencing 
significant problems with regards to the current security warnings that they encountered.  
Thus, ASIA is proposed to provide the possible solution with the new features and 
elements that convey the meaning of the message and promoted secure manner decision 
for end-users.  
 
This research is generally heading to the same intention to improve warnings but 
utilising different method and aims.  Understanding individual differences is useful to 
move towards better model of human decision making process (Böhme and Köpsell 
2010).  Then, it will lead to the creation of interface style that had significant effects on 
perceived ease of use and usefulness to use the system (Hasan & Ahmed 2007).  The 
empirical evidence to support the author’s proposes architecture is presented in Chapter 
8.  This chapter considers in particular the novel approach of ASIA, its process and the 
algorithm that will provide better warning comprehension, communicate the risks easily, 
and guide users to make a better decision in practice. 
 
6.3 A novel architecture of security warnings 
 
In order to provide a usable and presentable security warning, a novel architecture of 
Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) which can provide a new way of 
presenting warnings and information is proposed.  This architecture generally focuses 
on the adaptation of every security warnings dialogue that can be identified by the 
system.  Based on the user’s preferences (i.e. selection from the preferences list), 
security warnings will be adapted and used in place of the standard version.  Therefore, 
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in order for the warnings to adapt and feed the current warning implementation and be 
able to improve the interface of the dialogue box, ASIA’s aims are as follows:  
 
i. To adapt the presentation of security warnings based on user preferences; 
ii. To increase users’ comprehension of security warning dialogues before making 
a decision by enhancing the available help. 
iii. To improve the usability (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction) of 
security interactions; 
 
These aims have been achieved by utilizing a combination of engines and processes 
within the novel architecture as illustrated in Figure 6.1.  Generally, this architecture 
provides a basis to further understand how security warnings are presented to users.  
Users can make up their minds by choosing standard security warning (i.e. the default 
version) or security warning based on their preference (i.e. Security Warning 
Enhancement
1
).  At this stage, this architecture is set for dialogue box context of 
warnings rather than other contexts (i.e. in place, notification, balloon and banners).  In 
essence, the entire procedure involves two process engines and databases, as follows: 
 
i. When the user encounters a warning dialogue (standard warning) for the first 
time, the Program Executor will communicate with the Engine Manager to 
check what are users’ options (i.e. standard warning vs. security warning 
enhancement).  The Engine manager will check the status from User Support 
Data (USD).  If nothing is detected, standard security warning is presented.  
Users will make decision as usual. Then the decisions will be saved in 
Community Decision Data (CDD) accordingly.  After this, the Engine Manager 
presents Preferences lists (i.e. list of options to enhance security warning).  A 
choice will be made and the preference will be saved in User Support Data 
(USD).  After this, the Engine Manager shows the Dialogue options that will 
require user to choose whether to receive the standard warning or the security 
warning enhancement.  Simultaneously, there is a checkbox “Don’t ask me 
again” where by default the system will present a warning based on users’ 
preferences.  Again, it will be saved in USD.  It may be noted that before all 
                                               
1 The complete/full version of security warning is known as “adapted warning” where it comprised all 
elements that are required in computer warnings based on the preferences available. 
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processes and components within this stages is basically will be managed by the 
Engine Manager.  This Engine Manager will be acting as manager to decide on 
the initial procedure before warning adaptation occurs.        
 
ii. If standard security warning in Dialogue options is chosen, then the decision 
will be saved in USD as instructed by the Engine Manager.   Hence, every time 
users log on to the system, a standard warning will be defaulted.  All users’ 
decision on standard warning will be saved in CDD.  Users will continue to use 
the standard warning until he/she decides to change. 
 
iii. In contrast, if security warning enhancement is chosen, the Engine Manager will 
first check the USD on users Dialogues options and preferences list.  Once this 
has been confirmed, the Engine Manager will update the Adaptation Engine.  
The Adaptation Engine will pick up collective data from USD, DRD and CDD 
to generate warnings.   First, however, the Simplified security warning is 
presented.  Only if the “Help button” is clicked will all gathered data in the 
Adaptation Engine be used to present a Security Warning Enhancement.  When 
a decision is made within the warning received, it will be saved accordingly in 
CDD, as managed by the Adaptation Engine.   
 
iv. However, if other options is clicked (e.g. run, cancel or close) only then 
Simplified Security Warning is shown. Then their decision will be saved in 
CDD. 
 
(Note: It can be noted that all figures in this chapter are intended to be indicative 
data for illustration purpose.  It also applies to all tables presented, as it is not 
intended to represent the formal database schema).   
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Figure 6.1: The architecture of Automated Security Warning Interface Adaptation 
(ASIA) 
 
6.4 Process Algorithm 
 
It may be noted that both the Engine Manager and the Adaptation Engine are 
fundamental elements that controls all other elements within the architecture presented.  
Therefore, this section will further explore the overall process algorithm, in order to 
better understand how Security Warning Enhancement is generated.  Before this chapter 
proceeds, however, it is preferable to view the Process Algorithm based on the 
components involved, as presented in the ASIA architecture.  The Process Algorithm 
explains how this architecture begins, the checking phases, and ends by presenting a 
Security Warning Enhancement, as illustrated in Figure 6.2.  It has three checking 
phases as depicted in Table 6.1.  
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Checking Phases Descriptions 
1- Does Dialogue options contain data? It checks whether the Dialogue option contains any 
users’ decision. 
2- Dialogue options decision It checks user’s decision as to their preference on 
standard security warning or security warning 
enhancement. 
3- Was help button clicked? It checks whether users’ clicks help button to 
generate Security Warning Enhancement. 
Table 6.1: Three phases of checking  
  
Figure 6.2: Overall Process Algorithm 
 
These checking phases are essential in order for users to receive a Security Warning 
Enhancement.  The Process Algorithm may be regarded as a straight forward process, 
where the focal point of this overall process is to encourage users to click help in order 
to receive Security Warning Enhancement and to get more information to help users 
with their decision making process.  The first checking phase is part of Engine Manager 
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responsibilities to check whether there is data available (i.e. decision on Dialogue 
Options).  If there is data available (i.e. Dialogue Options not equal to 0), then once 
again, the Engine Manager will check the main user’s preference in Dialogue Options 
which is the second checking phase (i.e. whether standard warning or security warning 
enhancement).  On the other hand, if no preference exists yet in the Dialogue Options, 
then a standard security warning is presented.  Decisions will be made and recorded.  
Shortly after this, the Preference List dialogue is presented, and this offers the option to 
improve the security warning presentation layout.  Users’ decision on this preference 
will be recorded and will be used again in the Adaptation Engine later on.  After this, a 
similar process will be repeated as if users have chosen their preference in the first 
checking phase.  
 
As previously mentioned the second checking phase focuses on user’s selection of 
receiving standard or security warning enhancement.  Again, the Engine Manager will 
navigate to present standard security warning dialogue (i.e. if user decides with this 
version) or it will communicate directly with the Adaptation Engine when the user 
decides on the security warning enhancement.  The Adaptation Engine will gather the 
collective information from the databases and present the Simplified Security Warning 
(i.e. details of the process is explained on the next section).  At this stage, the third 
checking phase is conducted.  This will verify whether the help button is clicked or not.  
If it is not clicked, then users are able to execute the program (e.g. if run is chosen) or 
terminate the process (e.g. when cancel or close button is chosen).  On the other hand, if 
the help button is clicked, the Adaptation Engine will play a role in presenting a 
Security Warning Enhancement.  The warning layout will be varied depend on users’ 
decision with the Preference List in the early stage.  The Adaptation Engine will ensure 
that users will receive the warning based on their needs.  The full detail of each process 
involved includes the interaction with the database described in the next following 
sections.  
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6.5 General Functionality descriptions 
 
Table 6.1 provides general insights into the entities involved in the ASIA architecture.  
Further details of the main processes and databases are explained within this chapter in 
further details.  
 
 Functions Descriptions 
In
p
u
t 
 This manages three types of dialogues 
(to/from User Support Data).  It will check 
from the USD before deliver information to 
the Adaptation Engine.   So every time a user 
logs on to the system, the Engine Manager 
will act as the first point of contact (i.e. to 
decide whether to show standard or security 
warning enhancement).  Security Warning 
Enhancement only occurs if, and only if users 
click help button. 
E
n
h
a
n
c
e
r 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
 
Adaptation Engine This engine will receive instructions to 
generate security warning from the Engine 
Manager.  It will gather all information from 
three databases (i.e. USD, DRD and CDD).  
Following this, the Simplified Security 
Warning will be presented to users.  Security 
warnings are configured with some new 
features (i.e. tooltips details, about this file, 
Location link, signal warning/word and risk 
level bar).   
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 Functions Descriptions 
O
u
tp
u
t 
Security Warning Enhancement Users will only be presented with a Security 
Warning Enhancement if they click help 
button in the Simplified Security Warning.  
The warning is adapted and generated from 
the preferences that users had chosen 
before.  All information with regards to the 
warning will be there in warning dialogues, 
albeit help is clicked (i.e. Name, Type, 
Location, Main statement and additional 
information based on users’ preferences).  
The additional information will be embedded 
together on the same page instead of on a 
new dialogue box (i.e. standard dialogue box 
when help is clicked).   
D
a
ta
b
a
s
e
s
 
User Support Data (USD) This database contains security warning 
details (i.e. class name, application name), 
dialogue options choice, Guidance 
information (i.e. what is the summary, what 
should I do and what else should I know), 
users preferences (based on the options) 
and tooltips details.   
Decision Risk Data (DRD) This database contains Guidance information 
(i.e. what is the risk), the risk level bar 
information (i.e. indicator), matching signal 
icon and word and tooltips details 
Community Decision Data(CDD) This database contains statistics information 
(i.e. users decision with particular type of 
warning dialogue), about this file (i.e. web 
key search information) and guidance 
information (i.e. what did others do). 
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 Functions Descriptions 
O
th
e
rs
 
Program Executor Program executor will be defaulted in every 
web browser/ operating system from the 
software that user installed. It will 
communicate straight away with the Engine 
Manager to update the current status of 
users’ options (i.e. standard vs. security 
warning enhancement). 
Interface Graphical user interface that presents the 
security warning to users. 
Application Any type of software or program that users 
use.  Based on their action, clicking any 
button or link will generate a security 
warnings dialogue.  
User Any particular person that uses a computer 
Table 6.2: General description about the entities in ASIA architecture 
 
6.6 Processing Engines and storage 
 
The ASIA’s architecture relies on two main engines, namely the Engine Manager and 
Adaptation Manager.  A predominant role of these engines is to carry out various tasks 
such as to receive and to deliver data, verifying users’ choice or preference and most 
importantly showing security warning to users (i.e. Simplified Security Warning and 
Security Warning Enhancement).  On the other hand, three main databases involve 
within this architecture namely User support Data (USD), Decision Risk Data (DRD) 
and Community Decision Data (CDD).  All of these databases are essential in storing 
useful information that has been gathered from process involves.  Each of these engines 
and the databases will be fully discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.6.1 Engine Manager 
 
The Engine Manager is classified as part of the input process.  The main function of the 
Engine Manager is to become the first point of contact after the user interacts with the 
security warning, as depicted in Figure 6.3.  The main component within this engine is 
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known as the Engine Manager Controller.  The Program Executor will verify with the 
Engine Manager Controller first to check the availability of data in dialogue option (i.e. 
whether to receive the standard or security warning enhancement) on specific type of 
warning from the User Support Data (USD).  If there is nothing detected in the 
Dialogue Options from the database, the user will be presented with a standard security 
warning (i.e. where ASIA able to interact and handle warning from operating system 
and web browsers).   Standard security warning here can refer to a security warning 
dialogue box that users normally receive on a daily basis whilst using the computer.  
However, the scope of standard warnings in this architecture focuses on the warnings 
involved, with at least two options for users to choose, and it involves the user in 
making decisions that might affect security and protection (i.e. as it require users to pay 
more attention on the decision making process). 
 
It may be noted that on every standard security warnings presented to users, it will 
comes in many different layout as it is associated with the browser and operating system 
where the warning comes from on the first place (i.e. it will cater all forms of warnings 
from different browsers and operating system).  For instance, Internet Explorer, Mozilla 
Firefox and Safari use different mechanisms to present warnings.  Therefore, from the 
bigger perspective, the security warning identification process can be a difficult task and 
tedious job because of the system need to identify each of the security warnings.  
However, as this process is conducted in the background, users will not have much 
problem in handling this operation.   
 
Figure 6.3: Engine Manager 
CHAPTER 6: A NOVEL ARCHITECTURE FOR AUTOMATED SECURITY 
INTERFACE ADAPTATION (ASIA) 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
Table 6.3: Record in USD 
 
The Engine Manager Controller has the ability to identify the warning class, application 
name and the header name of warning.  By using this information, warning can be 
differentiating from where it derives and the Engine Manager in general uses it to 
generate a unique Group ID.  This is to ensure that each warning is unique from one 
another.  This information is essential in order to decide whether every security warning 
dialogue received can be categorised and recorded in USD.  Therefore, the Evaluator 
component will be referred to by the Engine Manager Controller.  The Evaluator will 
again make use of the information (i.e. warning class, application name and header 
name of warning).  In addition, the Evaluator also has the capability to detect how many 
options exist in each warning that been presented.  If all requirements are satisfied, the 
Engine Manager Controller saves all information after user been presented with the 
standard security warning.  Users make their decision as usual in the warnings they 
receive (e.g. by pressing run or cancel).  Every user’s decision will be recorded and 
saved in Community Decision Data (CDD) accordingly as depicted in Table 6.3.  
Simultaneously, the Engine Manager via its controller updated the Group ID 
information on Community Decision Data (CDD).  This group ID will be used later on 
in providing statistical information in the Enhancer Process (i.e. explained on the next 
section).  In contrast, if the Evaluator is not satisfied with all of the requirements, then 
data will not be categorised and recorded.  Hence, standard security warnings will be 
used by default.    
 
After this, one dialogue box namely Preference List been presented to users.  
Preference List utilised the available options (i.e. list of choice to improve warning) for 
users to choose.  These options are presented in the form of a checkbox, so that users 
are able to click any options that can satisfy their needs.  In this context, the lists are 
derived from the results of author’s user studies (i.e. method to improve security 
warning from end-users experienced dealing with computer warnings).  Therefore, the 
lists can be updated from time to time to suit the needs and requirement.  The following 
are examples of six options that can be used as the Preference Lists for user to choose: 
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Option 1: More information regarding the reason for the dialogue 
Option 2: More descriptive information to guide me on what to do 
Options 3: Recommendations based on other users’ actions in response to this dialogue 
Option 4: Consistent/explicit/clear usage of signal icons and words 
Option 5: Information presented in clear sections in the form of question/answer 
Option 6: Using non-technical language to describe the problem 
 
Based on the decision on the Preference Lists, users are likely to be presented with 
various version of Security Warning Enhancement.  Further details of these 
combinations are explained in Chapter 7.  Therefore, once users have decided on their 
Preference List, the Engine Manager Controller will then present a dialogue option to 
user once again (i.e. by asking users preference on receiving the standard or security 
warning enhancement).  It may be noted that this dialogue option contains a checkbox 
with an option “Don’t ask me again” where it means by default the system will 
automatically present warning based on users’ preference.  This decision or preference 
will then be updated in USD.  
 
In contrast, if users decide to receive standard security warnings when the Engine 
Manager Controller present to them with Dialogue Options, then the Engine Manager 
Controller will update the CDD with users’ decisions.  Thus, every time users wish to 
log in their system, a standard warning will be automatically defaulted for them.  They 
will continue to use this warning until they decide to change it.  If users decide to 
change this option, they will need to change the option in the settings provided in their 
computer.  From an overall perspective, the Engine Manager plays a vital role as a 
mediator to interact between another processes and databases.  For instance, from Table 
6.3, all data in the record will be sorted accordingly based on the interaction manage by 
the Engine Manager.  This data will be used when the Engine Manager starts to interact 
with the Adaptation Engine provided when users choose the security warning 
enhancement in Dialogue Options (i.e. Dialogue Options = Yes).  
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6.6.2 Adaptation Engine 
 
The Adaptation Engine is the core process involved in this architecture.  It consists of 
three main components namely Receiver, Negotiator + Updater and Internet Search.  
This engine is classified as the Enhancer Process where the adaptation of security 
warning initially begins.  It will have the direct interaction from the Engine Manager.  
When users decide to choose security warning enhancement in the Engine Manager 
processes, the Engine Manager Controller will first verify with UDD with regards to 
users selection on Dialogues Options and Preference Lists.  Once this is confirmed (i.e. 
example on Table 6.3- ID = 1, Dialogue Options = Yes and Preference List with some 
selections), the Engine Manager Controller initiates the interaction with the Adaptation 
Engine, as illustrated in Figure 6.4.  
 
When the Engine Manager makes its first contact with Adaptation Engine, the Receiver 
component will receive the instruction (i.e. the security warning enhancement is 
selected in Options Dialogue) and it will notify the Negotiator + Updater.  At this stage, 
Negotiator + Updater verify the information again with USD (i.e. Dialogue Options for 
this particular warning is equivalent to “Yes”).   If it is satisfied, the Adaptation Engine 
(i.e. via Negotiator + Updater) will generate the Simplified Security Warning.  This 
Simplified Security Warning is generated based on the information gathering by the 
Negotiator + Updater.  It may be noted that the Simplified Security Warning is created 
to imitate the standard warning layout or presentation.  In contrast, some additional 
information is added to ensure that warning message can be delivered in a simple and 
better way.  The imitation of standard security warning here can be defined so as to 
make use some available features from the standard security warning to be used again in 
the Simplified Security Warning.  This is to ensure that users will consistently able to 
familiarise with the new warning been presented to them as it share similar style and 
function in standard security warning.  Therefore, users are likely to be able to correlate 
their previous mental model (i.e. based on the exposure they already have) with the 
additional features of the security warning enhancement.   
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Figure 6.4: Adaptation Engine 
 
The sources of information to generate the Simplified Security Warning are derived 
from Table 6.4 to Table 6.7. 
 
The Simplified Security Warning layout made used some useful information from the 
standard warning (e.g. name, type and location).  However, some improvements are 
made to add more functions, such as concerning this file, risk level bar, appropriate 
usage of signal icon/word and hovers elements.  About this file is a function that is 
generated by the Internet Search process in the Adaptation Engine.  It will 
automatically get more information with regard to the warning dialogue that user 
encounters.  By referring to the file name of the warning, it will automatically browsing 
more information about it and provides useful search terms for users.  This means that 
when users click this link, they will be navigated to Google page that contains straight 
away search term related to the file involves.  Thus, users will be able to see straight 
away anything involves to the file name (e.g. discussion about the filename, comments 
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from the users and review about the file).   Instead, users manually type data to get more 
information, this function simplified users’ task.  However, it may be noted that users 
still need to make their own judgement with the information presented to them.  On the 
other hand, the risk level bar provides user with the risk level information to 
communicate the risk level clearly.  Therefore, it gives users some early indication with 
regards to the severity level of risk that users currently experience.  These features 
describe the current severity of risk involved to comprehend the users (i.e. by describing 
the wordings and colour schemes involve).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Tooltips detail from USD 
 
ID Tooltips details 1 
1 Name_of_the_file 
2 File_type 
3 Location_of_the_file 
4 Information_about_this_file 
: : 
 
ID Tooltips details 2 
1 Low_information 
2 Medium_information 
3 High_information 
4 Risk_level_bar_information 
: : 
 Table 6.5: Tooltips detail from DRD 
 
 
ID Matching icon & word  
1 Warning_Icon 
2 Error_Icon 
: : 
Table 6.6  : Matching icon and word from DRD 
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Table 6.7: Risk level bar from DRD 
ID Risk Level Bar 
1 Indicator_ &_ colour scheme 
: : 
: : 
When users hover to the available features on the simplified warning (i.e. name, about 
this file, type, location, risk level bar and risk information), they will be provided with 
quick information about the meaning of these function (i.e. derived from Table 6.4, 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6).  Each of these pieces of information will be complied by the 
Negotiator + Updater from the available record so that Simplified Security Warning can 
be presented in accordance.  Simultaneously, this warning seeks to match the current 
context of message by matching the usage of signal icon and words (i.e. derived from 
Table 6.6) which do not always occur in the standard warning.  Based on the author’s 
previous user study, it can be revealed that conflicts or mismatched on the usage of 
signal icons and signal words happened (Zaaba et al. 2011 and Zaaba et al. 2012).  
Hence, this proposed architecture tries to improve the condition.  When users receive 
the simplified warning, they will have to make decision by pressing the available option 
(i.e. by choosing one of these options: run, help or cancel).  If they press run, the 
program will be executed and users can proceed to the next stage.  A similar thing 
happens when users decide to cancel; the operation will be cancelled and the 
cancellation will be notified to users.   
 
In contrast, the focal point of this operation is when users press the help button.  ASIA 
architecture works differently and uniquely because it encourages users to click help 
upon receiving security warning.  This help function can be associated with more 
information that embedded in the warning (i.e. instead of presenting with another help 
dialogue box separately).  This method of implementation combines some other user 
help techniques which lead to usable security (Herzog & Shahmehri 2007).  It also 
made used questions and answered style interaction as proposed by Baecker et al. (1991) 
to produce an effective warning based on what users normally ponders in their mind 
upon completing their task.   When the help button is pressed, the Adaptation Engine 
via Negotiator + Updater plays it roles to update USD as illustrated in Table 6.8.  By 
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using this information, the Negotiator + Updater sort the relevant information based on 
the combination that users choose earlier.  For instance, if a user decides to click all 
available option, his/her preference can be classified as combination 1 (i.e. by the 
assumption this is the complete version of security warning that contains all 
information).  It may be noted that based on users decision in the earlier stage (i.e. by 
choosing Preference Lists checkbox), it will generate various type of warning outcomes.  
This is to ensure that only the information that is needed by users will be presented.  
Details of assessment are discussed in Chapter 7.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.8: Combination of user preference based on List preferences 
ID User Preference 
1 Combination_1 
2 Combination_2 
3 Combination_3 
4 Combination_4 
5 Combination_5 
6 Combination_6 
: : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.9: Details on guidance area (USD) 
ID Guidance 1 
1 Summary 
2 Guidance_information 
3 Investigative_information 
: : 
 
 
ID Guidance 2 
1 Risk_level_information 
: : 
: : 
Table 6.10: Details on guidance area (DRD) 
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Table 6.11: History information based on what others have done (CDD) 
ID Guidance 3 
1 History_information 
: : 
: : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.12: Statistics information based on the type of warning message 
ID Statistics details 1a 1b 1c 1d 
1 Run_counter - 1 1 1 
2 Cancel_counter - - - - 
3 More_info_counter 1 - - - 
: : : : : : 
 
After it is confirmed with the selected combination, it will gather all other information 
(i.e. to be embedded in the warning) which derives from Table 6.4 to Table 6.12  Again 
a similar process as mentioned in the creation of Simplified Security Warning will be 
repeated on Security Warning Enhancement (i.e. combination 1 – complete version of 
security warning).  The additional information as added elements on the Security 
Warning Enhancement (i.e. in the guidance area) is derived from Table 6.9 (details 
about the summary, guidance and investigative information), Table 6.10 (risk level 
information) and Table 6.11 (history information regarding what other people do which 
are based from Table 6.12).  After the gathering process is completed, user is then been 
presented with the Security Warning Enhancement (e.g. combination 1).  All of this 
information are presented to comprehend users with new details information (i.e. to 
guide users to utilise the available guidance information where they able to embrace 
secure manner decision action, to explain the technical terminology within current 
context of the message and most importantly to encourage users to use help option 
where it adapt new method of presenting warning).  Once he/she makes a decision with 
regard to the Security Warning Enhancement, the decision will be updated in the 
Community Decision Data (i.e. where a new warning record will be created) as 
illustrated in Table 6.13.  The value “1” in column “Y” meaning that one user had 
chosen run as his/ her decision where ID- 1A can be referred to the standard security 
warning that has been replaced with Security Warning Enhancement (i.e. which has 
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been group in ID 2 as Com 1 or initially combination 1).  Later, this statistics 
information will be used again in statistical presentation (pie chart) that will be 
presented depend on the Preference Lists that users choose.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.13: Statistics information based on Security Warning Enhancement 
 (users’ preferences) 
 
ID ID 2 Statistics details 2 Y N 
1A Com1 Run_counter 1 - 
    Cancel_counter - - 
: : : - - 
6.6.3 Databases  
 
There are three main databases involved in this architecture, namely User Support Data 
(USD), Decision Risk Data (DRD) and Community Decision Data (CDD).  In the early 
section, it has been notified that all figures in this chapter are intended to be indicative 
data for illustration purposes, and it also applies to all tables presented as it is not 
intended to represent the formal database schema.  These three main databases contain 
different types of information where the Adaptation Manager will become the mediator 
to decide which information to select and use before warning can be presented to users.  
From Figure 6.1, the Engine Manager interacts with User Support Data (USD) and 
Community Decision Data (CDD) whilst the Adaptation Engine communicates with all 
databases. 
 
Figure 6.5: Table representation in User Support Data (USD) 
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Figure 6.5 portrays three tables representations involved in USD.  It can be noted that 
this database consists of most of the record (i.e. security warning classification related 
such as warning class, application name, header name and Group ID).  In addition, users 
decision with regards to the Preference List and Dialogue Options are recorded in the 
same table.  Guidance 1 consists of records that will be appeared in Security Warning 
Enhancement (i.e. guidance area) whilst Tooltips details 1 would be used in the 
Simplified Security Warning and Security Warning Enhancement.  Therefore, at this 
stage, the Engine Manager manages all of these components accordingly before it can 
be delivered to the Adaptation Engine, in order to generate warning.  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Tables representation in Decision Risk Data (DRD) 
 
From the view of Decision Risk Data (DRD), four main table representations are 
depicted in Figure 6.6.  When the risk level bar is used, it will be associated with 
Tooltips details where information about risk will be presented.  For instance, when one 
particular user hovers to words in the warning such as low, medium and high, he/she 
will be presented with quick information about the meaning of those words.  On the 
other hand, this table also contains information on matching the signal icon and word 
based on the current context of warning message.  This improvement is suggested based 
on previous author’s user studies, where a mismatched usage of signal cues occurs even 
when the guideline are used.  Providing the correct usage of signal cues is essential so 
that users able to incorporate their understanding as part of their mental model process.  
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The last table representation can be referred to Guidance 2 table where it provides the 
risk level information on the guidance area.  Therefore, it is clear that Decision Risk 
Data (DRD) will be used to provide details of information that specifically caters for the 
risk that involves (i.e. in order indicating the severity on the current usage of warning 
message).  
 
Figure 6.7: Tables representation in Community Decision Data 
 
The final database (i.e. Community Decision Data) involves three main table 
representations.  Statistics details 1 consist of users’ decision upon receiving standard 
security warning via the Engine Manager processes.  The warning will be automatically 
classified and group accordingly (e.g. 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d).  In addition, Statistics details 2 
shares similar function but it will focus on users’ decision upon receiving Security 
Warning Enhancement (i.e. Com1) that also can be associated with the standard security 
warning (i.e. 1A) that users should receive.  On the other hand, Guidance 3 contains 
history information that will be used in the guidance area in the warning presentation.  
Community Decision Data can be viewed to provide information from the external 
source, where it utilises decisions as to what other people do upon receiving such 
warnings.  This will provide useful input to improve security warnings, where users can 
rely on other peoples’ views as to what possible action to take (i.e. social navigation).     
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6.7 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, ASIA architecture provides simple, transparent and encouraging safety 
behaviour for users when faced with security warning dialogues.  This architecture has 
been designed to accommodate end-users’ needs on warning messages and the 
components and functionalities of the architecture are described in detail.  By providing 
end-users with security warning based on their preferences, it can generate open a new 
dimension on how warning design can be improved.  Based on the previous user studies 
that had been conducted, it providing useful input to this architecture where method to 
improve warnings can be used (i.e. Preference List).  In addition, from time to time 
developers can further evaluate the suitability of the Preference List where it can be 
added at any time based on users’ needs.  By utilising all the components using two 
major engines (i.e. the Engine Manager and Adaptation Engine), users able to view 
warnings that is usable, understandable and promote secure manner action before one 
particular decision being made.  The warning presentation has been improved when 
users are presented with the Simplified Security Warning and when help button is 
clicked Security Warning Enhancement is generated.  In this context, warnings and 
useful information (i.e. additional information) are embedded together in the same 
dialogue, rather than presented separately as a help dialogue box.      
 
In order to achieve the highest level of satisfaction, the proposed architecture used 
useful information from three databases (i.e. User Support Data (USD), Decision Risk 
Data (DRD) and Community Decision Data (CDD)).  After all the information has been 
gathered and compiled (e.g. Guidance information, tooltips details, matching signal 
cues, risk level bar and statistical information) warning design can be improved to suit 
current contexts of warning in a way user can understand the meaning of the message 
and there are useful information as a guidance provided for them.  Therefore, a novel 
ASIA architecture is a robust framework that is able to achieve its aims.  In Chapter 7, 
Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) will be evaluated and validated in 
prototype software.      
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7 Evaluation and Validation of the Automated Security 
Interface Adaptation (ASIA) prototype 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Based on the evidence gathered from the previous user study presented in Chapters 2 to 
5, the Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) was developed to enhance 
current security warnings dialogue (describe in Chapter 6).  This chapter describes the 
evaluation and validation of the proposed framework via the implementation of a 
prototype system and its use within a final experimental study. 
 
Many techniques have been demonstrated to improve security warnings (e.g. matching 
complexity of risks, security automation, rewarded security behaviour and mental 
model).  However, none of these techniques have been adopted by developers.  Current 
security warning implementations do not provide enough information to inform users 
and guide them in making secure decision.  Although useful features have been 
provided (i.e. signal words, icons, computer terminologies, colours and useful help 
functions) many users were still confused especially as some of these features conflicted 
with the guidelines provided.  For example, when the help button is pressed, a new 
dialogue box will often pop up. This can distract users from the current task.  In 
addition, excess wording or information was provided in the help dialogue, which made 
the decision making process more complicated.  Users often had to read all the 
information and sometimes had to search for more (i.e. answers provided were not users 
oriented).   
 
These limitations meant that, users quickly learnt to ignore the help function and made a 
decision based on what they believed to be safe.  The main concern here is that if the 
decision making is not suitably informed.  Users might compromise their own security 
leaving their computer vulnerable to attack.  In reality, ASIA has been presented as a 
prototype rather than a full implementation.  However the results as presented in this 
chapter are convincing.  In the future, ASIA could be implemented as a full system.  
There are many challenges to implementing ASIA with more research needed to see 
how ASIA can integrate with various types of web browsers and operating systems.  A 
high level of understanding and technical ability is required so that ASIA can be put in 
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place without any conflicts with the computer systems (i.e. different platforms).  
However, it should be possible to improve the current security warnings if there is 
collaboration among the vendors of web browsers and operating.  For instance, 
developers from Microsoft, Google and Apple can use this architecture as the basis for 
further assessment and evaluation on how security warnings can be implemented in 
their products.  More user studies can be conducted to assess end-users’ understanding 
and needs, especially in real-time scenarios, which might be useful to provide solid 
evidence.  This will not be an easy process but many considerations must be put in place 
in relation to satisfying the end-users’ needs and without jeopardising the security and 
protection of the computer.  This final user study (study 4) utilised prototype software 
which was developed with the assumption of being able to present a method to improve 
security warnings based on user preferences and to be able to fulfil the aims of ASIA, as 
presented in Chapter 6.      
 
7.2 Methodology 
 
User study 4 is based upon a prototype implementation of the ASIA architecture.  The 
participants were recruited predominantly from among Plymouth University staff and 
students.  This experiment was conducted on a one-to-one basis via a software 
prototype, combined with questionnaires and interviews (all conversations were 
recorded for later analysis).   
 
Before the session began, participants were given a brief by the principal investigator 
about their right to withdraw at any stage of this experiment.  Then, the users were 
required to give their consent before they were briefed on the overall flow of the 
experiment (i.e. role-based and contextual scenarios) and that they were allowed to ask 
questions at any stage.  This method has been widely used in warning research in order 
to provide context whilst examining their comprehension and understanding of 
computer warnings (Egelman et al. 2007, Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón 2007, 
Keukelaere et al. 2009, Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011 and Raja et al. 2011).                  
 
Two investigators read the recorded transcript independently, identified the common 
ideas and later coded and classified the results.  Based on the coding, the principal 
investigator used the results as the final answers with regard to user feedback on the 
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interview session.  This technique has previously been used in order to increase the 
validity of similar studies (Raja et al. 2010 and Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011b).   
 
7.3 Study Design 
 
Participants were registered on a “first come first served” basis.  Therefore, only the 
first 50 participants were selected (i.e. they received e-mail notification stated their 
allocation date, time and location accordingly).  ASIA was developed using Microsoft 
Visual Studio Professional (2010), specifically using Visual Basic.  In this prototype 
software, users were required to adopt the role of a management trainee in IT Company, 
dealing with technical and non-technical tasks on a daily basis.  Their responsibilities 
involved dealing with the installation of software products, research and development, 
managing inventories, writing reports, managing the company’s e-mail and other task as 
directed.  Whilst dealing with these tasks, they encountered security warnings 
(simulated via seven tasks) and they were required to make at least one preference 
regarding features or elements that should be depicted in the warning message.  The use 
of the prototype software can be divided into three main phases: 
 
i. Capturing demographics 
This involved nine questions related to user’s background, skills, preferences 
and knowledge. 
 
ii. Practical tasks 
This involved a series of seven computer security warning dialogue boxes in 
different scenarios and web browsers (i.e. Internet Explorer, Google Chrome and 
Mozilla Firefox).  In each task, users were required to choose at least one 
preference for the given question.  Task 7 was repeated after this (presenting an 
enhancement of previous security warnings based on user preference).  
 
iii. Post-trial questionnaires and interviews 
Users were told that they would receive three security warnings.  Firstly, users 
were presented with the standard security warning (Task 7) followed by a 
questionnaire and interview.  Secondly, they received the security warning 
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enhancement based on their preferences, followed by a further questionnaire and 
interview.  The final section was only shown to users if they did not choose all 
the options, or at least option 2 in the repeated question (i.e. Task 7).  This is 
because the user would not be presented with security warning enhancement 
(adapted warning) if they did not choose those options.  Then, a comparison 
could be made (i.e. standard security warning vs. security warning enhancement 
(adapted warning)
2) by stating users’ preference and probing some questions 
with regard to the usability of security warnings (i.e. interview session). 
Within the prototype, in every task that the users encountered, six preferences were 
presented to them.  Users were required to choose at least one of the available 
preferences/options, as follows: 
 
Option 1: More information regarding the reason for the dialogue 
Option 2: More descriptive information to guide me on what to do 
Option 3: Recommendations based on other users’ actions in response to this dialogue 
Option 4: Consistent/explicit/clear usage of signal icons and words 
Option 5: Information presented in clear sections in the form of question/answer 
Option 6: Using non-technical language to describe the problem 
 
These preferences were used based on the author’s previous findings and the literature 
review from the aforementioned Chapters 2 to 6 (i.e. as well as from recommendations 
and suggestions from security practitioners).  By choosing any of these preferences or a 
combination of preferences, a different presentation of security warning dialogues was 
generated.  The adapted warning was generated only when all the options were chosen 
by users, or at least option 2 was clicked.    
 
One essential element that was hidden from the users’ view was that, if they chose 
option 2, it was equivalent to the function of “select all”.  The rationale not to use the 
“select all” wording was the possibility that users would automatically choose this 
option is available (i.e. would not read other information and click on the option that 
made their decision quicker).  Therefore, this hidden element was not revealed to the 
users.  Instead, the author used the “More descriptive information to guide me on what 
                                               
2 It is also known as security warning enhancement (complete) where all available preference is used to 
generate the warning. 
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to do” statement.  It may be noted that this statement generally describes the whole 
concept of guidance, which covers all other elements normally required in order to 
comprehend security warnings (i.e. all other five options).  The wordings “descriptive 
information” may be seen to emphasize the steps that are able to guide users by 
explaining the current issues of warnings circumstances and available features (e.g. 
signal icons, words, technical jargons and colours).  Results of some other combination 
are presented in Appendix D.    
 
There were seven identified tasks, which comprised security warnings in a dialogue box 
context that were derived from within three web browsers and applications (i.e. Internet 
Explorer, Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox).  These security warning dialogues were 
chosen to show the variety of available warnings and to ensure that users experienced 
the warnings that they normally encountered, rather than one that was unfamiliar.  
Within this chapter, detailed results are presented accordingly. 
 
7.4 Results and findings 
 
The majority of the participants were male, as compared to the last three user studies in 
Chapter 3 – Chapter 5 which were dominated by female participants (See Table 7.1).    
The majority of these participants were in the range of 18-25 years old and came from a 
wide range of educational levels (i.e. from GCSE/O-Level to Postgraduate).  The 
majority had at least a higher education level.   
 
In terms of computing skills, 54% respondents considered themselves as intermediate, 
30% as advanced and 8% as expert and beginner respectively.  The vast majority (90%) 
claimed that they had used the Internet for more than six years and the rest were in the 
range of 3-4 and 5-6 years.  This indicated that this group of respondents were likely to 
be familiar with current technology.  Google Chrome remained the preferred choice of 
browser by respondents, at 38% (i.e. as compared to user study 3 in Chapter 5 and 6) 
and followed by Internet Explorer 32%, Mozilla Firefox 22% and the respective balance 
8% with Safari and Opera. Even though the majority of participants were derived from 
the University environment, this did not significantly impact the higher proportion of 
Internet Explorer as main web browser (i.e. Internet Explorer is the default browser in 
the university environment).   
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Similar results were found with user’s operating system preference where the majority 
preferred to use Windows 7 with 64%.  It followed by Windows XP with 16%, Mac OS 
X with 12%, Linux and Windows Vista with 2% respectively.  Surprisingly, 4% (i.e. 
two respondents) did not know indicate a preferred operating system.  With regard to 
the usage of security software, 70% of respondents claimed to use it leaving 8% with 
“no” and 22% with “not sure”.  When asking users regarding their perception on 
decision making based on security message in general, 62% claimed it was easy, 18% 
claimed it was not whilst 20% were unsure.  Even though the percentage was not 
encouraging (e.g. more than 50%) but 38% can be considered a worrisome percentages.  
It is, however, concerning that 38% of respondents were either unsure or found the 
decision making process difficult when assessing their interactions with security 
dialogues.  This indicates that users in general had significant problems with their 
decision making process on security message.  
 
Characteristics 
(n = 50) 
Frequency 
Distribution 
Percentage 
Distribution (%) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
Age 
18 – 25 
26 - 35 
36 - 45 
46 - 55 
Above 56 
 
Educational Background 
Postgraduate 
Higher Education 
Diploma, Further Education 
GNVQ 
GCSE/ O Level 
 
 
31 
19 
 
 
26 
16 
5 
2 
1 
 
 
18 
19 
8 
0 
5 
 
 
62.0 
38.0 
 
 
52.0 
32.0 
10.0 
4.0 
2.0 
 
 
36.0 
38.0 
16.0 
0.0 
10.0 
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Characteristics 
(n = 50) 
Frequency 
Distribution 
Percentage 
Distribution (%) 
Computing skills 
Expert 
Advanced 
Intermediate 
Beginner 
 
Security software usage 
Yes 
No  
Not sure 
 
Years using Internet 
<1 
1 - 2 
3 - 4 
5 - 6 
> 6 
 
Preferred web browser 
Google Chrome 
Internet Explorer 
Mozilla Firefox 
Safari 
Opera 
I do not know 
 
Preferred operating system 
Windows 7 
Windows Vista 
Windows XP 
Mac OS X 
Linux 
 I do not know 
 
 
4 
15 
27 
4 
 
 
35 
4 
11 
 
 
0 
0 
2 
4 
44 
 
 
19 
16 
11 
3 
1 
0 
 
 
32 
1 
8 
6 
1 
2 
 
 
8.0 
30.0 
54.0 
8.0 
 
 
70.0 
8.0 
22.0 
 
 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
8.0 
88.0 
 
 
38.0 
32.0 
22.0 
6.0 
2.0 
0.0 
 
 
64.0 
2.0 
16.0 
12.0 
2.0 
4.0 
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Characteristics 
(n = 50) 
Frequency 
Distribution 
Percentage 
Distribution (%) 
Easy to make security decision in 
general 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
 
 
31 
9 
10 
 
 
62.0 
18.0 
20.0 
Table 7.1: Summary table of demographic user study 4 
 
7.4.1 Users’ preferences in the experimental tasks (i.e. 7 tasks) 
 
After the completion of the demographic section, users were presented with a security 
warning task 1, as depicted in Figure 7.1.  This security warning was taken from the 
Mozilla Firefox web browser when users navigated to their intended Google page after 
pressing the enter button.  As discussed in the previous section, if users clicked option 2, 
it was equivalent to ticking all available options.  Therefore this section sought to reveal 
end-users preferences based on the options given.  However, the focal point among 
these tasks was given to task 7.  Security warning adaptation was generated based on 
the options chosen by users in this task.  Then further assessments and evaluations were 
conducted for ASIA. 
 
It can be reported that the majority of users had chosen options 1, 2 and 6 as their main 
preference for the task 1 as depicted in Figure 7.1 (i.e. from single option views).  The 
27 respondents (out of 50) chose to have all preferences, five respondents chose option 
1 only and the remainder with other combinations.  This dialogue box used the header 
as a security warning, but with a question mark icon.  The information presented was 
incorporated the usage of technical expressions such as “unencrypted connection” and 
“third party”.  By looking at the overall presentation of the warning, it can be noted 
there were no unique indicators to describe the risk levels, explain what is really 
happening and guidance to help users to make a decision.   
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Figure 7.1: Task 1 security warning 
 
Figure 7.2: Task 2 security warning 
 
After clicking next, users were presented with task 2 as shown in Figure 7.2.  This 
security warning popped up when users clicked a link in a Word document to open a 
PDF document.  Again, the majority of the respondents 29/50 had chosen all of the 
preferences followed by six respondents with option 1 only.  The remainder had chosen 
other combinations.  This security warning explained the risk of opening the file and 
that this file should come from a trustworthy source, but did not explain what it meant 
and how it could help users.   
 
 
Figure 7.3: Task 3 security warning 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Task 4 security warning 
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In task 3 as presented in Figure 7.3, users were presented with a security warning titled 
“Opening Mail Attachment” from Outlook Express.  It reminded users that attachments 
should only be opened when they come from a trustworthy source (e.g. if the user 
knows the sender).  26/50 respondents chose all options, eight respondents with option 1, 
5 chose option 3 whilst the remaining chose other combinations preferences.  Based on 
this warning, there was a possibility that users might execute the malicious content if 
they open the file straight away.  However, the security warning did not convince users 
of the severity of the risks.      
 
With regard to Figure 7.4 from Internet Explorer, 27/50 respondents decided to choose 
all available options when they were presented with a “File Download – Security 
Warning” message.   Seven respondents decided to choose option 1, 4 chose option 3, 2 
with option 5 and the rest with other combinations.  With this security warning, the 
header title and the usage of signal icons were consistent (based on Microsoft (2010) 
Guideline).  If users wished to utilise the help option, they had to click the link at the 
bottom (new help dialogue pops-up).  The use of an unidentified program icon (white 
background) did not present a meaningful message to users.       
 
 
Figure 7.5: Task 5 security warning 
 
Figure 7.6: Task 6 security warning 
After clicking next in task 4, users were presented with task 5 as depicted in Figure 7.5.  
The warning header “Warning: Unresponsive Script” was derived from the Mozilla 
Firefox browser.  Within this warning context, 23/50 respondents chose all available 
options leaving eight respondents with option 1, 5 respondents with option 6 and the 
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remaining with other combinations.  Some comments can be made on the usage of 
wordings to explain the circumstances of the message.  The word “script” was used 
without further explanation and meaning and how it can affect the computer system.  
The information was delivered in a highly technical manner which was not suitable for 
general level users.  Therefore, users might struggle to understand it.   
 
Task 6 was the security warning related to an application download in Mozilla Firefox.  
The first security warning was presented to users when clicking the link to download 
the file.  Once they had saved the file on their computer and executed the .exe file, they 
received another security warning with the header “Open Executable File?”  This study 
revealed that 24/50 respondents chose all available options, five respondents decided to 
choose option 3, 4 respondents with option 1, 2 respondents with option 5 whilst the rest 
chose other options.  This security warning did not have features that were able to 
convince users to make safe decision at all.  Albeit users had to save the file in the first 
place, they should be given early information about the current warnings that they 
encountered (i.e. the severity/risk levels, consequences of actions and guidance on what 
to do).  Only after they executed the file from their computer, they receive another 
warning.  Again, in this warning, the information provided was too general. 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Task 7 security warning 
With the final task 7, users received a security warning when they wished to download 
an application using Google Chrome browser.  Based on user preferences in this task, 
security warning adaptation generated a new security warning after this.  This task was 
chosen because users were expected to be able to make use of all the features in this 
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warning.  It was also considered that users had greater familiarity with the downloading 
event, therefore this security warning was used as the focal point of this user study.  
End-user comprehension and further assessment will be described in the next sections.  
The majority of users 30/50 decided to choose all options leaving three respondents 
choosing options 1 and 3 respectively.  Two respondents chose option 5, and the 
remainder other combinations. 
 
7.4.1.1 Repeated task 
 
Once users had completed all of the seven tasks, they were presented with a “Dialogue 
Enhancement Notification”, as depicted in Figure 7.8.   
 
Figure 7.8: Dialogue enhancement notification 
Users were notified that one task would be repeated. Then, after they pressed the “Begin” 
button, they were presented with task 7 once again, as depicted in Figure 7.9. 
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Figure 7.9: Repeated task  
At this stage, it had been explained that an adaptation of security warning was made 
based on the preferences that users made in the previous task 7.  Once they pressed the 
“Next” button they were will be presented with a simplified security warning as 
depicted in Figure 7.10.  Shortly after this, the principal investigator explained that this 
was the first warning that occurred and users were required to familiarise themselves 
with the features (i.e. click the link or hover over any texts available) and they can make 
a decision by choosing one out of the three available buttons.  Later, they were asked 
questions about the decision they had made and the available features. 
 
 
Figure 7.10: The simplified security warning  
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7.4.1.1.1 Analysis and observations of end-users perception and understanding 
when encounters with the simplified security warning. 
 
After users had viewed the simplified security warning, as presented in Figure 7.10, 
they made their decision by choosing one of the available buttons.  Once they had made 
up their mind by choosing one of the available option, the principal investigator asked 
them to stop and asked them questions to probe their decision making process.  If the 
user hovered their cursor over certain features (i.e. icons or texts), tooltips would be 
displayed to provide a simple summary of the features.  It was to be expected that this 
would provide some clarification to users in order to understand the warnings.   
 
If users decided to choose help, they were presented with a security warning 
enhancement based on their preferences.  Therefore they were unable to see the 
simplified security warning again.  In order to counter this problem, users were again 
shown the image of a simplified warning in a word document, rather than on the 
prototype software (i.e. for the interview purposes).  If users had chosen Run or Cancel, 
nothing would happen but user’s decisions would be recorded (i.e. users would continue 
to view the simplified security warning, as in Figure 7.10).  Their decisions were 
classified, as presented in Table 7.2. 
 
Options available Total responses (n = 50) Percentage (%) 
Run 27 54 
Help 16 32 
Cancel 7 14 
Table 7.2: Users’ decision upon receiving simplified security warning 
The majority of users 27/50 decided to run straight away, 16/50 had chosen the help 
option whilst 7/50 users decided to cancel.  Then principal investigator interviewed 
them to further understand their decision making process and with regard to the features 
available (i.e. comprehension and satisfaction).  The first question was to probe the 
reason for choosing the presented options.  Two investigators read the recorded 
transcript independently, identified common ideas and later coded the results, as 
presented in “the reasons” column in Table 7.3 to Table 7.5 (i.e. Please refer to the 
Appendix D for the details of the questions). 
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The reasons Total responses (27/50) 
I just feel it is safe to proceed 1 
Risk level is medium 16 
I ignore everything because I want to use this 
software so I take the risks to proceed 
3 
My normal behaviour always choose run 3 
Filename is appropriate 1 
As long as I have antivirus I will always choose 
run 
1 
About this file – I can get some evidence on the 
popularity of search regarding this file 
2 
Table 7.3:  Reasons on choosing Run option 
 
The majority 16/27 of users who chose run claimed the reason they chose this was that 
the risk level was set to a medium level.  It was likely that they considered the medium 
range could not cause harm to their computer.  All respondents claimed that they could 
see straight away the risk level bar that attracted them on the first impressions.  On the 
other hand, three users demonstrated that they would ignore everything (i.e. take the 
risk) if they really wanted to use this software.  Surprisingly, a further three users 
claimed that it was their normal behaviour to choose “run” all the time.  When probing 
further, they said that they most likely ignored all of the details in the warnings as they 
believed it was safe to proceed based on their previous experienced.  This indicated that 
users learnt from the past by ignoring the security warning, and because no obvious bad 
consequences happened to them.  Two users claimed that this file had a positive impact 
on them as they could see that some other people had previously searched for more 
information about this file (i.e. by the assumption they can read good reviews about this 
file).  One interesting finding was related to one participant who claimed that he/she 
would always choose run as long as he/she had installed antivirus software on the first 
place.  When probing further, this person assured that antivirus would protect them from 
any malicious attack because this was the reason why they used the software.    
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The reasons Total responses (16/50) 
Publisher could not be identified 1 
Risk level is set to medium and I want to 
get more information 
13 
 
Help is always best option as I think this 
operation is quite risky 
2 
Table 7.4: Reasons on choosing Help 
With regard to the reasons for choosing help, the majority 13/16 decided as the results 
of the risk level was set to medium.  They were not sure whether to proceed or not, thus, 
they wished to obtain more information.  Some of these users claimed that they did not 
want to take the risk of becoming a victim of malware attacks, so help was the best 
option.  At least within these contexts, users were able to view any useful information 
available to help them.  When probing further, most of these users mentioned that they 
would be pleased to use the help function if this function provided straightforward 
information rather than generic information.  Five users claimed that most of the help 
functions provided did not specifically solve problems, but rather, gave general 
information.  Users had to view and click somewhere in the function to get to the 
solution, which was a cumbersome task.   
 
The reasons Total responses (7/50) 
The risk level is medium  - It is too risky to 
proceed 
4 
Publisher could not be identified – I do not 
want to take any risk 
2 
Entirely not looking secure 1 
Table 7.5: Reason on choosing Cancel 
On the other hand, only seven users chose cancel when the security warning was 
presented to them.  After probing them with some questions, the majority claimed that 
they decided to choose cancel when they saw the risk level was set to medium range.  
For them, it was still a risky range.  They defined the safe range when the risk level was 
set to low (i.e. green colour).  Two respondents also used the statement “Publisher could 
not be identified” as their reason.  For them, it was crucial if the computer was unable to 
detect the publisher so it is possible that the software came from an unknown source 
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which could cause harm to them.  Again when asking further, they did not want to take 
further risk.  One claimed that “it is better not to download rather than crash your 
computer system”.    
The next question asked users “What features help you to understand the security 
warning” based on the depicted warning in Table 7.6.  It can be revealed that almost 
half of the overall respondents liked the risk bar level used in the warning.  Most of 
them stated that it looked attractive with the vibrant colours.  Some of them claimed that 
they could quickly make up their mind with the decision based on the risk level bar 
presented (i.e. convey the risk level that users encountered).     
 
The reasons Total responses (n = 50) 
Risk bar level 23 
Overall presentation help me to understand 
warning 
4 
About this file feature 9 
Visual will always come first 1 
Signal icons (!) 5 
Hover information  2 
No specific features 2 
Jargon busting – too many technical words 1 
Use simple and plain English 1 
Not sure 1 
I ignore everything but visually I think it is nice 1 
Table 7.6: Features that help users to understand the security warning 
enhancement. 
 
9/50 claimed that this file (i.e. with the assumption it able to work) was useful because 
they able to view more information just by clicking.  5/50 indicated that the exclamation 
mark icon (!) made them aware of this security warning.  These users claimed that the 
icon was clearly presented with a nice colour scheme.  With the overall layout making 
them more focus on understanding the warning.  They also claimed that some other 
features available within this warning contributed to the success of the overall layout.  
Two users appreciated the hover information (i.e. tooltips), whilst the other two 
surprisingly claimed no specific features helped them to understand the warning (See 
Table 7.6).         
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Level of satisfactions Total responses (n = 50) 
Yes slightly but more information is better 12 
Very satisfied 30 
I am not really sure 2 
Yes but more details information should be 
there to explain the risk level 
1 
I hope to have online feedback features so 
that user can straight away give some thought 
to developer 
1 
Not enough information and it should be more 
explicit 
4 
Table 7.7: Satisfaction with the information provided 
The final question “Are you satisfied with the information provided? Why?” was asked 
to evaluate the early stage of users’ reaction when encountered with the simplified 
security warning.  This gave an early indication as to how end-users viewed ASIA (i.e. 
even though the security warning enhancement had not been viewed yet).  From the 
interview session, the majority of users responded that they were very satisfied with the 
layout 30/50.  12/50 respondents claimed that more information should be there to make 
it more useful, and one claimed that the risk level bar should provide more detailed 
information.  On the other hand, four users claimed that the information was still not 
enough and it should be presented in an explicit way.  When they were asked how 
explicit they wished the information to be, some claimed that they did not mind if the 
information was in a long statement, as long as they could understand it without the 
need to view other sources.  Only two users claimed that they were not really sure.   
 
7.4.1.1.2 Early stage results 
 
Having understood this early analysis and observations, the majority of users decided to 
run the file straight away from the provided options.  With ASIA, it is expected that 
users will choose Help more readily.  A new security warning (security warning 
enhancement) would be generated once the help button was pressed.   
 
Users had not been told about it (i.e. choosing help) as the author wished to see how the 
simplified security warning changed users’ perception with regard to the new layout of 
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warning they encountered.  In addition, it was important to see end-users normal 
decision upon receiving security warning dialogue.  It was felt to be better to let users 
decide what they believed was the right thing to do, rather than make it compulsory for 
them to click Help at this stage (i.e. to avoid bias).  However, shortly after users had 
made their decision (i.e. pressing run or cancel), they were briefed about the new help 
feature available once they had pressed the function.  The next evaluation and validation 
stages provided more empirical evidence, as outlined in the next section.   
 
ASIA encourages users to click help when they encounter a security warning because it 
combined two stages of an ideal security warning as discussed in Chapter 6.  ASIA 
promoted a new dimension of presenting security warnings where upon clicking the 
help button users were still in the same security warning dialogue with new additional 
features based on their preferences (i.e. rather than having a new dialogue box pop-up). 
It basically integrated the simplified security warning and some other features based on 
what end-users really want it to be in the first place (preferences).   
 
The way information and new features were presented in the simplified security 
warning was accepted by the majority of the respondents, with more than  80% of total 
respondents being satisfied with the level of information provided.  They had 
highlighted some available features that helped them to understand the security warning 
(i.e. risk level bar, about this file, signal icon and hover tooltips information).   Only two 
users responded that they were not really sure about the new layout of the security 
warning presented.  Therefore, it may be concluded from the initial analysis and 
observations that ASIA provided a potential improvement that could lead users with 
better and improved decision making process that will be discussed further in the next 
section.       
        
7.4.1.2 Enhancer Process and expected output 
 
The adaptation of security warnings involved two main stages (i.e. the simplified 
security warning and the security warning enhancement).  The first security warning 
that popped up after users clicked “Next” in the previous task is shown in Figure 7.10.  
This security warning was part of the enhancer process, where some of the available 
features in this warning were derived from the standard security warning.  After the user 
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clicked next, the adaptation of security warnings started by enhancing the simplified 
security warning with some additional features based on user preferences.  These 
additional features were used based on the suggestion in the previous studies of end-
users (Chapters 3 - 5).  Figure 7.11 is an example of the adapted warning (i.e. if users 
chose option 2 or all of the options).    
 
Figure 7.11: The adapted warning.   
 
7.4.1.2.1 Help function details 
 
Normally, the help function was represented by a hyperlink in the footnote area with 
some text explaining the risk level and other related information.  When users clicked 
the link, they were presented with a new dialogue box which contained the help 
documentation (e.g. context sensitive help and online help), as shown in Figure 7.12.  
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Figure 7.12: Help dialogue box 
 
However, within the ASIA framework, significant changes were made.  The 
conventional help button was used instead of the hyperlink that was normally used in 
the standard security warning.  The focal point to be addressed here was related to the 
main function of this help feature.  All adaptation elements were generated once this 
button was pressed (i.e. the Engine Manager extracted information from User Support 
Data (USD), Decision Risk Data (DRD) and Community Decision Data (CDD)) in 
order to deliver the security warning enhancement.     
7.4.1.2.2 Standard security warning vs. simplified security warning 
 
Figure 7.13 : Simplified security warning details 
The simplified security warning used some similar features that were readily available 
in the standard security warning (i.e. name of the file, type, two buttons, background 
colours and texts).  It kept some of the useful features and enhanced the security 
warning with some other additional information.  The simplified security warning had 
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additional features, as presented on Figure 7.13.   It consisted of the main question, 
about this file link (specific information via web search), location hyperlink, and risk 
level, help button functions and warning icon as described in Table 7.8.     
 
Standard security 
warning 
Simplified security warning 
 
 Name of the file 
 Type 
 Two buttons (i.e. run 
and cancel) 
 Background colours 
 Texts 
Similar Features Additional Features 
 Name of the file 
 Type 
 Two buttons (i.e. run 
and cancel) 
 Background colours 
 Texts 
 The main question 
 About this file 
 Location 
 Risk level 
 Help button 
 Warning icon 
Table 7.8: Comparison of availability of features between standard security 
warning and simplified security warning.   
 
Some of these additional features were derived from features available in standard 
security warning (i.e. with an improvement in terms of wordings and layout).  The 
significant changes in the additional details are given in further detail in Table 7.9, as 
follows: 
 
Additional features Descriptions 
The main question In the standard security warning the main question was posed 
as “The publisher could not be verified. Are you sure you 
want to run this software?” However in the simplified 
version, the wording was slightly changed to “Publisher could 
not be identified. Do you want to run this file?”.  Instead of 
using technical expression (i.e. verified), the wording was 
changed to make it more easily understood. 
About this file (web 
search) 
This is a new functionality introduced by the simplified security 
warning.  When users click this hyperlink, it navigates the user 
to a search page for the file.  So instead of users manually 
typing for example “review about GstarCAD2011”, the 
generated hyperlink might be useful to provide details. 
Location hyperlink Initially, in the standard security warning, the location is known 
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Additional features Descriptions 
as “From” and it did not have the hyperlink.  To ensure that 
every feature is presented in a meaningful manner, the new 
term “Location” was introduced instead of “from”.  The 
Location had been set up as a hyperlink so that users can see 
the specific location of the downloaded file (i.e. instead of 
presenting “from” with a static location.  
Risk level The risk level was introduced to convey the severity of risk 
involved with regard to the message presented.  Every security 
warning dialogue should clearly communicate the risk so that 
end-users and aware of the possible actions to take.  No 
specific risk level was used in the standard security warning. 
Help button In the standard security warning, the help function was 
represented using a link at the footnote area.  Some 
information was presented to explain the scenario but using 
technical terminology.  Therefore, the help function had been 
used to generate security warning enhancement (preferences) 
which were later able to achieve the aims of ASIA.  
Warning icon Initially from the standard security warning, two icons had been 
used (i.e. unidentified program icon with white background and 
warning error icon).  In order to produce a more meaningful 
security warning in the first place, the unidentified program 
icon was removed.  An error icon was replaced with the 
warning icon (i.e. based on Microsoft Guidelines 2010).  An 
error icon should only be used when presenting an error 
condition.    
Table 7.9: Description of additional features available on the simplified security 
warning. 
 
7.4.2 The adapted warning 
 
When users clicked the help button on Figure 7.13, they were presented with Figure 
7.14 if they chose at option 2 or all of the available options on the preferences list.  The 
adapted warning layout originated from the simplified security warning.  The layout 
was expanded to become longer in terms of size, with additional functions.  The 
decision areas that comprised the run and cancel button were moved to the bottom, 
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whilst the help button was expanded as “Guidance”.  The guidance element consists of 
useful information presented as questions and answers (Baecker et al. 1995).  The 
availability of questions and answered were depending on the preferences that the user 
had chosen in task 7.  The details of the available features are presented in Table 7.10.    
 
Figure 7.14: The adapted warning details 
 
Additional features Description 
The main question “Publisher could not be identified. Do you want to run this 
file?”  It used a more straight forward question rather than the 
one in standard warning 
Signal icon The warning icon is used to be consistent with the header of 
the message.  It conveys the message as a warning rather 
than an error or as information.  
About this file (web 
search) 
This function opened a search page that related to the file (i.e. 
information about how many people are searching for this 
particular file).  So instead of users manually type for example 
“review about GstarCAD2011”, the generated hyperlink might 
be useful to provide details.  
Location Initially, in the standard security warning, the location is known 
as “From” and it did not have the hyperlink.  To ensure that 
every feature is presented in a meaningful manner, the new 
term “Location” was introduced instead of “from”.  The 
Location had been set up as a hyperlink so that users were 
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Additional features Description 
able to find the specific location of the downloaded file (i.e. 
instead of presenting “from” with a static location.  
Risk level The risk level was introduced to convey the severity of risk 
involved with regard to the message presented.  Every security 
warning dialogue should clearly communicate the risk so that 
end-users are aware of the possible actions to take.  No 
specific risk level was used in the standard security warning. 
Guidance area The guidance area was introduced to help users to make a 
better decision.  Therefore, useful information can be gathered 
by users before they were able to make a decision.  Instead of 
showing this information in a new dialogue box, the information 
was depicted in the same warning dialogue (i.e. expansion 
areas). 
List of questions and 
answers 
This consisted of five questions and answers.  These were the 
questions that users normally tend to ask upon completing 
computer tasks.  The amount of questions and answers here 
can be varied based upon user preferences. 
Allocation button Run and cancel buttons were placed at the bottom after the 
expansion of the simplified security warning.  This was to 
ensure that the options available were still consistent with the 
standard security warning. 
What is the summary This explains the summary of the warning presented  
What is the risk This explains about the risks involved (i.e. risk level, 
description and consequences).  It provides further information 
based on the risk level bar on the main page. 
What should I do This explains possible actions that users should do or consider 
before taking any action.  
What did others do This provides statistical values (pie chart) on what other 
people chose when encountering the same warning. 
What else should I 
know 
This provides an investigative action for users based on 
gathering all available information. 
Hover functions This provides quick information to help users understand the 
context of warning (i.e. what is really happening) when hover 
to feature as the following: 
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Additional features Description 
GstarCAD2011|PRO_ENG(3).EXE 
Hover tooltips = This indicates the types of file that you are 
downloading. 
24 Results available 
Hover tooltips = A web search for the filename has found 24 
results, which may potentially give further details about what it 
is. 
Application 
Hover tooltips =This indicates that the file is a program that 
you can download and run 
C:\Documents and Settings\newuser\... 
Hover tooltips = This indicates the location of the file on your 
system 
Risk level bar 
Hover tooltips = The risk level is set to Medium. The system 
was unable to detect the publisher of this file.  It is 
recommended you to view all information given before making 
any decision. 
Low 
Hover tooltips = The green area means that the file that you 
are downloading is likely to be safe 
Medium 
Hover tooltips = The yellow area indicates that the computer is 
unable to identify the source of the file that you are trying to 
download 
High 
Hover tooltips = The red area indicates that the file you are 
downloading is likely to be harmful to your system. 
Table 7.10: Description of the adapted warning 
 
7.4.3 Post-Trial Questionnaires and Interviews 
 
This section highlights details of the questionnaire and interview with regard to the 
security warnings that users encountered (i.e. refer to Appendix D for details of the 
questionnaires).  In order to reduce bias, users were presented with a standard security 
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warning first, followed by the security warning enhancement (i.e.  Similar technique by 
Raja et al. (2011) was used in this prototype software).   According to Cranor (2008), 
each individual had their own set of personal variables, intentions and capabilities that 
impacted warning information processing.  Therefore, by presenting security warning 
enhancement first will produce element of bias (i.e. users had encountered simplified 
security warning before).  To reduce the learning effects, the author counter balanced 
the order of presenting the warnings.    
 
Based on Figure 7.15 there were three main sections involved.  Firstly (i.e. section 3-1) 
users were presented with standard security warning.  Then, they were required to 
answer questionnaire A followed by an interview.  Then, in section 3-2 users were 
presented with the security warning enhancement (based on user preferences).  Again, 
they were required to answer questionnaire B followed by an interview.  Then, users 
could only proceed to section 3-3 if in section 3-2, user preferences were not equivalent 
to the adapted warning, as depicted in Figure 7.11. 
 
 
Figure 7.15: Questionnaires and interviews in section 3 
 
The principal investigator gave ample time for users to be familiar with the adapted 
warning in section 3-3 (i.e. if this was not the users’ choice in section 3-2).  They were 
allowed to click any link, hover their cursor and click any possible button to read and 
familiarise themselves with the information provided.  Shortly after that users were 
asked some usability related questions (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency and user 
satisfaction) to compare between the standard security warning and the adapted warning.  
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They were also asked about their main preference and what other elements should be 
there to improve the warnings presentation.   
 
This study used the questionnaire and interview in two separate sessions (i.e. 
Questionnaire A and Questionnaire B).  This was followed up by an interview session 
after the users had finished filling in the questionnaire section.  There were twelve 
questions provided, comprising the assessment of users’ knowledge about the nature of 
security dialogue, the types of problem that occurred and some other related questions 
related to usability issues.  The first two questions were related to the comprehensibility 
of security warnings, whilst the remaining ten questions were focused on the 
questionnaire (i.e. likert-scale options). Comprehensibility questions were asked to 
examine users’ knowledge about current security warning presentations, whilst the 
remaining questions were intended to evaluate end-users satisfaction, perception and 
understanding of the overall presentation of security warnings. 
 
Ten questions presented in the questionnaire (i.e. likert-scale options) can be classified 
within two groups of connotation (i.e. positive and negative).  The positive connotation 
can be defined as the positive feelings or expression with regard to the features, decision 
making, awareness and satisfaction (i.e. questions 2 to 10) whilst negative connotation 
focused on the negative impact as the results of using standard security warning (i.e. 
question 1).   The following section discusses the standard security warning and security 
warning enhancement findings. 
 
7.4.3.1 Standard security warning  
 
Users were presented with standard security warnings as depicted in Figure 7.16.  They 
were required to view all details and were allowed to click the hyperlink in the footnote 
area, and were presented with a new dialogue box which contained help as shown in 
Figure 7.12. 
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Figure 7.16: Standard security warning 
 
Users had been told that the help dialogue box was not the real dialogue but a 
simulation of the real one. However, the information provided was copied from the real 
dialogue.  Users had also briefed on the concept of help dialogue box that been 
presented to them in general (i.e. context sensitive help).  Once they were satisfied with 
everything, they started to fill in Questionnaire A.   
7.4.3.1.1 Questionnaire A 
 
The first question that was presented to users concerned the nature of the security 
dialogue that appeared.  It was expected that users would choose warning messages 
rather than other options.  Based on the depicted image, this was clearly a warning 
message.  This study revealed that 47/50 of respondents correctly identified the nature 
of the security dialogue presented to them, whilst three others claimed that it was on 
information and question message respectively.  A surprising result was highlighted 
when two participants decided to choose two options (i.e. warning and information) 
messages, albeit the instruction provided stated only one option was allowed.  
 
The second question was set to test users’ understanding with regard to the type of 
problem as depicted in security warning.  It is expected that users would choose only 
three options (i.e. option 2, 4 and 8) as the correct answer.  Only six users successfully 
chose the correct answers.  The full results of user decisions are presented in the 
following Table 7.11 (i.e. the results in this table were based on the combination of user 
decision.  Thus the total will not equal to 50). 
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Type of problems 
Users 
decisions 
(Combination) 
Unable to download the software due to an error 2 
Potentially became a victim of malware (e.g. virus, worms and 
trojans) 
25 
Trying to download.docx document 1 
Downloads from unauthorized publishers 44 
Does not facing any risk to proceed with the decision 2 
Unable to view what other people do with regard to  security 
message 
17 
Having difficulties to use guidance or help functions 6 
Facing potential problem with regard to  his/her action to download 
software 
13 
Table 7.11: Users decision with regard to the type of problems based on standard 
security warning 
 
 
Figure 7.17: Likert-scales range (i.e. 1 to 7) 
Overall, users indicated a satisfactory level of understanding where the two most 
popular options were from the correct options (i.e. option 2 and option 4).  Some other 
types of problems were chosen as distraction options to evaluate user understanding and 
to ensure that users thought properly before a decision was made.  Meanwhile, the next 
section comprised of ten questions related to end-user understanding, satisfaction and 
perception with regard to the overall presentation of standard security warning.  Users 
were required to choose one of the available ranges from the likert-scale as presented in 
Figure 7.17.   
 
On the other hand, Table 7.12 shows overall results based on descriptive statistics (i.e. 
frequency, mode and median). According to Boone and Boone (2012), the descriptive 
method is the appropriate one to analyse a series of individual questions.  In addition, 
Bertram (2006) claimed that this implementation was easy to read and to complete by 
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participants.  Therefore, the author made use of this technique to present the results as 
shown in Table 7.12.   
 
Statements 
Most frequent 
answer 
(n = 50) 
Mode Median 
1. The security dialogue was too 
complex for me to understand 
15 
Strongly disagree 
1 2 
2. I spent enough time to view the 
information provided 
22 
Mostly agree 
6 6 
3. It was easy to understand the 
information provided  
13 
Somewhat agree 
5 5 
4. The way information was presented 
helped me to complete the tasks  
12 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 4 
5. I could effectively complete my task 
using the information presented 
13 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 4 
6. It was easy to find the information I 
needed 
13 
Somewhat disagree 
3 4 
7. The interface of security dialogue 
was understandable 
11 
Mostly agree 
6 5 
8. The security dialogue helped me to 
fix the problem in the way that I 
understood 
12 
Mostly disagree 
2 4 
9. The available help increased my 
knowledge and awareness about the 
contents and features of the dialogue.   
13 
Mostly disagree 
2 3.5 
10. This dialogue had all the 
functionality and capability I expected it 
to have 
11 
Somewhat disagree 
3 4 
Table 7.12 : Statistics on users’ decision with regard to standard security warning 
 
With regard to question 1, the majority of users selected “strongly disagree” and 
“mostly disagree” based on the median value presented.  This demonstrated that they 
CHAPTER 7: EVALUATION AND VALIDATION OF THE AUTOMATED 
SECURITY INTERFACE ADAPTATION (ASIA) 
 
 
 
 
216 
did not think that the presented warning was a complex version.  However, it can be 
highlighted that in terms of easy of finding information that users needed, the majority 
selected “somewhat disagree”.  This indicated that users still facing significant 
problems with regard to the level of information provided.  In terms of helped user to 
fix the problem and helped to increase their awareness and knowledge, the majority 
selected “mostly disagree”.  This demonstrated that users still experienced some level of 
difficulties in making a decision, despite the features and information was provided.  
The final question covered almost all elements that comprised all other questions in the 
questionnaire.  The majority of users said “somewhat disagree” to this question.  This 
showed that users were expecting more in order to help them comprehend the message 
and help to make a decision in a secure manner.  In the next section (covering Interview 
A), details of the investigation are presented. 
 
7.4.3.1.2 Interview A   
 
After users had filled in the questionnaire, they were asked six questions to probe their 
understanding upon receiving a standard security warning, as depicted in Figure 7.16.  
The listed questions were given specific attention to the available features (i.e. signal 
icon, words, technical terminology, help function and level of information provided), 
the opinion about action taken and satisfaction of overall experienced.  The following 
section highlights the interview findings in further detail. 
 
Users’ decision 
Total responses (n 
= 50) 
The file will be executed /run with potential of risks 37 
Unsure/Uncertain 8 
It is dangerous to proceed so I’d rather click cancel 1 
Negative effects/problem with my computer 4 
Table 7.13: What do you think will happen if you click run?    
When users were asked (as shown in Table 7.13) the majority of them gave the correct 
answer (i.e. the execution of the file).  Surprisingly, eight respondents were unsure what 
to do.  When further probed, the reasons they were uncertain were that they did not 
understand the information provided and they were afraid to proceed with uncertain 
level of risk. 
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Users’ decision 
Total responses (n 
= 50) 
Information provided were ambiguous and difficult to 
understand  
7 
Combination of features (i.e. icon, wording and header) 15 
Unidentified/unknown publisher 13 
Type and name of file  2 
Link provided 5 
Icon/symbol and colour 8 
Table 7.14: What do you think of the feature(s) that are available to help you make 
a decision in this security warning? 
The next question asked about elements of warning that enabled users to make a 
decision as presented in Table 7.14.  15/50 claimed that the combination of features 
available on the warning such as the error shield icon, security warning header, type and 
name of the file, publisher could not be identified and unknown publisher allowed them 
to make a decision.  On the other hand, seven respondents claimed that information 
provided in this security warning were ambiguous thus difficult for them to understand.  
When probing further, users mentioned that they were unable to make use of the help 
function because the information provided was too simple and general.  They would 
expect the information to be straight forward to give them a solution rather than general 
advice.  Having understood this, users demonstrated that they were aware of the features 
available in the security warning.  One possible reason was because users might be 
experienced with this security warning before.  Therefore this significantly affected 
their understanding.  One observation can be made from this, namely that some users 
realised some features that existed on the warning after they were asked by the principal 
investigator (i.e. after giving full attention to reading the warning).  This indicated that 
these users did not pay attention to warning details.  Therefore, they may not have 
understood the features presented to them (i.e. meaning and function wise).  
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Users’ decision 
Total responses 
(n = 50) 
Uncertain decision whether to run or cancel 5 
Publisher could not be identified 9 
Technical terminology or wording that makes it difficult to 
understand 
4 
Unknown filename 4 
It is easy and straight forward 21 
Insufficient information from the hyperlink 4 
Information provided is too general 3 
Table 7.15: Were there any aspects of the warning that you found hard to 
understand or interpret? 
When asked about specific elements of warning that were difficult to understand, the 
majority claimed that it was easy and straight forward 21/50 as shown in Table 7.15.  
One possible reason that contributed to this was because users might have encountered 
this type of security warning before (i.e. had experienced or seen).  Some other users 
mentioned that they did not understand that the publisher could not be identified 9/50, 
uncertain decision 5/50, unknown filename 4/50, problem with technical jargon 4/50, 
insufficient details from the hyperlink 4/50 and information provided is too general 3/50.  
Overall, users still experienced a significant level of difficulty with regard to the 
security warning dialogue they received.  Even though some features were presented to 
help users in making decisions, it was still insufficient to convince users to make better 
decisions.    
Users’ decision 
Total responses  
(n = 50) 
Yes with previous experienced in this field 2 
It is easy to understand/straight forward/basic/simple 36 
It is difficult to understand the technical jargon 7 
Not entirely understand 5 
Table 7.16: Do you understand the way information was presented especially with 
technical wording? 
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In terms of understanding the technical language, the majority 36/50 claimed it was 
easy (i.e. straight forward, basic and simple) as shown in Table 7.16.  However 7 users 
claimed it was difficult whilst the other five were not entirely sure.  From this 
observation, the standard security warning is quite straight forward with the level of 
information provided.  However since the majority of respondents classified themselves 
as intermediate 27/50 and beginner 4/50 users, it might be difficult for them to judge.  
The information depicted in this security warning should be presented clearly in terms 
of concept and explanation (i.e. simple and plain language and proper explanation). 
 
Users’ decision 
Total responses  
(n = 50) 
Insufficient options with limited explanation  38 
Enough option 9 
Enough options with the link at the bottom 3 
Table 7.17: Do you feel that this security warning was presented with enough 
options to guide you? 
Almost 80% of total respondents demonstrated that there were insufficient options with 
limited explanation with regard to the warning presented as shown in Table 7.17 whilst 
the remainder claimed there were enough options.  When probing further, the majority 
of users mentioned that the option that they were looking for was guidance to help them 
make a decision.  Some of these respondents even suggested an automated decision 
option.  They claimed that the decision making process should be made on their behalf 
by the computer to reduce the possibility of becoming victims of computer problems.  
Users’ decision 
Total responses  
(n = 50) 
Not really helpful 26 
Insufficient information 8 
Satisfied with the link but it is still unclear 6 
Satisfied with overall 10 
Table 7.18: Do you feel satisfied with help available for this warning? 
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The final question probed users’ satisfaction with regard to the help function available.  
26/50 users claimed that the current help function was not really helpful whilst another 
eight users claimed there was not enough information on the help provided as shown in 
Table 7.18.  Only ten users were satisfied with the overall help function whilst six were 
partially satisfied.  Based on these results, it indicated that the current implementation of 
the help function was still not sufficient to satisfy users.  Therefore, the help function 
should be designed accordingly and can be associated with more useful information.    
Based on the overall results, it can be summarised that end-users still face significant 
problems with regard to the standard security warning dialogue presented to them.  
They had demonstrated a considerable level of understanding with regard to decisions 
when clicking run and the way information was presented especially with technical 
language.  On the other hand, they claimed that current options in the security warning 
were still insufficient with limited explanation.  In addition, the help provided was not 
really useful.  It gave clear indication that users had experienced difficulties with regard 
to the security warning they received.  In the next section, users were presented with the 
security warning enhancement based on their preferences. 
 
7.4.3.2 Security warning enhancement (i.e. based on users preferences) 
 
The full results of users’ combination preferences are presented in Table 7.19 based on 
task seven.  The adapted warning as shown in Figure 7.11 was the most popular option.  
This was the complete version of the security warning enhancement when user clicked 
option 2 or all of the available preferences.  It can be noted with regard to the other 
preferences, option 1 “more information regarding the reason for the dialogue” and 
option 6 “using a non-technical language to describe the problem” were among the most 
common chosen ones by the users based on the results presented. 
 
All the available preferences or options that had been offered were suggested from the 
previous users’ studies results in order to improve the security warning dialogues.  In 
section B, the reported results were based on 50 respondents overall.  However, focus 
was given to the adapted warning, where the majority of participants had their 
preferences in order to make a fair and relevant comparison later on (refer to Appendix 
D for example of security warning enhancement images based on users’ preferences). 
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Security warning preferences classification 
Total 
 responses 
Warning  
Group 
Security enhancement 1 (complete version where 
users choose at least option 2 or all options / the 
adapted warning) 
30 A 
Security enhancement 2 
(i.e. Option 1 only) 
5 B 
Security enhancement 3 
(i.e. Option 3 only) 
5 C 
Security enhancement 4 
(i.e. Option 1 & 3 only) 
3 D 
Security enhancement 5 
(i.e. Option 5 only) 
2 E 
Security enhancement 6 
(i.e. Option 1,3 &4 only) 
2 F 
Security enhancement 7 
(i.e. Option 3 & 6 only) 
1 G 
Security enhancement 8 
(i.e. Option 1 & 6 only) 
1 H 
Security enhancement 9 
(i.e. Option 1, 4 & 6 only) 
1 I 
Table 7.19: Results on security warning enhancement based on users’ preferences 
(classification) 
 
7.4.3.2.1 Questionnaire B 
 
The first question presented to users was similar to that presented in Questionnaire A.  It 
was expected that users would choose warning messages rather than other available 
options.  With regard to the security warning enhancement 41/50 correctly identified the 
nature of the security dialogue as a warning message, whilst nine others claimed it was 
an information message.  Again, two participants decided to choose two options 
(warning and information) for the message.  However, after being told that they had to 
choose only one, both of them decided to go for the warning message.  In terms of 
comprehensibility with regard to the type of problems from the security dialogue 
presented to them (i.e. security warning will be varied based on users’ preferences) the 
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full results of users’ decision were compiled in Table 7.20 (i.e. the results in this table 
were based on combination of users’ decision.  Thus, the total will not equal 50). 
 
Type of problems 
Users 
decisions 
(Combination) 
Unable to download the software due to an error 2 
Potentially became a victim of malware (e.g. virus, worms and 
Trojans). 
29 
Trying to download.docx document 1 
Downloads from unauthorized publishers 41 
Does not facing any risk to proceed with the decision 1 
Unable to view what other people do with regard to  security 
message 
4 
Having difficulties to use guidance or help functions 3 
Facing potential problem with regard to  his/her action to download 
software 
11 
Table 7.20: Users decision with regard to the type of problems based on security 
warning enhancement (preferences)  
Based on the type of problems that users have to choose, it was expected that their 
selection of answers would focus on options 2, 4 and 8 (Questionnaire B – Question 2 in 
Appendix D).  Again only six users correctly made their choices (i.e. similar with 
Questionnaire A).  From these results, there was a slight increase in choosing option 2 
(i.e. from 25 in questionnaire A to 29 in questionnaire B) whilst with option 4 and 8, 
there was a slightly decrease (i.e. from 44 to 41 and 13 to 11).  This happened because 
some of the security warning enhancements that they received (i.e. security warning 
group D, G and H) offered limited information that was able to answer the current 
warnings context that users faced.  Even though some of these results were not really 
convincing, the next ten questionnaire questions gave a different indication of the 
results. 
 
The results presented in Table 7.21 were based on the questionnaire questions presented 
to them.  The majority of users 26/50 selected “strongly disagree” and “mostly disagree” 
based on the median given.  In terms of information contexts (i.e. easy to understand 
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and help to complete task), the majority selected “mostly agree”.  These high percentage 
proportions indicated that with the security warning enhancement, the information was 
much more comprehensible and they even demonstrated that they had enough time to 
view the details.  With this warning, the majority claimed it was easy to find the 
information presented.  In addition, they also selected “strongly agree” to state that the 
interface of security dialogue was understandable.   
 
Based on these results, the information provided in the security warning enhancement 
was seen to be more presentable and easy to be understood (i.e. new features or 
function).  In terms of the help function, the majority selected “mostly agree” to indicate 
that it increased their knowledge and awareness with regard to the contents and features 
available.  The final question revealed that the majority agreed that the security warning 
enhancement based on users’ preferences had all functions and capabilities that they 
expected to have (i.e. mode/median = 5). 
 
Statements  Most frequent 
answer 
(n = 50) 
Mode Median 
1. The security dialogue was too 
complex for me to understand 
26 
Strongly disagree 
1 1 
2. I spent enough time to view the 
information provided 
16 
Mostly agree 
6 6 
3. It was easy to understand the 
information provided  
18 
Mostly agree 
6 6 
4. The way information was presented 
helped me to complete the tasks  
18 
Mostly agree 
6 6 
5. I could effectively complete my task 
using the information presented 
16 
Somewhat agree 
5 6 
6. It was easy to find the information I 
needed 
20 
Mostly agree 
6 6 
7. The interface of security dialogue 
was understandable 
19 
Strongly agree 
7 6 
8. The security dialogue helped me to 
fix the problem in the way that I 
understood 
15 
Somewhat agree 
5 5 
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Statements  Most frequent 
answer 
(n = 50) 
Mode Median 
9. The available help increased my 
knowledge and awareness about the 
contents and features of the dialogue.   
18 
Mostly agree 
6 6 
10. This dialogue had all the 
functionality and capability I expected 
it to have 
15 
Somewhat agree 
5 5 
Table 7.21: Statistics on users’ decision with regard to security warning 
enhancement 
Based on the overall findings, a significant number of users accepted the security 
warning enhancement better than the standard version of warning.  Based on the line 
graph depicted in Figure 7.18, it can be seen that the security warning enhancement 
pattern (i.e. median (E)) was better than the standard security warning (i.e. median (S)).  
The median value had been used as the main comparison to indicate where the main 
results fluctuated around based on the overall 50 participants.  In terms of the positive 
connotation group of questions in the enhanced version (i.e. question 2 to question 10), 
almost all of the depicted results performed better when compared to the standard 
warnings.  Meanwhile, for the negative connotation group (i.e. question 1 - the security 
dialogue was too complex for me to understand), the security warning enhancement 
based on users’ preferences were better as most users claimed that they “strongly 
disagree”.  
 
Figure 7.18: Comparison between standard vs. security warning enhancement  
(i.e. users’ preferences) 
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Therefore, when probing users with specific questions with regard to users’ knowledge 
about the nature of security dialogues, the types of problem that occurred and some 
other related questions regarding usability issues, the majority demonstrated greater 
understanding of the enhanced version of the warning.  The interview in section B 
probed this in further detail.   
 
7.4.3.2.2 Interview B 
 
After users had filled in the questionnaire, they were interviewed to obtain further 
details about the security warning enhancement that they received.  Thus, the results of 
this section portrayed mixed answers as users were interviewed in relation to the 
security warning enhancement based on preferences that they had chosen in the first 
place (i.e. Table 7.19).  In each of the questions, users’ feedback referred to their main 
preference (i.e. Most of users gave more than one answer but the focus were given to 
their main decision).  The following section highlights the interview findings in further 
detail. 
 
Users’ decision Total responses  
(n = 50) 
Concise risk level bar 11 
New help options that are informative /relevant/ 
presentable 
23 
Simple language 3 
Useful icon/symbol/questions 4 
Unsure/Uncertain 5 
About this file 2 
View decision – Others people view 2 
Table 7.22: What do you think of the feature(s) that are available to help you make 
a decision in this security warning? 
Based on the results presented on Table 7.22, in general most users were happy with the 
new option features provided in the security warning enhancement (i.e. Guidance area, 
risk level, questions and answers link, signal icon and words and tooltips information).  
They demonstrated that more functions were helpful within this context of warning, 
when compared to the standard version.   
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Users’ decision Total responses  
(n = 50) 
No.  It is understandable  41 
Guidance style box 1 
File type 2 
Source of publisher 2 
Not sure 1 
The presented link 1 
What is the summary 1 
What else should I know 1 
Table 7.23: Were there any aspects of the warning that you found hard to 
understand or interpret? 
When probing the elements that users found difficult to understand, the vast majority 
41/50 selected “No. It is understandable” as shown in Table 7.23.  However, nine other 
users were still confused about some of the available elements presented (i.e. guidance 
style box, file type, source of publisher, what is the summary and what else should I 
know).  Some of them further clarified that the functions were pretty new to them.  
Therefore, it was quite difficult to understand the usage of such functions in the 
available time.  With regard to the other users, most of them claimed that the risk level 
bar and the guidance area details were informative and helped with their decision 
making.  
Users’ decision 
Total responses  
(n = 50) 
Yes with technical jargon understood 43 
No 2 
I just ignored both 4 
Not sure 1 
Table 7.24: Do you understand the usage of signal icon/signal words in this 
security warning? 
In terms of the usage of signal icons and signal words (the principal investigator gave an 
example to make them aware about the meaning/concept of signal cues), the vast 
majority demonstrated that they were understood, as shown in Table 7.24.  Surprisingly, 
four respondents claimed that they ignored both elements.  When further probed, they 
mentioned that it never affected them when making a decision because it was just an 
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image and word.  One of them claimed that it always looked similar in all security 
warning, so he/she would not bother to pay attention.  On the other hand, three 
respondents claimed “no” and “not sure” respectively. 
 
Users’ decision 
Total responses 
 ( n = 50) 
Yes/ Understandable/Straight forward/easier/better 45 
No 5 
Table 7.25: Do you understand the way information was presented, especially 
technical wording? 
With regard to the way information was presented especially technical wordings on 
Table 7.25, again the majority claimed that it was understandable, straightforward, 
easier and even better when compared with the standard security warning.  With the 
new guidance area, the majority of users claimed that the information provided within 
that frame helped to explain more appropriate details.  Some of the respondents also 
claimed that the usage of tooltips was helpful in explaining quick information about the 
meaning of most of the features available in the security warning. 
 
Users’ decision 
Total responses  
(n = 50) 
Yes with enough options 33 
Yes with limited options but can be improved 9 
Not much options 8 
Table 7.26: Do you feel that this security warning was presented with enough 
options to guide you? 
When asked about their feeling as to whether enough options were presented to guide 
them, 33/50 claimed that they had enough options, 9 claimed they had limited options 
but could be improved and the remainder did not have many options, as shown in Table 
7.26.  For example one of the users suggested that there should be an option (e.g. button 
or link) for users to click to get the list of trusted and untrusted publisher names.  Hence, 
it would be much easier to verify whom he/she should trust.   
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Users’ decision 
Total responses  
(n = 50) 
Yes with fully satisfaction 40 
Partially satisfied 7 
Not satisfied 3 
Table 7.27: Do you feel satisfied with help available for this warning? 
The final set of question asked about users’ satisfaction with the help function available 
within the security warning enhancement context.   40/50 respondents were fully 
satisfied, whilst the remainder were partially satisfied or not satisfied, as presented in 
Table 7.27.  Three respondents claimed that the security warning enhancement they 
received were rather complex to understand.  There were more links to click (i.e. more 
actions to be taken) and this led to time constraints. 
 
Based on the overall results, it can be summarised that end-users were satisfied with the 
security warning enhancement based on users’ preferences, when compared to the 
standard security warning.  They had demonstrated positive results in most of the 
questions presented.  More useful features were available in the security warning 
enhancement that helped them to make a decision.  In terms of the way information was 
delivered (i.e. technical wordings), the vast majority were clearly satisfied.  On the other 
hand, users agreed that the security warning enhancements had enough options and they 
were satisfied with the options available.  Therefore, this gave a clear indication that 
users were happy to receive security warning enhancements based on their preferences.  
In the next section, a detailed comparison was made to compare users’ experienced 
between usage of the standard security warning and the adapted warning version. 
 
7.4.4 Comparison of the standard security warning and the adapted warning  
 
Comparisons can be made between users’ performance after being presented with the 
standard security warning and the adapted warning version.  In order to make a useful 
comparison, this thesis focused on 30 respondents that had experienced the same 
security warning enhancement as depicted in Table 7.19.  This meant that 30 users who 
had chosen preferences that produced a complete security warning enhancement/ 
adapted warning became the focal point of this section.  As these users had common 
ground in terms of experiencing similar standard and enhanced security warnings, it is 
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fair to make a comparison of each of the ten presented questionnaire questions in the 
next section.   
   
7.4.4.1 Demographic detail comparison 
 
In terms of general users’ demographic background (n = 30), comparisons were made 
based on age and computing skills as presented in Figure 7.19 and age and education 
background in Figure 7.20.    
 
 
Figure 7.19: Demographic comparison age and computing skills. 
 
It can be revealed that the majority of users classified themselves as intermediate 16/30, 
advanced 9, expert 3 and beginner 2 respectively.  In terms of age classification, the 
majority were from the age range of 18-25 years old.  Interestingly, these results also 
presented at least one representative from each age group.   
 
 
Figure 7.20: Demographic comparison age and education background (n = 30). 
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In terms of education background from these 30 participants, there was an  equal split 
between postgraduate and higher education from two age groups (i.e. 18-25 and 26-35), 
whilst  the remainder had a diploma or further education and/or at least GCSE/O-level 
education.  From this demographic data, the sample study was derived from all age 
group ranges from various educational backgrounds, which is very useful in terms of 
data segregation.  As this study was well promoted in the university environment, 
respondents were generally derived from a postgraduate and undergraduate background 
which indicates that the majority of them were students or members of staff.  Overall, 
most of the respondents can be considered to have familiarity with computing 
technology based on their computing skills capabilities and also good education 
background (i.e. education from college or university).     
   
7.4.4.2 Pre-warning (standard) and Post-warning (adapted) 
 
The comparison was made by looking at pre-warning and post-warning user 
performance in terms of the ten questions presented in the questionnaire section in 
Table 7.28.  Pre-warning referred to standard security warnings whilst post-warning 
referred to the adapted warning.  Pre-warning had a particular look at users’ experienced 
with standard security warning that they had encountered in task 7 (i.e. it will be 
repeated again in section 3 of the user study).  Post-warning was related to users 
experience with security warning enhancement based on user preferences (i.e. the 
adapted warning).  Therefore, users experienced both warnings and were able to assess, 
evaluate and later compare warnings.     
 
From Table 7.28, it shows the comparison between the pre-warning (standard) and post-
warning (adapted) based on the likert-scale values with ten questions.  In addition, this 
table utilises a comparison using mode and median values which was based on 
descriptive statistical analysis.  The mode values represent the preference action by 
users whilst the median values constituted the central tendency from the overall 30 
respondents.  Having identified the mode and median, indication was given as to where 
the users’ preferences on the likert-scale scoring lay.  Therefore, the degree of thought 
on their part could be gathered as the main outcome of this study.   
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Table 7.28: Comparison table between pre-warning (standard) and post-warning 
(adapted) 
From the results, in general, neither of the security warnings was complicated for users 
to understand, as both mode and median values were in the range of one to two.  In 
terms of enough time spent to view information provided, users demonstrated that they 
spent their time better in standard security warning.  One possible reason was that the 
size of the warning was smaller, and contained less information compared to the 
adapted version.  Thus, users might easily read the available information.  However, 
with regard to the other questions, the security warning enhancement performed better 
based on the mode and median values.  The details of the comparison are explained on 
the next section.     
   
In terms of the detailed comparison, both performances were plotted by line graph as 
shown in Figure 7.21 and Figure 7.22.  From the results, there was a pattern 
demonstrated by the users.  In the standard security warning, the plotted line results 
were distributed almost evenly compared to the adapted warning results.  With the 
adapted warning, the distribution was mostly scattered to the right (i.e. somewhat agree, 
mostly agree and strongly agree).  It can be noted that if the distribution is scattered 
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more to the right it indicates a better user acceptance and vice versa for the distribution 
on the left.       
 
Figure 7.21: Users’ performance score on 10 questions with regard to the standard 
security warning 
 
Based on this observation, the majority of users demonstrated their acceptance of the 
adapted warning version with more positive attributes (i.e. values more than four in the 
likert-scale).  However, with regard to the standard security warning, users generally 
demonstrated that they were almost equally split between the likert-scale values (one to 
three) and (four to seven).  Based on the trend from the questions, respondents still 
struggled with the current usage of standard security warning, albeit they were more 
familiar with this version of the warning compared to the adapted warning. 
 
 
Figure 7.22: Users’ performance score on 10 questions with regard to the adapted 
warning 
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Having understood this comparison, the next section presenting detailed comparison 
focused on the evaluation of one-to-one questions (i.e. one to ten).   
 
7.4.4.3 Detailed comparison of one-to-one questions 
 
This section presented a more specific comparison of user performances on each of the 
presented ten questions.  The comparison was presented by a line-graph, on a one-to-
one basis (n = 30).  By looking at these one-to-one comparisons, the evaluation and 
validation process may be explained with clarity and sufficient empirical evidence may 
be provided to support the findings and the proposed architecture.  In addition, based on 
these comparisons, a Chi-square test is presented to examine the difference between 
having the standard and the security warning enhancement (adapted warning).  
According to McCrum-Gardner (2007), Chi-square test is used as a comparison of more 
than two groups.  Key (1997) further explained that the differences are related to the 
actual sample and another hypothetical or previously established distribution.  Therefore, 
from the results that had been gathered, this section compares each of the ten available 
questionnaire questions using a Chi-square test.  Having said this, the seven likert-scale 
values (Figure 7.17) were grouped into three classifications, as follows: 
 
i. Likert scale range from 1-3 is equal to No 
ii. Likert scale value four is equal to Neutral 
iii. Likert scale range from 5-7 is equal to Yes 
 
The rationale for this classification was that these likert-scale ranges were to ensure that 
the analysis could be presented in a better focus because the collected sample size (n = 
30) can be considered small (refer to Appendix D for the full test results of Chi-Square 
(X
2
) Test). 
    
In may be noted from Figure 7.23 that users demonstrated almost a similar fluctuated 
pattern from both warnings.  Half of the overall responses 15/30 (adapted warning) 
chose “strongly disagree” with regards to the complexity of warning dialogue, 
compared with 10/30 for the standard security warning.  This indicated that a significant 
number of users had experienced a more user-friendly dialogue with the adapted 
warning.  One surprising finding can be noted with two users who claimed “strongly 
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agree” with the complexity of the adapted version of warning.  A possible reason that 
contributed to this was that the users did not have exposure or familiarity with the usage 
of this security warning before.  In addition, with the adapted warning more information 
was depicted (i.e. guidance area) and more features were introduced.  Therefore, with 
lack of experience in terms of its usage (i.e. temporarily used in the prototype software), 
this might contribute to the reasons why users experienced difficulty with the adapted 
warning.  With regard to Chi-Square test result (i.e. X2 < 5.991 where X2= 4.32), there 
is no significant difference between the standard and adapted warnings that users 
encountered.  Thus, it can be suggested that most of the respondents considered that 
both warnings were not too complex for them to understand. 
     
 
Figure 7.23: Comparison of “The security dialogue was too complex for me to 
understand”. 
 
In terms of viewing the information provided users spent enough time with the standard 
security warning compared to the adapted warning based on Figure 7.24.  The 
comparison was made based on the assessment with positive likert-scales (i.e. 5-7 
range).  23/30 had chosen the 5-7 range with the standard warning compared to 19/30 
with the adapted warning.  One observations can made from this finding, namely that 
users need to spent more time on the adapted warning as it involved clicking few 
hyperlinks (to navigate to sections within the same dialogue).  As this prototype 
software was conducted within a time constraint (i.e. users might feel not sufficient time 
to view).  It may have significantly impacted on the findings.  With regard to the Chi-
square test result (i.e. X2 < 5.991 where X2= 1.76), there is no significant difference 
between the warnings.  This is interesting because the layout of both warning was 
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totally different especially in the adapted warning version (i.e. as it provided more 
function and information) but surprisingly was not significant statistically.      
 
 
Figure 7.24: Comparison of “I spent enough time to view the information 
provided” 
 
In terms of the simplicity of understanding the information provided, users 
demonstrated better understanding of the adapted warning compared to the standard 
version as depicted in Figure 7.25.  23/30 respondents selected “mostly agree” and 
“strongly agree” with the information provided by the adapted warning.  This indicated 
that the information provided was significantly improved and worked better for end-
users, especially with the guidance area.  By introducing the questions and answers (i.e. 
via hyperlink), users were presented with information within the same page.  To a 
certain extent, users were able to see others’ peoples decisions based on the provided 
link.  With regard to the standard security warning, only 11/30 indicated the ease to 
comprehend the information provided.  One observation that can be made was that users 
were required to click the link in the footnote area in order to get more information (i.e. 
in order to receive the help dialogue box).  Even if they had viewed the available help, 
too much information was depicted at the same time.  With this help of the dialogue box 
(i.e. context sensitive help), users were brought to the specific information that dealt 
with the current state of the application.  In Windows XP the information provided on 
the help dialogue was not sufficient compared to Windows 7 (i.e. far more 
comprehensive) as shown in Figure 7.26.  With regard to Chi-square test result (i.e. X2 
< 5.991 where X2= 5.64), there was no significant difference between both warnings.  
However, more users regarded the adapted warning as easier.      
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Figure 7.25: Comparison of “It was easy to understand the information provided” 
 
In Windows 7, the approaches to present help were almost similar with the proposed 
technique in the adapted warning.  However, the main differences were based on how 
the help function was used and the level of information provided.  In the proposed 
method, when the help button was clicked, a new security warning enhancement was 
generated (i.e. it encourages users to click help by default) and the guidance area was 
presented.  Users were presented with useful information on the summary page.  When 
a link was clicked (i.e. list of questions), users were brought to a specific section within 
the same dialogue to answer the question that users would like to explore.  All the 
information was embedded together, rather than presented in a new dialogue box. 
 
With the help dialogue box from Windows 7, there were many listed questions and 
answers presented to users, rather than specific ones.  Some of the presented links even 
provided too much information, rather than providing simple and concise answer (e.g. 
when users click what are the risks when downloading files?).  However, it can also be 
noted that this version had significantly improved and worked better, compared with the 
previous version in Windows XP (i.e. the improvement with ask function, survey 
elements and instant help search function).  The approach to question and answer styles 
was adopted in the proposed framework (i.e. presented with five questions only as noted 
in guidance area).    
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A 
 
B 
Figure 7.26: Help dialogue box in Windows XP (A) and in Windows 7 (B) 
 
A consistent result was demonstrated by users with regard to the information provided 
which helped them to complete the tasks as depicted in Figure 7.27.  28/30 respectively 
chose the positive likert-scale (i.e. 5-7 range) in the adapted warning, this was better 
than the standard version.  From the results, it may be seen that eleven users chose 
“mostly disagree” and “somewhat disagree” with the standard warnings, whilst only one 
user in the adapted warning chose “mostly disagree”.  This indicated that users were 
facing more difficulties with the standard warning in relation to the information 
provided to help them complete the tasks.  Based on the Chi-square test result (i.e. X2 > 
5.991 where X2= 21.19), there was a highly significant difference between the standard 
and the adapted warning with regard to the way information was presented to complete 
the task.    
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Figure 7.27: Comparison of “The way information was presented helped me to 
complete the tasks” 
Again, a similar pattern of results was portrayed in Figure 7.28, in which 28/30 chose 
the positive likert-scale (i.e. 5-7 range) claiming they can effectively complete the task 
by using the information provided in the adapted warning compared with only 12/30 
with the standard warning.  Only two users selected “mostly disagree” and “somewhat 
disagree” with the adapted warning, compared with nine users with the standard 
warning.  With regard to the Chi-square test results (i.e. X2 > 5.991 where X2 = 19.85), 
there is a significant difference between both warnings, where the vast majority of users 
preferred the adapted warning compared with the standard version.       
   
 
Figure 7.28: Comparison of “I could effectively complete my task using the 
information presented” 
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In terms of the ease of finding information, Figure 7.29 shows that 27/30 users 
positively accepted the adapted warning whilst only 8/30 with the standard warning 
based on the positive likert-scale (i.e. 5-7 range).  As discussed earlier, with the adapted 
warning, each part of the information provided specifically in the guidance was 
presented using a question and answer format (i.e. based on Baecker et al. 1995).  This 
technique helped users to get the answers straight away, as the questions listed were 
based on the question that users normally asked when performing task.  On the other 
hand, Chi-square test results (i.e. X2 > 5.991 where X2 = 24.82) revealed that there was 
a highly significant difference between both of these warnings in terms of the fact that it 
was easy to find information that users needed.  Therefore, it can be suggested that the 
vast majority 27/30 of users found it was easier to find information in the adapted 
warning compared with the standard warning.       
 
Figure 7.29: Comparison of “It was easy to find the information I needed” 
 
On the other hand, in terms of the comprehensibility of the warning interface, 25/30 
respondents chose the positive likert-scale (i.e. 5-7 range) with the adapted warning 
whilst 16/30 with standard warning as shown in Figure 7.30.  Ten users claimed that the 
standard security warning was difficult for them to understand, whilst only three users 
with the adapted warning based upon likert-scale (i.e. 1-3 range).  With regard to the 
Chi-square test result (i.e. X2 > 5.991 where X2 = 6.41), there is a significant difference 
in both warnings in terms of comprehension of the interface of warning dialogue where 
most respondents decided that the adapted warning was more understandable when 
compared to the standard warning.      
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Figure 7.30: Comparison of “The interface of security dialogue was 
understandable” 
Users than demonstrated that the adapted warning helped them to fix the problem in a 
way they understood, where 24/30 selected “somewhat agree” to “strongly agree” with 
the adapted warning whilst only 11/30 with the standard warning dialogue as shown in 
Figure 7.31.  With the adapted warning, the flow was increased consistently except for 
the last part, whilst, with standard warnings, the line graph fluctuated and the top peak 
was recorded as” mostly disagree” with regards to helping users to fix the problem in a 
way they understood.  On the other hand, with regard to the Chi-square test result (i.e. 
X2 > 5.991 where X2 = 13.94) it can revealed that there is highly significant difference 
between standard and adapted warning in how the security dialogue helped users to fix 
problems in a way they understood.  It can be revealed that 14/30 selected “No” (i.e. 
likert scale 1-3) on the standard warning whilst only 2/30 with the adapted warning.  It 
can be suggested that users experienced greater difficulties in the standard warning 
compared to the adapted warning. 
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Figure 7.31: Comparison of “The security dialogue helped me to fix the problem in 
the way that I understood”. 
 
In terms of the help features, 27/30 indicated that the adapted warning was able to 
increase their knowledge and awareness with regard to the contents and features of the 
dialogue based on the likert-scale (i.e. 5-7 range) whilst only 11/30 with standard 
security warning as portrayed on Figure 7.32.  Even though the vast majority were 
generally satisfied with the help available, surprisingly one user still selected “mostly 
disagree”.  With the adapted warning, the overall presentation had been improved in 
order to communicate the risk effectively and guide users to make a secure decision.  
Hence, users demonstrated that they accepted the adapted warning far better than the 
standard warning.  Meanwhile, the Chi-square test result (i.e. X2 > 5.991 where X2 = 
18.48) revealed that there is highly significant difference between both warnings in 
terms of has the available help function helped to increase user’s knowledge and 
awareness of the content and features.  With a standard warning, 8 users selected neutral 
whilst only five users in the adapted warning.  Again, the majority agreed with the 
statement, especially with the adapted warning version.          
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Figure 7.32: Comparison of “The available help increased my knowledge and 
awareness about the contents and features of the dialogue”. 
 
The final question may be considered as the summary of overall users’ experiences with 
security warning as shown in Figure 7.33.  It can be revealed that 22/30 respondents 
claimed that the adapted warning based on their preferences had all the functionality 
and capability they expected to have whilst only 10/30 selected the same for the 
standard security warning based on the likert-scale (i.e. 5-7 range).  The Chi-square test 
results (i.e. X2 > 5.991 where X2 = 10.59) revealed that there is a significant difference 
between the standard and the adapted warning in terms of the dialogue having the 
functionality and capability that users expected it to have.  It can be suggested that 
generally most of the users were able to distinguish the differences from both warnings.  
Thus, it can be discovered that the adapted warning provided better content and features 
in order to compare with the standard warning.      
 
Figure 7.33: Comparison of “This dialogue had all the functionality and capability 
I expected it to have” 
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In summary, nine out of ten questions were significantly positive towards the security 
warning enhancement (adapted warning) based on user preferences (i.e. except on 
question 2).  However, with regard to the Chi-Square results, it can be revealed that 
(7/10) questions were significantly different statistically in terms of users’ decision in 
comparing the standard and the adapted warning.  This evaluation was based on users’ 
experience with the standard security warning and the adapted warning based on their 
preferences.  Even though the experience of each warning can be considered temporary 
(i.e. via prototype), it gave one clear indication of how security warnings can be 
improved based on users’ need.  In addition, this opened a new dimension for 
integrating help information together with the warning dialogue (i.e. via adaptation).  
Even though not all users preferred with the full version of the security warning 
enhancement (adapted warning), all users had a chance to experience it.  Therefore, it 
gave users the opportunity and equal chance to feel and to make a comparison later on.  
Based on the presented results at this stage, end-users demonstrated that they were 
positively inclined towards the security warning enhancement (adapted warning) based 
on the presented question which comprised the end-users satisfaction, perception and 
understanding of the overall presentation of security warnings. The next section 
presents further details with regard to the usability aspects which continue the aims of 
this research study.  
 
7.4.4.4 Usability questions 
 
The final section of this user study was an interview in relation to usability which 
comprised effectiveness, efficiency and user satisfaction of the usage of security 
warnings.  This technique was derived from Herzog and Shahmehri (2007) who 
published the comparison analysis of user help techniques based on security and 
usability criteria.  The evaluation of usability was conducted in a general sense, rather 
than a detailed assessment as the prototype software presented referred to one scenario 
only.  For example, the time that user took using the standard security warning compare 
with the security warning enhancement (adapted warning) was not measured.  However, 
users had been told to make a comparison in terms of the time involved in the decision 
making process.  The need for usability with this user study was to ensure that the 
adapted warning (i.e. by the usage of software) could be considered efficient to them.  
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As usability is closely related to user friendliness (Faulkner 2000), in order to 
strengthen the outcome of this user study, the author believed that understanding users’ 
assessment on usability aspects is needed.  Therefore, a comparison was made for each 
usability element and specific questions were asked and users were required to justify 
their reasons as well (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency and user satisfaction). 
 
After assessing usability elements, users were asked their main preference between the 
standard security warning or the adapted warning and the reasons for their choice.  
Although only 30 users had chosen the adapted warning, the remaining twenty users 
were told to make a comparison based on the adapted warning as well.  It can be noted 
with regard to these twenty users, they also had equal opportunities to experience the 
features and functionality of the adapted warning as well although this warning was 
generated for them on the first place (i.e. based on users’ preferences) (refer to section 
7.4.3).  This was to ensure that evidence can be gathered from overall views of 
respondents (i.e. n = 50) rather than generalisation from part of the sample.  Before 
ending the session, users were asked whether they had any thoughts on the method to 
improve the current implementation of security warnings (i.e. based on standard 
warning and enhancement warning that they had seen).  Lastly, they were asked if they 
wished to give any comments in relation to this study.  The lists of questions presented 
to users are shown in Table 7.29. 
 
Questions (n = 50) 
 
Comparison 
Elements 
Standard 
Security 
Warning 
Adapted 
Warning 
1. Which of security warnings able to 
provide effective solutions for you to 
make a decision? Why? 
Effectiveness 2 48 
2. Which of security warning able to 
guide me through to make a safe 
decision? (i.e. in terms of time 
involved) Why? 
Efficiency 2 48 
3. Which of this would be easy for 
you to use? Why? 
User 
satisfaction 
2 48 
Table 7.29: Comparison of usability elements and users’ preferences 
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When users were presented with question 1 in relation to effectiveness, 48/50 users 
claimed the adapted version was more effective compared to the standard version.  The 
reasons for their choices are presented in Table 7.30.   
 
Reasons 
Total responses (n 
= 48/50) 
Adequate information for me to understand 20 
Suitable for all level of users 4 
Estimation of risk levels 11 
Statistical details 6 
Clearer terminologies and understandable  7 
Table 7.30: The reasons on choosing the adapted warning (effectiveness) 
The majority of users claimed that the adapted warning dialogue provided adequate 
information for them to understand.  This answer generally covered some other 
elements that could refer to the “adequate information” such as the risk level, statistical 
details and simple terminology.  Users mentioned specifically how with the adapted 
warning, the risk level was able to convince them in a better way to understand the 
problem they encountered (i.e. able to communicate the risk) and the guidance elements 
in the dialogue guided them thoroughly to make better decisions.  Users also realised 
with the adapted warning that all useful information was depicted in the same dialogue 
rather than be presented in a new dialogue box.  With regard to the two users who 
preferred standard security warning, they claimed that they were familiar with that 
version, and thought it was simpler.  They simply wanted to make a quick decision and 
they also ignored warnings most of the time.  When probing their decision, they 
mentioned that with the adapted warning, it was still good, but they suggested it would 
be more useful to be used for people without technical background. 
Reasons 
Total responses 
 (n = 48/50) 
Informative descriptions/Useful information/Guidance 25 
Improved layout 3 
Risk level well informed (e.g. colour code bar) 10 
More precise and convincing 3 
Informed decision  7 
Table 7.31: The reasons on choosing the adapted warning (efficiency) 
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The second question was asked in relation to efficiency (the time involved with regard 
to making a safe decision).  As expected, the majority 48/50 of users preferred the 
adapted warning with their reasons shown in Table 7.31.  From this result, all 
functionality provided in the warning was able to help them to comprehend the 
problems and later guided them to make decisions in adequate time.  The risk level bar 
made them pay more attention to the colour coded bar and therefore they could make a 
quick decision merely by looking at this feature.  The guidance area provided questions 
and answers as a guiding interface for users.  In addition, the signal icons or words were 
used in a reasonable way (i.e. as in Microsoft Guidelines).  Therefore, users were able to 
make better judgements in their decision processed.   Users mentioned that they had to 
use more time with this warning because all information was allocated in one dialogue.  
Meanwhile, with the standard warning, they would make a quicker decision if they did 
not click the link at the bottom.  However, the vast majority were happy with the 
adapted warning as this was seen to provide better layout and guidance for users’ 
comprehension and for the sake of security and protection of the users’ computer.   
 
2 users claimed that the standard security warning was more efficient highlighting the 
familiarity issue.  As they got used to the previous version, they considered the new 
security warning as not efficient because the information was too much for them.  When 
further probe, one of the respondents mentioned that they considered themselves 
immune to security warning (i.e. it was just a warning and they believed nothing bad 
happened based on their experience receiving warnings on a daily basis).  However, 
they still appreciated the value of the information provided, which might be able to help 
other people who need it most, such as non-technical people.       
 
Reasons 
Total responses 
 (n = 48/50) 
Guidance elements that able to help making decision 9 
Simplified and informative 19 
Better layout and user friendly 5 
Risk level options 9 
Statistics on users’ action 6 
Table 7.32: The reasons on choosing enhancement security warning (user 
satisfaction) 
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The final part of the usability questions was related to user satisfaction.  Effectiveness 
and efficiency normally will influence user satisfaction.  According to Herzog and 
Shahmehri (2007) an additional factor that influences user satisfaction is empowerment.  
Empowerment is achieved when users are supported in achieving something that they 
are unable to handle.  Even though this thesis did not ask specifically about 
empowerment, the author believed that with the proposed method of security warnings 
(i.e. the adapted warning), empowerment was accomplished.  For instance, security 
warnings were improved with new features such as the risk level bar, matching icon and 
wording, tooltips information, question and answer style questions.  It is expected that 
this element can be assessed in future research.   
 
The next step was to evaluate user satisfaction.  In may be noted that consistent answers 
were demonstrated by all 50 respondents, as 48/50 were more satisfied with the adapted 
warning.  The reasons for their choices are presented in Table 7.32.  The majority 
agreed that the adapted warning was simplified and more informative.  Some suggested 
that the warning presented enough information (i.e. less to read) because the 
information had been classified accordingly in the guidance area.  The risk was 
communicated better informing users before they made their decisions.  Even though 
users had not experienced this warning in a live system, it gave a clear indication of 
how a security warning would be able to satisfy users’ need in relation to the 
presentation of warnings.  Overall, users demonstrated a positive preference for the 
adapted warning. Designing warnings that cater to end-users’ requirements are 
important so that they are able to understand and react accordingly.  This also indicated 
that users were satisfied with the new functions that were used in the proposed warnings, 
as the vast majority provided reasons by demonstrating the usefulness of the available 
features to help and guide them.     
 
After the evaluation and the validation of the overall steps within this user study, users 
were asked about their main preference for the security warnings they received.  Based 
on their experience with the standard security warning and the adapted warning, they 
were required to make a choice and justify their reasons.  The majority 46/50 opted for 
the adapted warning compared with the standard security warning.  Even though users 
consistently preferred the adapted warning in the usability questions (i.e. effectiveness, 
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efficiency and user satisfaction) the final verdict was portrayed slightly differently (i.e. 
from 48 to 46 respondents).  Therefore, it is useful to further evaluate this change.    
 
Table 7.33 presents the reasons for user preferences with the adapted warning compared 
to the standard security warning.  The majority claimed that the new warning was 
simple, informative, visually attractive and contained all necessary information in one 
place.  Some of them even highlighted that it was suitable for all levels of users. 
 
Reasons 
Total responses  
(n = 46/50) 
Simple and informative/simplified 17 
Visually attractive (e.g. risk level bar) 13 
Suitable for all level of users 3 
All information in one place 11 
Secured 2 
Table 7.33: The reasons on choosing enhancement security warning (preference) 
 
The four users who preferred to have the standard security warning were three male and 
one female user respectively.  All of their decisions are presented in Table 7.34 
 
 
Effectiveness Efficiency User Satisfaction 
Standard Adapted Standard Adapted Standard Adapted 
User 1       
User 2       
User 3       
User 4       
Table 7.34: 4 users’ decisions on usability set of questions 
It can be observed that the majority of them still preferred the adapted warning when 
they were presented with the set of usability questions.  Only two of them chose the 
standard security warning (i.e. with regard to effectiveness and efficiency) whilst the 
rest selected the adapted version.  When further probing this group of users, most of 
them mentioned that they were happy with the adapted security warning, but they still 
preferred the standard version.  However, users 1 and 2 claimed that the information 
provided in the warning was too much for them to read.  In addition, familiarity became 
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one of the biggest factors that made this group of users remain with the standard 
warning.  However, it can be noted that all of these users were very satisfied with the 
adapted warning when they were asked with regard to their satisfactions level 
(additional questions by principal investigator).  3/4 users suggested that the adapted 
warning is more suitable for people who are still new users of their computer.  They 
also believed that it was still useful for any level of user to have this warning, as more 
useful information was provided and it helped users to be more cautious.  
 
Reasons 
Total responses  
(n = 50) 
Incorporate the features to antivirus company  3 
State the amount of people who proceed with options 
rather than percentage 
3 
Explanation on type of file in details 3 
More help links 2 
Reduce the guidance area size 1 
Do not use technical jargon 1 
Flashing to indicate high risk  1 
Pie chart should provide expert advice rather than general 
public 
2 
Improve security warning icon to more meaningful or try to 
standardise it 
8 
Using less wordings 1 
Computer system should be able to make a decision on 
behalf of users 
2 
Enough information provided 23 
Table 7.35: Other suggestions to improve security warnings in general 
After this, the principal investigator asked users if they would like to suggest other 
elements that might be needed to improve security warnings.  Therefore, Table 7.35 
lists some suggestions from end-users with regard to their suggestions to improve 
security warnings.  The majority of users claimed that an essential element that should 
be presented in one particular warning was an adequate level of information.  Therefore, 
information should be able to inform end-users and able to convince them to make a 
good judgment before proceeding with any possible action.  One interesting finding 
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from this was that one user suggested that a flashing indicator should be used to 
highlight the severity of risk, so that they would knew straight away something need to 
be done.  
 
Viewing others’ decision feature was also highlighted by users as it helped them to see 
what others did.  However some users claimed that the statistical information was still 
not very clear and suggested instead that showing the percentages of how many people 
had executed the file and cancelled the operation, would be useful if statistics sharing 
decisions made by expert users and the decision based on the successful rate of the 
execution of the file (i.e. without any malware detection) which some of them claimed 
would be more convincing.  In addition, three respondents even suggested that this 
function could be integrated with an antivirus company to gain more trust from end-
users.  Two users suggested that the pie chart should be provided with expert advice 
only rather than the general public.  They believed that following an expert path would 
be much more useful and more trusted.  The final part of the interview asked if users 
wished to give some opinions or comments about this study. Most of them were 
satisfied and happy with the way the user study had been conducted. 
 
7.5 Final observations 
 
In Chapter 2, the author made use of the two recommended strategies by Cranor (2008) 
to build a secure system so that human beings could use it as follows: 
i. To build systems that are intuitive and find methods to make it easy to use 
ii. To teach humans how to perform the security critical task 
Therefore, the author believed that ASIA accomplished both of these strategies based on 
the presented results within this chapter where it can be revealed that end-users 
significantly preferred to use the adapted warning compared with the standard security 
warning.  The prototype was developed to evaluate and to validate the architecture 
proposed in Chapter 6.  The next two sections describe the two observations that can be 
made with regard to the aims of ASIA and the “combined approach” that was proposed 
in ASIA. 
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7.5.1 Automated Security Interface Adaptation aims – Validation 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, ASIA proposed the aims presented in Table 7.36.  Therefore, 
based on the results presented within this Chapter 8, the table describes the level of 
achievement based on the listed aims. 
 
Aims Supporting evidence Descriptions 
To adapt the 
presentation of security 
warnings based on user 
preferences 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5 
highlighted problems with 
regard to security 
warnings.  This chapter 
provided an evaluation 
and validation based on a 
user study utilising a 
software prototype. 
Evidence suggested that 
the majority of users 
(46/50) prefer to have the 
adapted warning rather 
than standard security 
warning. 
To improve the usability 
(i.e. effectiveness, 
efficiency and 
satisfaction) of security 
interactions  
Section 7.4.4.4 provided 
the evaluation and 
validation process with 
regards to the usability 
aspects.  
Evidence suggested that 
48/50 respondents 
consistently opted for the 
adapted warning with 
regard to the usability 
features. 
To increase users’ 
comprehension of 
security warning 
dialogues before making 
a decision by enhancing 
the available help 
Section 7.4.3 for 
described the assessment 
of the adapted warning. 
Evidence suggested that in 
most cases, users chose 
the positive likert-scale 
range as compared to the 
standard warning. 
Table 7.36: Aims of ASIA validation 
Based on the results presented in this whole thesis, and specifically in Table 7.36, it is 
clear that all the aims presented were achieved and validated.  Even though the final aim 
of promoting a secure decision making process by enhancing the help feature was not 
encouraging (i.e. 16/50 clicked help), users were asked to try the new function 
embedded in the help button.  After users had experienced this, it can be revealed that 
the vast majority preferred the adapted warning.  Therefore, they now realised the new 
concept of help (i.e. the main questions and useful information embedded together in 
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one dialogue) that had been presented to them (i.e. results as presented in sections 7.4.3 
and 7.4.4).  In the next section, the validation process is presented, so as to compare 
various help techniques and the technique that were embedded in ASIA.  
 
7.5.2 Usable help technique – Validation 
 
In Chapter 2, a table of comparison was presented with a “combined approach” column, 
with the “maybe” justification on each question (i.e. pending upon evaluation and 
validation) as depicted in Table 2.5. This section provides the results of the validation 
process based on the presented evidence.  ASIA made use of the combination approach 
from other users help techniques.  Based on the comparison in Table 7.37, it may be 
noted that one of the common and useful help techniques is the online help.  This can be 
considered as an online documentation comprising various types of information related 
to the current state of the application.  However, the information was too detailed.  
Sometimes, it integrated with other usable help techniques such as context-sensitive 
help and light-weight help.  The information provided was normally very case specific, 
and was explained in long narratives.   
 
ASIA proposed the usage of a “combined approach” which sought to make use of ten 
questions to be integrated into the adapted warning.  Not all questions were directly 
asked,  however the outcome of the questions was expected to be answered in the 
warnings (i.e. via new features introduced such as tooltips information, risk level bar, 
Guidance area (Q & A), less technical terminology words, match signal icon and word).  
Therefore, Table 7.37 presents the assessment results based on the user study that had 
been conducted. 
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Table 7.37: Comparison of which user questions can be answered by which user 
help technique (adapted from Herzog and Shahmehri (2007)) 
 
Based on the previous comparison between the user help technique, online help may be 
considered as the best approach.  However, from the author’s observation, it is lacking 
the historical information and involved user search activity (i.e. effort) to seek solutions 
to some questions (i.e. descriptive, procedural, interpretive, navigational, choice, 
guidance and investigative).  To resolve this problem, a “combined approach” was 
introduced in ASIA framework to bridge the gap and improve the overall function of 
help.  Based on the results presented within this chapter, Table 7.38 further described 
the evaluation and validation process on the combined approach that has been used in 
ASIA.  This evaluation and validation process was based on the results presented earlier 
within this chapter.  Therefore, the outcome from this user study and detailed 
explanation in Table 7.38 elucidated the results on Table 7.37 (i.e. blue background).     
  
Users’ 
questions 
Combine  
approach 
results 
Evaluation and validation  
Informational 
Yes with 
guidance 
ASIA presented users with Guidance elements 
that consisted of questions and answers. The 
information provided was informative to explain 
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Users’ 
questions 
Combine  
approach 
results 
Evaluation and validation  
what user can do with this security warning.  
“What is the summary” link provided a context to 
explain what users can do with this application.    
Descriptive 
Yes with 
guidance 
ASIA presented users with Guidance elements 
that consisted of questions and answers. The 
information provided was informative to describe 
what a user can do with this security warning.  
“What is the summary” link provided a summary 
on what is happening.  It’s available straight away 
once users clicked help (i.e. no further search 
required).  
Procedural 
Yes with 
Q & A format 
ASIA presented users with Guidance elements 
that consisted of questions and answers.  At the 
main Guidance area, users had been presented 
with simple instructions on how to use the 
guidance (i.e. no further search required). 
Interpretive 
Yes with the risk 
level bar and 
Guidance 
ASIA presented users with Guidance elements 
that consisted of questions and answers.  “What 
is the risk” explained the severity level of 
problems that users encountered.  
Simultaneously, the risk level bar with colour 
coding communicated the risk in a better way for 
users to understand.  The tooltips functions 
explained the definition of the texts (i.e. no further 
search required). 
Navigational 
Yes with tooltips 
information 
ASIA presented users with features which 
embedded the tooltips information.  It explained 
simple and useful information for users. For 
instance, when users hover over “location” they 
were presented with “This indicates the location 
of the file on your system”.  In addition, “what is 
the summary” also explained the current context 
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Users’ 
questions 
Combine  
approach 
results 
Evaluation and validation  
of the warning (i.e. no further search required). 
Choice 
Yes with 
guidance 
ASIA presented users with Guidance elements 
that consisted of questions and answers.  It 
provided users with some choices presented in 
the guidance area.  Users would be able to get 
more information from one page to another page 
(i.e. but still remain in one dialogue box) (i.e. no 
further search required). 
Guidance 
Yes with 
Q & A format 
ASIA presented users with Guidance elements 
that consisted of questions and answers.  “What 
should I do” presented the recommended action 
for users to take (i.e. no further search required). 
History 
Yes by showing 
what others did 
This was the missing element in other user help 
techniques.  ASIA provided this information via 
“what did others do” to view social navigation 
elements.  One value added element in ASIA. 
Motivational 
Yes upon receive 
risk level bar 
The risk level bar provided quick information on 
the severity of warning message. Tooltips 
provided quick and useful information for users to 
apprehend.  Therefore, it gave early motivation to 
users.   
Investigative 
Yes with 
Q & A format 
ASIA presented users with Guidance elements 
that consisted of questions and answers.  By 
clicking “what else should I know” gave users 
some other suggestion that can considered 
before a decision is made (i.e. no further search 
required).  
Table 7.38: Details of evaluation and validation 
 
Having evaluated and validated the results from Table 7.38, it may be noted that with 
the “combined approach”, as proposed in ASIA, security warnings were improved and 
this approach is feasible.  Another comparison was made between the standard security 
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warning and the adapted warning as depicted in Table 7.39.  It may be revealed that the 
standard security warning only covered (i.e. using “”) five contexts of (Q & A) whilst 
the adapted warning covered all of the available contexts.  Even though this result was 
not representative, but was based on the focal point of study (i.e. task 7) it was proved 
that the “combined approach” embedded in ASIA was workable.  One main difference 
that can be revealed in this comparison is that ASIA improved warnings to incorporate 
all questions and answer elements, especially with regards to historical information 
(which cannot be done in online help).  
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Standard security warning  
          
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Enhanced security warning 
          
Table 7.39: Comparison of security warnings based on the availability of 10 
questions. 
Therefore, based on the overall empirical evidence presented in the earlier chapters, this 
thesis has been able to achieve its goal by fulfilling all the objectives as presented in 
Chapter 2.  This proves that ASIA was achievable and that security warnings were 
improved. 
7.6 Discussions 
 
Based on the evidence presented within this chapter, it can be noted that the final study 
utilised 50 respondents to experience the standard security warning and the adapted 
warning.  Thus, participants had experienced the look and feel of both warning styles 
and then made their own judgement on which became their preference.  In the early 
stage of the experiment, 54% of respondents clicked “run”, 32% used the help button 
whilst 14% opted for cancel upon receiving the simplified security warning (Table 8.1). 
Participants were shown the security warning enhancement based on their preferences 
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only if they selected help.  After all participants had experienced the adapted warning, 
the vast majority (46/50) opted for the adapted warning.   
 
These results indicated that the changes which had been made to the security warnings 
layout are feasible and accepted by the end-users.  The additional features that were 
introduced such as about this file, the main question, location, risk level, help button 
and warning icon (Tables 7.2 and 7.3), became the factors that contributed to the 
successful implementation of the adapted warning.   The majority of respondents (i.e 
results derived from questionnaire and interviews) demonstrated that they found these 
new features were able to assist them in comprehending more easily the information 
provided in one particular warning when compared with the standard version of 
warnings.  For example, in terms of signal cues, icons and technical jargon.  With the 
adapted warnings, end-users were given some useful information to be assessed (i.e. 
written information or mouse hover) so that they were able to comprehend current risk 
and situation before making any decision.  In contrast, the standard security warning 
were unable to provide sufficient information and the layout of the warning remained 
similar to one and another.  From an end-users perspective, they found some significant 
difficulties in making their decisions and expected more in order to help them to 
comprehend the meaning of the warning.  In addition, they also demonstrated that not 
enough options existed to guide them and a lack of satisfaction with the availability of 
help functions in the standard security warning.  With the adapted warnings, more 
useful help functions and the availability of various options made users more aware and 
understand the current context of warnings and able to comprehend them.  
 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, a lack of focus had been given to design a 
meaningful solution as a new method of interaction to provide effective security 
warnings.  Most of the literature that had been discussed highlighted how security 
warnings can be improved using various methods especially to improve the layout of 
warnings.  On the other hand, there is a lack of research in the adaptation of security 
warnings (i.e. presenting security warning based on end-users’ need).  Therefore the 
ASIA architecture is introduced to counter these problems by presenting more useful 
information and available features.  This new concept makes this research direction 
significantly different and unique.  It meant that security warnings can be improved and 
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presented with suitable information that would be able to suit their understanding rather 
than giving general information as portrayed in standard security warnings.      
 
As mentioned in the previous section, this user study implemented a “combined 
approach” that had been introduced in Chapter 2.  This approach worked to bridge the 
gaps that currently exist in implementations of security warnings by providing more 
information that is desired by end-users when they encountered security warnings.  One 
similar underlying research that matches the author intention to improve warnings is 
proposed by Keukelaere et al. (2009) with Adaptive Security Dialogs (ASD).  ASD’s 
worked adapted the risk that users had been exposed to (i.e. security warnings for 
opening text file and pdf file will be different).  On the other hand, the author’s work 
adapted the warnings based on users’ preference on what level of information is needed 
in the security warning.  Given the useful and suitable information depicted in the 
adapted warning, users are able to understand the current context of warning and to help 
them to make secure manner decision.  In ASD, the security warning presentation is 
fixed based based on the five classes of dialogs.  Each different file extension had a 
fixed version of dialogue box.  Whilst in ASIA, the security warnings presentation will 
be presented to end-users based on types of information that they wanted to have in the 
warning (i.e. warnings icons, web search, risk level bar, location hyperlink and guidance 
information (help)).  Thus, ASIA improves the security warnings by introducing more 
user-friendly layout, more useful information and more interactive interaction with end-
users which had not been done in ASD.  
 
From the perspective of the standard security warning, the information provided was in 
a generic context.  It generally lacked guidance and history information on what end-
users should do and refer to before making a decision.  Therefore, ASIA framework via 
this user study significantly improved the current implementation of security warnings 
and it worked better in relation to usability (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency and user 
satisfaction) than the standard security warning as demonstrated by the majority of 
respondents within this user study.  The prototype of ASIA highlighted significant 
novelty by presenting security warnings based on end-users needs.  The vast majority of 
respondents opted for adapted warnings based on a series of interviews and 
questionnaire sessions.  Even though this user study was presented as a prototype, it 
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gave an early indication of the effectiveness of end-users’ interaction with the security 
warnings.  Thus, it can be suggested that adapted security warnings work better than the 
conventional security warnings which satisfied the aims of the overall study.  In 
addition, this research was able to highlight a novel way of interaction or presenting 
security warnings that caters to end-users needs on the level of information that should 
be presented in a particular warning.  The proposed idea of security warning adaptation 
is still new and it would need more time to be conducted in real-life.  However, given 
that the ASIA concept had been tested, validated and evaluated, it gaves a positive 
outcome to conduct more research within these areas of study.    
 
7.7 Constraints   
 
The following were the constraints of this user study: 
 
i. This evaluation and validation process was conducted as a prototype software 
(i.e. role-based in order to provide context of warnings) rather than offering real-
time experience for end-users.  Therefore, end-users were unable to have real 
interactions with the new security warning they experienced. 
 
ii. The security warning enhancement was based on only one task (i.e. task 7).  
Therefore, it did not provide a wide range of flexibility in terms of experiencing 
with many security warnings.   
 
iii. The experiment was conducted personally by the principal investigator, to 
minimise bias the interview scripts were coded by two external individuals. 
 
iv. The focus of these warnings was only based on dialogue box contexts rather 
than other type of warnings (i.e. balloon, notification, in place and banners). 
 
v. The user study did not cover the element of habituation effects, which was 
normally correlated with security warnings. 
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7.8 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the evaluation and validation of this user study may be considered as 
successful.  Even though the implementation did not involve real-time user interaction, 
using prototype software gave an early indication that security warnings can be 
improved based on user preferences.  The “Automated Security Interface Adaptation 
(ASIA)” prototype was developed to evaluate and to validate the effectiveness of the 
proposed framework in Chapter 6.  Users are routinely presented with standard security 
warnings from various web browsers, these web browsers have different methods of 
presenting warnings especially with regard to their functionality and approach.  
Microsoft as one of the major developers produced their own guidelines to ensure that 
all of the functionality was presented within their design concept.  However, based on a 
series of user studies presented in Chapters 3 to 5, these guidelines are not implemented 
(e.g. Microsoft).  This signals that there is also a need to take a particular look at the 
creation of the guidelines from the end-users and developers’ perspective, so that it 
clarifies how to create and use it effectively.  
 
In general, end-users still experience significant problems with regard to the security 
warnings that they encounter.  In order to ensure that users are able to use the warnings 
correctly and in a secure manner, usability plays a vital role.  A significant area in which 
usability plays a key role is when users have to make a decision.  And of course, the 
significant type of decision that users have to make is when the system issues them with 
computer warnings, because their impact on the decision could be significantly greater 
on security and protection of the system and information.  Having conducted a number 
of trials, it may be concluded that end-users are significantly satisfied with the adapted 
warning presented to them.  Based on the presented results from the earlier sections, 
end-users indicated that they were able to comprehend the warnings better compared to 
the standard version.  Even though these evaluation and validation processes were 
presented as prototype software, it gave a clear indication that security warning should 
be presented in a way that suits end-user needs.  For instance, the Chi-Square test 
revealed the significant difference on both presented warnings.  Therefore, this supports 
the findings on how each warning was presented differently (i.e. by rejected null 
hypothesis).    
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Based on the author’s knowledge, there are no similar adaptation concepts available and 
as such this proposed method can be considered as a new concept.  In addition, ASIA 
utilised the help function which embedded all useful information in a similar dialogue 
of warnings rather than having different dialogue boxes.   The prototype software tried 
to imitate real scenarios and it was conducted with deliberate considerations (i.e. role-
based scenarios and order of warnings).  Based on the empirical evidence presented 
within this chapter, it can be considered that the ASIA framework is feasible and 
achievable.  Users demonstrated significant satisfaction, specifically with the new 
proposed security warning enhancement.    
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8 Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter presents a summary of the thesis by reviewing the achievements that have 
been made, and later presents the limitation of the study.  The chapter then goes on to 
highlight future directions for research. 
 
8.1 Achievements of research 
 
Based on the overall findings in this thesis, it may be noted that all of the objectives 
which were set out in Chapter 1 have been addressed by the series of user studies and 
the prototype of the Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) architecture.  The 
achievements of the research are highlighted as follows: 
 
i. A detailed understanding of the current state of the art in the use of security 
dialogues and warnings.  The research illustrated the need to improve security 
warnings by highlighting the fundamental concept, approaches and weaknesses 
in the way that security warnings are currently implemented (i.e. Chapter 2). 
 
ii. A comprehensive assessment of security dialogues and warnings through a 
series of experimental studies.  The evidence obtained through these trials 
proved that in most scenarios, end-users face significant difficulties 
understanding and interacting with security warnings and thus it can be 
demonstrated that security warnings should be improved accordingly (i.e. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
 
iii. Proposal of the Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) architecture to 
improve security warnings.  This architecture provides a novel approach to adapt 
security dialogues and warnings based on end-users’ need or preferences (i.e. 
Chapter 6). 
 
iv. Implementation of a prototype to evaluate and to validate the ASIA architecture.  
The results proved that, in the vast majority of cases, the adaptation warnings 
were the preferred choice when compared to the standard warnings in terms of 
usability (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency and availability) and the overall 
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implementation that include usable help technique table comparison (i.e. 
Chapter 7). 
 
Two papers relating to the research programme have been presented at refereed 
conferences, with favourable comments being received from delegates.  As such, it is 
believed that the research has made valid and useful contributions to the body of 
knowledge of information security, in regards to security warnings (see Appendix E). 
 
8.2 Limitations of the research 
 
Despite the aims of this research having been met, there are a number of limitations that 
can be identified.  The limitations may be summarised as follows: 
 
i. The evaluation and validation user study was conducted as a prototype system 
rather than having a real-time context where end-users were able to experience 
the look and feel of security warnings through genuine interactions.  It was 
difficult to conduct a real-time study, due to privacy and ethical issues.  Also, 
only one task has been presented (i.e. task 7) in order to generate a security 
warning enhancement, rather than having all tasks.  This was done to elicit the 
learning effect and to ensure that users remained focused through a long period 
of user study.  It may be noted, for the user study as described in Chapter 7, that 
each session was approximately 40 minutes. 
 
ii. The focal point of this research was specifically on dialogue box warnings as 
suggested by the previous user studies (Chapters 4 and 5).  It did not cover other 
types of interaction such as notifications, in-place, balloons and banners.  As a 
result, warning dialogues that provided at least two options (e.g. Yes and No) 
and were associated with security and protection (i.e. upon detection of warning 
class, header name and application name) were chosen. 
 
iii. The 7 tasks that were used were derived from 3 main web browsers (i.e. Internet 
Explorer, Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome) rather than providing flexibility 
with all browsers.  A series of user studies conducted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
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revealed that these three browsers were among the most popular to be chosen by 
end-users. 
 
iv. A study of “habituation effects”, as suggested in warning studies, has not been 
covered.  A habituation effect considers in particular the effect of repeated 
exposure to warnings.  At present, the aims of this research are limited to how 
warnings can be presented based on user preferences. 
 
v. With regard to the participants involved (i.e. ranging from 30 to 50 participants 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5), the majority were experienced in using a computer and 
the Internet for more than six years, and had good computing skills.  The 
segregation of the data sets (i.e. participant group in terms of age) was not 
sufficiently diverse with the majority aged from twenty to early 30s and had a 
high level of familiarity with technology.  It would be useful if the data set can 
be varied to different age groups (e.g. older participants).  In addition, 
participants from the general public (i.e. not within the university) would 
provide a more diverse sample distribution, as they might come from different 
backgrounds. 
 
vi. The interview sessions were recorded by the principal investigator, with most of 
the participants involved being predominantly Plymouth University students or 
staff.  As a consequence of the interviews being recorded, participants might 
have provided biased answers (i.e. to satisfy the listener or examiner). 
 
vii. Most of the outcomes of the user studies in this thesis were evaluated using a 
descriptive method (i.e. frequency and cross tabulation analysis).  It would be 
useful to consider other statistical analysis techniques. 
 
Despite these limitations, the overall findings are still valid and useful, based on the 
evidence that has been gathered.  The presented contributions have highlighted how this 
research can fit into the domain of warning research study and significantly improve the 
current state of the art. 
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8.3 Suggestions for future work 
 
This research has sought to improve the domain of computer security, specifically in 
terms of computer security warnings.  The issues of usability and users’ experience of 
the usage of security dialogues and warnings were highlighted in which future work 
may be carried out to advance upon what has been achieved with this particular research. 
Details of proposed future work are presented below:  
 
i. An application (i.e. automated security warnings adaptation software) could 
be designed that would interact with any context or type of security warning 
from different web browsers in a computer, in real-time, and therefore  enable 
a wider range of assessments to be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of 
how security warning presentation can be improved. 
 
ii. The habituation effects study could be conducted in relation to this warning 
study.  It could consider how security warning enhancements can be accepted 
by end-users after being used for a certain period of time (i.e. whether 
habituation effects still exist or can be minimised).  Hence, it will gather more 
empirical evidence in terms of how security warnings can be improved. 
 
iii. Once a full, real-time application has been developed, a repeated study with 
regards to the questionnaire and interview may be conducted again.  This will 
provide more useful insights from end-users based on the results of using the 
security warning enhancement over a prolonged period of time.  In addition, a 
usability study may be conducted again (i.e. in a real-time context) and all of 
these results may then be compared with the results presented in Chapter 7.  
 
iv. It would be useful to obtain involvement from a range of participant groups to 
provide more evidence as to how each group of people understand and make 
use of the warnings.  Therefore, it might be useful to suggest that warnings 
can be presented to cater for needs based on these different groups (e.g. based 
on age or technical ability or experience). 
 
v. For more comprehensive analysis, various statistical analysis techniques can 
be used, such as significance and reliability tests, to further validate the 
findings. 
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vi. Further research should also focus on how warnings can be effectively used to 
warn the user and simultaneously minimise the level of interruption whilst 
users are focussed on the respective task.  As it has been proposed that 
warnings should only be presented when needed (i.e. based on the criticality 
of the warnings), it is useful to assess the effectiveness of warning 
implementations in various application usage contexts (e.g. from different 
operating systems, web browsers and Internet security packages). 
 
8.4 The future of security warnings 
 
The future of this research offers considerable score for future work, since end-users 
deal with computer warnings on a daily basis, whilst using their computer at home or at 
work.  The interdependencies of human and computer cannot be neglected as warnings 
will continue to be used to warn and to inform the user about possible problems.  
However, more research and development is needed to find methods that ensure that 
warnings are presented in a meaningful manner, at the time they are needed, with 
sufficient information to make an informed decision, but, in a way that users do not 
disregard the main purpose of the warning.  To this end, this research has proposed and 
developed the ASIA architecture that provides improved security warnings and reacts to 
users’ needs. 
 
The problems or difficulties based on end-user experience with computer warnings have 
been clearly established in this thesis.  These facts then led to a series of experimental 
studies to explore alternative approaches to provide warnings in a desirable context that 
suited the users’ needs.  Thus, security warnings become the means to provide 
transparent security and protection with regards to the decision making process that a 
user has to make which greatly affects the fundamental goal of computer security. 
 
The research has shown that, as far as security warnings are concerned, a ‘one size fits 
all’ approach is not viable, and users need targeted support in order to understand and 
thereby make more informed decisions.  ASIA evidences the potential to contribute here 
by tailoring security interactions far more closely to individual needs.  Through doing 
so, security technology will be better positioned to serve and protect a much wider 
proportion of the online community than is currently being achieved. 
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Survey questions 
 
Perception and usability in information security: A survey of public attitudes 
 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network 
Research (CSCAN)  
 
This survey is being conducted for PhD research on perception and usability in 
information security at University of Plymouth, United Kingdom. The questionnaire is 
designed to investigate perception and level of understanding on usage of computer and 
its application. It consists of 5 sections, namely: 
 
1. Background/demographic - Overview on users' background which consists of 
gender, education background, occupation, computing skills and perception on security 
in computing contexts. 
2. General usage of computer and operating systems - Analysis of users’ experience 
on using the Internet, operating system and security concerns on computer 
3. Usability and protection - Analysis of users’ understanding on issues of usability 
and protection in relation to malware, security applications, security updates and 
security trust which require respondents to identify features from a depicted diagram in 
order to determine what they understand about the features. 
4. Computer scenario study - Analysis of users’ understanding of computer web 
security issues based on their past experiences and knowledge of dealing with 
information security 
 
Researcher details: 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN)  
School of Computing and Mathematics, PL4 8AA  
University of Plymouth 
E-mail: zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Project Supervisors: 
Prof. Steven M. Furnell 
Dr. Paul Dowland 
There are 41 questions in this survey 
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Consent Form 
 
Dear participants, 
  
 This survey is designed for adult participation. If you are NOT 18 YEARS OR 
OLDER, PLEASE DO NOT ANSWER THIS SURVEY. Anyone can take part in the 
survey and you are free to withdraw at any time. 
All your answers will be treated confidentially and respondents will be anonymous 
during the collection, storage and publication of research material. The survey is hosted 
online within the Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research 
(CSCAN). Responses are collected online and stored in a secure database. Once the 
survey has been taken offline participant responses will be extracted, statistically 
analysed and published into a suitable academic journal. In addition these results may 
be used and published in a PhD thesis. Your responses will be treated as confidential at 
all times and data will be presented in such a way that your identity cannot be connected 
with specific published data. Should you have any questions about the study or you 
wish to receive a copy of the results, please contact the researcher Zarul Fitri Zaaba via 
email or address below: 
 
Researcher details: 
Zarul Fitri ZaabaCentre for Security, Communications and Network Research 
(CSCAN) School of Computing and MathematicsUniversity of Plymouth 
Mail to: zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
If you have any concerns regarding the way the study has been conducted, please contact 
the secretary of Faculty of Science and Technology Ethics Committee: 
Paula Simson 
A106, Portland Square, Drake Circus 
Faculty of Science and Technology  
University of Plymouth  
Phone:+44 (0)1752584503 
Mail to: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk  
 
1 [QC1]Are you 18 years old and above? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes  
 No  
Only answer this question if you are 18 years old and above.  IF your answer is NO 
please quit the survey. 
 
2 [QC]I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time and I confirm that I have read 
and understand the information given and agree to take part in the study? * 
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Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Yes' at question '1 [QC1]' (Are you 18 years old and above?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes  
Section 1 
Background and demographic  
 
3 [Q1]Please select your gender * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Female  
 Male  
4 [Q2]Please select your age * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 18-30  
 31-40  
 41-50  
 Above 50  
5 [Q3]Educational background * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Postgraduate (e.g Masters, PhD)  
 Higher education (e.g Bachelor Degree, HND, Diploma)  
 Further Education (e.g Certificates, A-Levels, GNVQ)  
 GCSE/O Level  
 Other  
6 [Q4]How do you rate your computing skills? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Expert  
 Advanced  
 Intermediate  
 Beginner  
7 [Q5]How many years have you been using a computer? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 <1 year  
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 1-2years  
 3-4 years  
 5-6 years  
 >6 years  
8 [Q6]What kind of problems do you regularly encounter while using your computer? * 
Please choose all that apply: 
 User interface difficulties  
 Complex security features  
 Problem in understanding help functions  
 Internet connection speed  
 Application problems (i.e installation, difficulty on software usage etc)  
 Hardware difficulties  
 Operating systems  
 Malware (i.e Viruses, worms, trojans, rootkits etc)  
 None  
 Other:  
9 [Q7]What is your level of concern regarding the security of your computer? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 I am very concerned  
 I am concerned  
 I am mildly concerned  
 I am not concerned at all  
 I don't know  
Section 2 
General usage of computer and operating systems  
 
10 [Q8]How long you have been using the Internet? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 < 1 year  
 1-2 years  
 3-4 years  
 5-6 years  
 > 6 years  
 I do not use Internet  
11 [Q9]What is your primary operating system (OS) for your computer? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Windows 7  
 Windows Vista  
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 Windows XP  
 Mac OS X  
 Linux  
 I don't know  
 Other  
12 [Q10]Do you feel it is important to update the operating system (OS)? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 It is very important  
 It is important  
 It is mildly important  
 It is not important at all  
 I don't know  
13 [Q11]How do you keep your operating system (OS) up to date by installing online 
software update/patches? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Updated automatically  
 Updated manually  
 Not updated  
 I don't know  
  
14 [Q11X]Do you use any security software? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes  
 No  
 I don't know  
15 [Q11X1]From which vendor(s) do you use your security products? * 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Yes' at question '14 [Q11X]' (Do you use any security software?) 
Please choose all that apply: 
 Avast  
 AVG  
 AVIRA  
 BitDefender  
 eScan  
 ESET NOD32  
 F-Secure  
 G DATA  
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 Kaspersky  
 Kingsoft  
 McAfee  
 Microsoft Live OneCare  
 Norman  
 Norton  
 Sophos  
 Symantec  
 Trend Micro  
 Trustport  
 Other:   
16 [Q11X2]What type of security software products do you use? * 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Yes' at question '14 [Q11X]' (Do you use any security software?) 
Please choose all that apply: 
 Antivirus  
 Zone Alarm Firewall  
 Mobile Security  
 Anti spyware  
 Internet Security (i.e Antivirus, Anti spyware, E-mail security etc)  
 Other:   
17 [Q12X]What is your preferred web browser? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Internet Explorer 8  
 Internet Explorer 7  
 Mozilla Firefox  
 Opera  
 Safari  
 Chrome  
 I don't know  
 Other  
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Section 3 
Usability and protection 
 
18 [Q12-a]You received an e-mail from a bank to request for re-activate your online 
banking account. When you click the hyperlink from the e-mail to respond, you receive 
the screen below. How would you respond?  
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Mozilla Firefox ' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred 
web browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Try to find more information about the meaning of the message  
 Close the browser  
 Ignore the warning and proceed with the transaction  
 I don't know  
 Other  
 
19 [Q12-b]You received an e-mail from a bank to request for re-activate your online 
banking account. When you click the hyperlink from the e-mail to respond, you receive 
the screen below. How would you respond?  
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Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Internet Explorer 8' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your 
preferred web browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Try to find more information about the meaning of the message  
 Close the browser  
 Ignore the warning and proceed with the transaction  
 I don't know  
 Other  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A: USER STUDY 1 DOCUMENTATION 
 
 
 
 
298 
20 [Q12-c]You received an e-mail from a bank to request for re-activate your online 
banking account. When you click the hyperlink from the e-mail to respond, you receive 
the screen below. How would you respond?  
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Internet Explorer 7' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your 
preferred web browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Try to find more information about the meaning of the message  
 Close the browser  
 Ignore the warning and proceed with the transaction  
 I don't know  
 Other  
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21 [Q12-d]You received an e-mail from a bank to request for re-activate your online 
banking account. When you click the hyperlink from the e-mail to respond, you receive 
the screen below. How would you respond?  
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Opera' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred web 
browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Try to find more information about the meaning of the message  
 Close the browser  
 Ignore the warning and proceed with the transaction  
 I don't know  
 Other  
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22 [Q12-e]You received an e-mail from a bank to request for re-activate your online 
banking account. When you click the hyperlink from the e-mail to respond, you receive 
the screen below. How would you respond? 
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Safari' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred web 
browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Try to find more information about the meaning of the message  
 Close the browser  
 Ignore the warning and proceed with the transaction  
 I don't know  
 Other  
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23 [Q12-f]You received an e-mail from a bank to request for re-activate your online 
banking account. When you click the hyperlink from the e-mail to respond, you receive 
the screen below. How would you respond?  
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Chrome' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred web 
browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Try to find more information about the meaning of the message  
 Close the browser  
 Ignore this warning and proceed with the transaction  
 I don't know  
 Other  
  
24 [Qxx-1]Do you feel that you understood the information depicted in the screenshot?  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Internet Explorer 7' or 'Mozilla Firefox ' or 'Internet Explorer 8' or 
'Opera' or 'Safari' or 'Chrome' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred 
web browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes  
 No  
25 [Qxx-1a]Which of the following did you have difficulty understanding? * 
APPENDIX A: USER STUDY 1 DOCUMENTATION 
 
 
 
 
302 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'No' at question '24 [Qxx-1]' (Do you feel that you understood the 
information depicted in the screenshot?) Please choose all that apply: 
 Technical terminology  
 The nature of the event being described  
 The choices available  
 Other:  
26 [Qxx-2]Why do you believe the security message would have appeared? * 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Safari' or 'Internet Explorer 8' or 'Internet Explorer 7' or 'Mozilla 
Firefox ' or 'Opera' or 'Chrome' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred 
web browser?) Please choose all that apply: 
 The website contains inappropriate materials  
 The website is linked to fraudulent activity  
 The website contains viruses  
 It is the security warning which I encounter normally  
 I don't know  
 Other:   
27 [Q14]Have you experienced any of the following? * 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  Yes No I don't know 
Never heard of 
it 
Virus     
Worms     
Trojans     
Phishing     
Spyware     
Spam     
Unauthorized 
access attempt     
 
28 [Q15]How has the possibility of becoming a victim of malicious attack or 
cybercrime changed your behaviour towards the usage of computer security? * 
Please choose all that apply: 
 It has not changed my attitude  
 I only visit web sites that I am familiar with  
 Used Internet security package  
 Go online surfing less often  
 Other:  
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29 [Q16]Which of the following security applications do you have installed on your 
computer? * 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  Yes No I don't know 
Never heard of 
it 
Anti-virus     
Anti-spyware     
Anti-phishing     
Firewall     
Intrusion 
detection 
system 
    
Pop up blocker     
Parental 
controls     
Spam filters     
 
30 [Q17]How do you update your anti-malware tools? * 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Updated 
manually 
Updated 
automatically 
Not updated at 
all 
I don't know 
Antivirus     
Anti-spyware     
Anti-phishing     
Firewall     
Intrusion 
detection 
system (IDS) 
    
 
31 [Q18]Which of these statements do you agree, with regarding your use of anti-
malware protection tools? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 It is very important to trust anti-malware tools as they provide 
safeguards for my computer  
 It is important to trust anti-malware tools as they provide safeguards for 
my computer  
 It is mildly important to trust anti-malware tools as they provide 
safeguards for my computer  
 It is not important to trust anti-malware tools  
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 I don't know  
Section 4 
Scenario study 
 
32 [Q19a]You would like to download a new free application from your web browser. 
When you click the link to download the file, the following pop up appears. What 
would you do next? 
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Internet Explorer 8' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your 
preferred web browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 I get the information about the application from the web  
 I save and scan the file for viruses  
 I save and run the application  
 I cancel or quit from the process  
 I run the application  
 I don't know  
 Other  
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33 [Q19b]You would like to download a new free application from your web browser. 
When you click the link to download the file, the following pop up appears. What 
would you do next? 
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Internet Explorer 7' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your 
preferred web browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 I get the information about the application from the web  
 I save and scan the file for viruses  
 I save and run the application  
 I cancel or quit from the process  
 I run the application  
 I don't know  
 Other  
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34 [Q19c]You would like to download a new free application from your web browser. 
When you click the link to download the file, the following pop up appears. What 
would you do next? 
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Mozilla Firefox ' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred 
web browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 I get the information about the application from the web  
 I save and scan the file for viruses  
 I save and run the application  
 I cancel or quit from the process  
 I run the application  
 I don't know  
 Other  
  
35 [Q19d]You would like to download a new free application from your web browser. 
When you click the link to download the file, the following pop up appears. What 
would you do next? 
 
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Opera' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred web 
browser?) 
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Please choose only one of the following: 
 I get the information about the application from the web  
 I save and scan the file for viruses  
 I save and run the application  
 I cancel or quit from the process  
 I run the application  
 I don't know  
 Other  
36 [Q19e]You would like to download a new free application from your web browser. 
When you click the link to download the file, the following pop up appears. What 
would you do next?
 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Safari' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred web 
browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 I get the information about the application from the web  
 I save and scan the file for viruses  
 I save and run the application  
 I cancel or quit from the process  
 I run the application  
 I don't know  
 Other  
  
37 [Q19f]You would like to download a new free application from your web browser. 
When you click the link to download the file, the following pop up appears. What 
would you do next? 
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Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Chrome' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred web 
browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 I get the information about the application from the web  
 I save and scan the file for viruses  
 I save and run the application  
 I cancel or quit from the process  
 I run the application  
 I don't know  
38 [Q20]Do you feel there is enough information for you to make a decision based on 
the depicted warning? * 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'Internet Explorer 8' or 'Internet Explorer 7' or 'Mozilla Firefox ' or 
'Opera' or 'Safari' or 'Chrome' at question '17 [Q12X]' (What is your preferred 
web browser?) 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes  
 No  
39 [Q21]What other information do you think is needed? * 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: 
° Answer was 'No' at question '38 [Q20]' (Do you feel there is enough information 
for you to make a decision based on the depicted warning?) 
Please choose all that apply: 
 Details of the consequences if you were to proceed to run the application  
 Provision of a proper help function  
 Confirmation of legitimate download  
 Its free from any kind of malware attack  
 Other:  
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40 [Q23]By completing this online questionnaire, are you more or less concerned about 
security on your computer? * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 I am more concerned  
 I am less concerned  
 My level of concern has not changed  
 I don't know  
 Other 
 
41 [Q22]Do you have any comments regarding the given questions or wish to share any 
information with regards to information security issues. Please feel free to leave your 
comments in the space provided  
Please write your answer here: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
If you have any questions or would like to be notified the findings from this survey, 
please e-mail zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
Thank you for spending your time to fill in this survey 
 
Submit your survey. 
Thank you for completing this survey. 
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Figures from Chapter 3 – Section 3: Usability and Protection 
 
 
  Figure 3-1: Responses to phishing warning – Mozilla Firefox 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Responses to phishing warning – Internet Explorer 8 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Responses to phishing warning – Internet Explorer 7 
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Figure 3-4: Responses to phishing warning – Opera 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Responses to phishing warning – Safari 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Responses to phishing warning – Chrome 
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Section 4: Computer Scenario Study 
 
Figure 3-7: Internet Explorer 8 Security pop up respondents’ decisions 
 
 
Figure 3-8: Internet Explorer 7 Security pop up respondents’ decisions 
 
 
Figure 3-9: Mozilla Firefox Security pop up respondents’ decisions 
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Figure 3-10: Opera Security pop up respondents’ decisions 
 
 
Figure 3-11: Safari Security pop up respondents’ decisions 
 
 
Figure 3-12: Chrome Security pop up respondents’ decisions 
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Human Ethics Committee Sample Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT / PRACTICAL STUDY 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Name of Principal Investigator 
 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
__________________________________________________ 
Title of Research  
 
Information security: A usability perspective of security features in computer 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Brief statement of purpose of work 
 
The U-Surf system is being used to conduct a survey as part of the PhD project at the 
University of Plymouth.  The aim of this study are to give users the practical exposure 
on dealing with security warning/message and  to investigate how end users’ understand 
these features with regard to the usage of computer application on daily basis.  This 
finding will help to determine the features that easily to be understood compare to 
currently tend to cause difficulty.   Hence, it will lead to the potential for new 
approaches to improve the usability of security warning/message in computer 
respectively.  Please note that you are going to use this program only for 14 days.  
________________________________________________________________ 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me.   
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my 
data to be destroyed if I wish.  
 
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.  
 
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far as 
possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been separately 
assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSSH regulations). Under these 
circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name: ………………………………… 
 
Signature: .....................................…                         Date: ................……………. 
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
 
FACULTY OF SCINECE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Research Information Sheet 
 
Principal Investigator :  Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
 
Title of Research : Information security: A usability perspective of  
security features in computer 
 
Introduction & Aim : 
 
The U-Surf system is being used to conduct a survey as part of the PhD project at the 
University of Plymouth.  The aim of this study is to examine how end users understand 
and handle security-related events, notifications and warning messages that they may 
encounter during day-to-day use of their systems.  This finding will help to determine 
the features that are most easily understood and those that tend to cause difficulty.   
Hence, it will lead to the potential for new approaches to improve the usability of such 
warnings/messages in future systems.  Please note that you are asked to use this 
program only for 14 days.  This study is designed for adults aged 18 years or 
older.  Please read the following sections before continuing to ensure that you 
understand your rights to withdraw, the procedures of the study and issues relating to 
confidentiality and data protection.  
 
Procedure: A step by step process 
 
Please not that this program will be used for only 14 days for the purpose of experiment. 
1. User will be given the consent form with details of research information.  They will 
read and understand the procedure before they proceed with this study.  If they agreed, 
they will give their signature. 
 
2. Researcher will give respondents’ guidance sheet and program installer. They will 
follow step by step procedure as stated in the guidance sheet until the program can be 
fully used. 
 
3. Complete the capture process and the relevant questionnaire ( that requires only few 
clicks which is less than 5 minutes) each time user encounter security message/ warning 
event when using computer 
 
4. Finally, after 14 days of using the program, respondents’ will send the completed 
questionnaire data to this e-mail (usurf2011@gmail.com).  This will include a 
(Questionnaire) zip file contains database and folder of image captured. 
5. Last step, after using sending the final results (zip files), they will have to uninstall 
the program from their computer.  This process is provided in the guidance sheet section.  
 
After 14 days 
After 14 days, you will be required to send back the results. (Follow steps 4 in 
Procedure) 
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What happen to collected data:   
All data from this study will be treated as confidential. Your responses can only be 
accessed by the principal investigator only for the purpose of this research 
project.  Your responses will not contain any identifying information.  Novel results 
may be published into one or more journal/conference articles. Data and references to 
any participants will be anonymised so that true identities are not revealed. 
 
Description of Risk: 
Please note that this study needs you to capture your experience dealing with security 
warning/message.  There is no specific risk identified in this study as none of the results 
reported from the study will include information that allows identification of named 
individuals. 
 
Benefits of study: 
This study will help researcher to understand users’ exposure towards the security 
warning/message and able to analyse what can be done to improve current security 
situation.  In addition, this study able to give end users’ knowledge and experience with 
regards to various types of security warning that they have day to day basis.  
 
Right to Withdraw: 
Respondent are able to quit or withdraw at any time. If they already have installed the 
program in their computer and decide to withdraw please refer to Guidance sheet – 
Section D.  All information regarding the program installed will be deleted from your 
computer.   
 
If you need further assistance please contact the principal investigator:- 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
Centre for Security Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
A304 Portland Square 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA  Telephone: 01752 586287,  Email: zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
Should you have any concerns about the way in which this study is being conducting 
please contact the secretary of the Faculty of Science and Technology Ethics 
Committee: 
 
Paula Simson 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
Dean's Office 
Smeaton 009 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone: 01752 584503 
Email: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk  
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Guidance Sheet 
 
The U-Surf system is being used to conduct a survey as part of the PhD project at the 
University of Plymouth.  The aim of this study is to examine how end users understand 
and handle security-related events, notifications and warning messages that they may 
encounter during day-to-day use of their systems.  This finding will help to determine 
the features that are most easily understood and those that tend to cause difficulty.   
Hence, it will lead to the potential for new approaches to improve the usability of such 
warnings/messages in future systems.  Please note that you are asked to use this 
program only for 14 days.  
 
Step by step with illustration 
A. Installation and registration 
 
You are kindly required to:- 
1. You have read, understand and agree to participate in this experiment by signing the 
consent form. Then you can start to use the program by following step by step actions to 
use the program.  
 
2. Install this program (U-Surf System) by running the setup from the CD provided/Pen 
Drive.  After the installation, click the notification balloon to complete the registration 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 :  Notification balloon for registration process 
Personal details form will pop up. You will first need to read and understand the general 
information section.(It is a reminder about the program that you are going to use)  By 
clicking the checkbox meaning that you are agree to participate in this study as depicted 
in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2 : Click the checkbox to proceed 
Then you may proceed to next section until everything is saved as shown in Figure 1.3-
Figure 1.5 
 
Figure 1.3: Demographic caption 
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Figure 1.4: Computer Experience caption 
 
Figure 1.5: Security knowledge caption 
 (Click Ok when Information message pop up in Figure 1.5 and program will seat back 
in your system tray)   at this stage, you are not able to change anything in your personal 
details as it will be locked. 
 
3. After you have saved the information in personal details, you are able to see small Z 
icon on the system tray in Figure 1.6 . Right click the icon until you see list of menu.  
Please choose run at startup as depicted in Figure 1.7.  
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Figure 1.6: Notify icon in system tray 
 
Figure 1.7: click right on notify icon and select Run at startup 
4. Restart your computer. Then, you will see the Z icon in your system tray and you are 
officially can use the program installed. 
 
B. Capture security warning/message &  Answering Questionnaire 
 
1. This program will always seat in your system tray and will not disturb your current 
task.  If you are facing any security warning/message (e.g. security message upon 
downloading application from website in Figure 1.8, press ALT then Z slowly.   Please 
wait until you can see notification balloon from you system tray stated “You have 
successfully saved the Screen Capture…… click the notification to proceed” in 
Figure 1.9. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.8: Capturing image of security warning (in round shape) when downloading 
application from Internet. 
 
Notify 
Icon 
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Figure 1.9: Notification successfully captured image 
 
2. You may decide to answer the questionnaire straight away by clicking the balloon 
notification. Then, form questionnaire will be presented as shown in Figure 1.10 
 
 
 
Figure 1.10: Form questionnaire 
 
3. You also may decide to complete it at your convenient time.  If you would like to do 
it at any time, clicks the icon Z from system tray.  Then, form questionnaire will be 
presented again. 
 
4. To complete the questionnaire, firstly, you will click any 1 item in List of pending 
questionnaire.  Then, on right of the List of pending questionnaire table, it will 
preview the image in the Image View that you have captured.  You can click the image 
to zoom in and out(Note: once you mouse hover inside the Image View, the border will 
change to blue color and the mouse change to magnifying glass icon).  Then after you 
have clicked (zoom in) the image, you can control the panel movement to see the 
specific warning/message that you have captured. 
 
List of 
pending 
questionn
aire table 
Image 
View 
Panel 
Event 
Details 
section 
Questionnaire 
section 
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5. Later, you will have to answer questions with regards to the image that you viewed.  
All questions are compulsory to answer.  If you decide to do it later, press skip button 
(It will bring the program back to system tray). If you satisfied with your choices, press 
save button until you see message saying that it is successfully saved as shown in 
Figure 1.11 . Click Ok. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.11: Information notification saying the data is saved 
C. After completed study (14 days) 
 
You are required to send a zip folder document from your computer by e-mail to 
(usurfsupport@gmail.com) or directly to the researcher Mr Zarul Fitri Zaaba (please 
refer address in Help section).  Please note that the folder will be located on your 
desktop with the name questionnaire data (ZIP file). 
 
D. Uninstall Program  
Steps to uninstall your program (Other than Windows 7) 
1. Click start. Go to setting then click control panel 
2. Then, click Add/Remove programs. Wait few seconds 
3. Find U-Surf System in the currently installed program list. 
4. Click once, until you can see Remove button appears.  
5. Click remove then yes. 
 
 
If using windows 7 only 
1. Click start. Go to setting then click control panel 
2. Then, click program and features & you will see U-Surf System program in the list  
3.  Right click the program or click the program to uninstall 
4. Then click ok to uninstall 
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E. Help 
 
If you need further assistance please contact the principal investigator:- 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
Centre for Security Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
A304 Portland Square 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone:01752586287 
Email: zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Should you have any concerns about the way in which this study is being conducting 
please contact the secretary of the Faculty of Science and Technology Ethics 
Committee:- 
 
Paula Simson 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
Dean's Office 
Smeaton 009 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone: 01752 584503 
Email: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk  
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Figures from Chapter 4 – Results and findings  
 
Figure 4-1: Managing tasks using computer 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Satisfaction on layout of security warning 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Level of concern for computer security. 
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Human Ethics Committee Sample Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT / PRACTICAL STUDY 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Name of Principal Investigator 
 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Title of Research  
 
Security Usability Survey 2011 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Brief statement of purpose of work 
 
The Security Usability Survey 2011 is being used to conduct a survey as part of the PhD 
project at the Plymouth University.  The aim of this study is to examine how end users 
understand and handle security-related events, notifications and warning messages that 
they may encounter during day-to-day use of their systems.  This finding will help to 
provide a proof that shows the needs to enhance the implementation of security message.   
Hence, it will lead to the potential for new approaches to improve the usability of such 
warnings/messages in future systems.  Please note that you are asked to use this 
program for 5 days only.  This study is designed for adults aged 18 years or 
older. Please read the following sections before continuing to ensure that you 
understand your rights to withdraw, the procedures of the study and issues relating to 
confidentiality and data protection.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me.  I understand that I am free 
to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my data to be destroyed if I wish.  
 
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.  
 
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far as 
possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been separately 
assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSSH regulations). Under these 
circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 
 
 
 
Name: ……………………………………….   
 
Signature: .....................................…………..              Date: ................……………. 
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Research Information Sheet 
 
Principal Investigator :  Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
 
Title of Research  : Security Usability Survey 2011 
 
Introduction & Aim  : 
 
The Security Usability Survey 2011 is being used to conduct a survey as part of the PhD 
project at the Plymouth University.  The aim of this study is to examine how end users 
understand and handle security-related events, notifications and warning messages that 
they may encounter during day-to-day use of their systems.  This finding will help to 
provide a proof that shows the needs to enhance the implementation of security message.   
Hence, it will lead to the potential for new approaches to improve the usability of such 
warnings/messages in future systems.  Please note that you are asked to use this 
program for 5 days only.  This study is designed for adults aged 18 years or 
older.  Please read the following sections before continuing to ensure that you 
understand your rights to withdraw, the procedures of the study and issues relating to 
confidentiality and data protection.  
 
Procedure: A step by step process 
 
Please not that this program will be used for only 5 days for the purpose of experiment. 
1. Users will be given the consent form and research information form. If they agree to 
participate, they will give their signature before proceeding with the study. 
 
2. The researcher will give respondents a guidance sheet and program installer. They 
will follow the step by step procedure as stated in the guidance sheet in order to prepare 
the program for use. 
 
3. Firstly, user will fill in the demographic form and then the program will 
automatically capture images of any security-related dialogues that they encounter while 
using their system.  Whenever any such dialogue is encountered, the user will 
subsequently be presented with a second dialogue box with questions about security 
their decision making process. All of their responses will be saved for future analysis in 
the research. 
 
4. After 5 days of using the program, respondents will be instructed to generate a zip 
file containing the database and folder of captured images. The respondent will then be 
instructed to send the data using dropbox (a program that the user will have to install 
from the specified link) or by giving the file manually to principal investigator using 
pen drive.    
 
(Note: Dropbox: is an application that allows users to share files up to 2GB online.  The 
Principal Investigator will only be able to access the file after the respondent has e-
mailed a link to the principal investigator. Please refer to guidance sheet) 
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5. Finally, after sending the final results, they will be instructed to uninstall the program 
from their computer.  This process is provided in the guidance sheet section 4. 
 
After 5 days 
After 5 days, you will receive e-mail reminder to send the results to researcher. (Follow 
steps 4 in Procedure) 
 
What happen to collected data:   
All data from this study will be treated as confidential. Your responses can only be 
accessed by the principal investigator only for the purpose of this research 
project.  Your responses will not contain any identifying information.  Novel results 
may be published into one or more journal/conference articles. Data and references to 
any participants will be anonymised so that true identities are not revealed. 
 
Description of Risk: 
Please note that this study will capture security message in background as it will detect 
it automatically.  There is no specific risk identified in this study as none of the results 
reported from the study will include information that allows identification of named 
individuals.   
 
Benefits of study: 
This study will help the researcher to understand whether user can make a decision or 
not based on the security message that they received.  In addition, this study able to give 
end users’ knowledge and experience with regards to various types of security warning 
that they encounter day to day basis.  
 
Right to Withdraw: 
Respondent are able to quit or withdraw at any time. If they already have installed the 
program in their computer and decide to withdraw please refer to Guidance sheet – 
Section 4.  All information regarding the program installed will be deleted from your 
computer.   
 
If you need further assistance please contact the principal investigator:- 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
Centre for Security Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
A304 Portland Square 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone: 01752 586287, Email: zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Should you have any concerns about the way in which this study is being conducting 
please contact the secretary of the Faculty of Science and Technology Ethics 
Committee: 
 
Paula Simson 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
Dean's Office 
Smeaton 009 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone: 01752 584503, Email: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk  
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Guidance Sheet 
 
There are 5 sections that you have to deal with: 
1. Installation 
2. User’s main task 
3. Sending the results (After the program has been used for 5 days) 
4. Uninstall process 
5. Help 
 
Please follow step by step: 
1. Installation 
 
Figure 1 
1. Install the program by choosing setup.exe 
and you will see Setup-CSCAN Security 
Survey. Click Next. 
 
Figure 2 
2.Click Next 
 
Figure 3 
3. Click Next 
 
Figure 4 
4. Click Next 
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Figure 5 
5. Choose Install 
 
Figure 6 
6. Click Finish and leave (Tick) on launch 
CSCAN security message 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
Figure 8 
7. Shortly after that, you receive demographic form and balloon notification (C icon) as shown 
in Figure 7 and Figure 8. Please fill in the demographic form (Figure 7). All fields are 
compulsory.  Then click Finish Survey. 
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2. Users’ main task 
i. Use your computer like usual. 
ii. This program will detect security message automatically and you will have to 
answer as shown in Figure 10 
iii. See Example below: 
 
Figure 9 
1. Assume that you receive this security 
message (It will be detected automatically by 
the program). You need to make a decision 
on it. Choose any of your preference answer. 
 
Figure 10 
2. After you made a decision (By clicking Yes, 
No or X on Figure 9), the dialogue box (Figure 
10) will be pop up to ask you with a question. 
Choose your answer accordingly and it will be 
saved in the database. 
Note: The program will automatically detect the security message. Users’ 
responsibility is only to answer the dialogue box pop up as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
3. Sending the results (After the program has been used for 5 days) 
 
Figure 11 
1. Right click the C icon and choose Make Zip 
file. This will create a zip file on your desktop 
(Contains data image capture and database) 
 
Figure 12 
2. You will receive a balloon notification 
when the creation of zip file is successful. 
 
Figure 13 
3.  This is the example of zip file created on 
your desktop. 
 
There are 2 methods to send back the outcome of the study. 
 
1. Attach the file from your computer (Figure 13) and send directly to 
usurf2011@gmail.com 
 
Or 
 
2. If the file attachment is too large, please use Dropbox method instead.  
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In order to proceed with this, you have to download the free Dropbox software from 
this link http://www.dropbox.com. Please click download to proceed and follow these 
instructions accordingly. 
 
 
1. You received security warning (it depend on 
the browser that you use). Click run or save (In 
other type of browser. Then activate it by double 
click the saved file) 
 
2. Click Install 
 
 
3. You receive the progress page  
 
 
4. Choose I don’t have DropBox account 
(default) and click Next.   
Choose I already have a drop box account 
if you had one.  
 
5. If you have chosen I don’t have Dropbox 
account, please fill in the details, tick the 
box(Terms of Service) and click Next 
 
6. Choose 2GB (Free) instead and click 
Next 
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7. Choose Typical and Install 
 
8. You will receive “Welcome to Dropbox, 
<Your name>”  and click Next 
 
9. Click Next 
 
10. Click Next 
 
11. Click Next 
 
12. Click Finish (officially you have 
installed the Dropbox in your computer) 
 
13. Double click Dropbox icon on your system 
tray 
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14. The interface after clicking the dropbox 
icon is likely to be this. 
 
 
15. Click the public folder and copy the zip file 
(Figure 13) on your desktop and paste it in 
public folder. Wait until the Tick icon(green 
background) appears. It means that the file is 
fully loaded.  
 
 
16. Right click the file that has been pasted, 
choose DropBox, choose copy public link. 
(Here, it will automatically generate the 
link/URL) 
17. Instantly, open your e-mail and paste the link 
(Right click and choose paste). Send it to 
usurf2011@gmail.com 
 
 
4. Uninstall Process 
 
 
1. Right click C icon on your system tray and choose Close program  
2. On your computer, Click Start – Program - CSCAN 
3. Choose Uninstall 
 
.   
4. You will receive CSCAN Security Survey Uninstall dialogue box and click Yes. 
5. Uninstall process completed  
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5. Help 
 
If you need further assistance please contact the principal investigator: 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
Centre for Security Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
A304 Portland Square 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone:01752586287 
Email: zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Should you have any concerns about the way in which this study is being conducting 
please contact the secretary of the Faculty of Science and Technology Ethics 
Committee:- 
 
Paula Simson 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
Dean's Office 
Smeaton 009 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone: 01752 584503 
Email: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk  
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Human Ethics Committee Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT / PRACTICAL STUDY 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Name of Principal Investigator 
 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Title of Research  
 
Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Brief statement of purpose of work 
 
Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) is being used to conduct an 
experiment as part of a PhD project at Plymouth University.  This research is about the 
adaptation of security warnings (i.e. messages, notifications, pop ups) that you may 
receive on PC systems.  The Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) 
prototype presents you with a series of warnings and then attempts to adapt one of them 
into a new version based on your preferences. This study will help to provide evidence 
of how security warnings should be best presented to support and inform their users. 
This study is designed for adults aged 18 years or older. Please read the following 
sections before continuing to ensure that you understand your rights to withdraw, the 
procedures of the study and issues relating to confidentiality and data protection.  
_______________________________________________________________ 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me.   
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my 
data to be destroyed if I wish.  
 
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.  
 
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far as 
possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been separately 
assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSHH regulations). Under these 
circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name: ……………………………………….  
 
Signature:   .....................................…………                              Date:...................... 
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Research Information Sheet 
 
Principal Investigator :  Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
 
Title of Research  : Automated Security Interface Adaptation  
(ASIA) 
 
Introduction & Aim  : 
 
Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) is being used to conduct an 
experiment as part of a PhD project at Plymouth University.  This research is about the 
adaptation of security warnings (i.e messages, notifications, pop ups) that you may 
receive on PC systems.  The Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) 
prototype presents you with a series of warnings and then attempts to adapt one of them 
into a new version based on your preferences. This study will help to provide evidence 
of how security warnings should be best presented to support and inform their users.  
This study is designed for adults aged 18 years or older. Please read the following 
sections before continuing to ensure that you understand your rights to withdraw, the 
procedures of the study and issues relating to confidentiality and data protection.  
 
Procedure: A step by step process 
 
A step by step summary of the actions involved in the study is as follows: 
1. Volunteers will be given the consent and research information forms. If they agree to 
participate, they will give their signature before proceeding with the study.  The PI will 
also highlight that they has the right to withdraw at any stage of experiment. 
 
2. The PI will give participants a guidance sheet to help them understand the flow of the 
experiment and they are allowed to ask questions to clarify anything related to the 
experiment. 
 
3. Firstly, users will be told by the PI that this experiment is a role-based study where 
users will play a role as management trainee in the IT Company. The experiment will 
begin when users click the “Begin” button which takes them to a brief demographics 
questionnaire section.  They must complete all questions before proceeding.  
 
4. Then, users are presented with 7 tasks, which each involve presenting a security 
warning and asking the user their opinion about its clarity and any further information 
that may help them.  They will indicate their preference(s) on every task they are 
dealing with.  After the last task, participants will receive a dialogue box saying that one 
of the previous tasks will be repeated again.  Then after clicking “Next” button, they 
will be presented with the first enhanced version of a security warning that has been 
created by the system. With this security warning, if user does not click “Help” button 
then the PI will intervene with some questions. Shortly after that, user will click help to 
proceed.      
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5. After that, the PI will take over the session (section 3) where the questionnaire and 
interview sessions will take place.  A questionnaire paper will be completed by the 
participant, followed by interview discussion with the PI.   
(Note: In this section, users will be presented with standard security warning, followed 
by the questionnaire and interview.  In the next part, users will be presented with an 
enhanced security warning, followed by further questionnaire and interview activity.  
Finally, the last part will involve the user being shown the full version of security 
warning (i.e. if they click all options in the checkbox in task 7)). 
 
6. Finally, the participant will be asked few questions related to usability of security 
warning and their preferences.  All of the conversation bits will be voice recorded and 
manually written in a log book by the PI.      
 
What happen to collected data:   
All data from this study will be treated as confidential. Your responses can only be 
accessed by the principal investigator only for the purpose of this research 
project.  Your responses will not contain any identifying information.  Novel results 
may be published into one or more journal/conference articles. Data and references to 
any participants will be anonymised so that true identities are not revealed. 
 
Description of Risk: 
Please note that this study will involve you to make choice(s) on the given tasks.  At the 
final sections of this experiment, you will have to answer questionnaire and having 
interview which will be recorded and noted by the principal investigator.  There is no 
specific risk identified in this study as none of the results reported from the study will 
include information that allows identification of named individuals.   
 
Benefits of study: 
This study will help the researcher to understand the effectiveness of the experiment to 
proof that the framework to enhance security warnings can be implemented in the future.  
In addition, this study able to give end users’ knowledge and experience with regards to 
various types of security warning that they encounter day to day basis especially via the 
interview session. 
 
Right to Withdraw: 
Respondent are able to quit or withdraw at any time as mentioned in Guidance sheet and 
Research Information sheet. 
 
If you need further assistance please contact the principal investigator:- 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
A304 Portland Square 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone: 01752 586287 
Email: zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Should you have any concerns about the way in which this study is being conducting 
please contact the secretary of the Faculty of Science and Technology Ethics 
Committee: 
 
Paula Simson 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
Dean's Office 
Smeaton 009 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
 
Telephone: 01752 584503 
Email: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk  
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Guidance Sheet 
Automated Security Interface Adaptation 
 
This guidance information will guide you to complete the experiment.  There are 3 main 
sections that you will need to complete.  All of this process will take approximately 40 
minutes.  You are allowed to ask any questions at any stage and you also have the right 
to withdraw at any time during this experiment.  Please follow this guidance step by 
step. (Note: You are allowed to ask any questions if you facing any difficulties with this 
experiment). 
 
Section 1: Demographics 
 
Read and understand the instructions and then 
click Begin. 
 
Fill in all required questions and click save. 
 
Section 2: 7 tasks and a repeated task 
 
 
Please choose your preference(s) and click Next 
Please choose your preference(s) and click 
Next 
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Please choose your preference(s) and click Next 
 
Please choose your preference(s) and click 
Next 
 
Please choose your preference(s) and click Next 
 
Please choose your preference(s) and click 
Next 
 
Please choose your preference(s) and click Next 
 
Click Begin for the next step 
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Read and understand the instructions then click 
Next  
 
You will receive this security warning. Then 
choose any of the actions.   
 
 
This is an example of an enhanced security 
warning based on the preferences chosen in 
previous sections.  Shortly after this stage, the 
researcher will intervene and ask you to 
complete a questionnaire and interview 
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Section 3: Questionnaire and Interview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At this stage principal investigator will explain the process (i.e. questionnaire and 
interview questions).  Questionnaire will be given as paper-based whilst interview will 
be recorded and the principal investigator also will write down the notes in log book.  
Principal investigator details: 
Zarul Fitri Zaaba 
Centre for Security Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
A304 Portland Square 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone:01752586287 
Email: zarul.zaaba@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Should you have any concerns about the way in which this study is being conducting 
please contact the secretary of the Faculty of Science and Technology Ethics 
Committee:- 
 
Paula Simson 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
Dean's Office 
Smeaton 009 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
Telephone: 01752 584503 
Email: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk
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Note: Interview questions will not be revealed to participant involved.  
Interview in section 2: Principal investigator will intervene when the user makes a decision with this security warning: 
 
If the user clicks run/cancel, the principal investigator will ask these questions: 
1. Why did you choose the run/cancel/help option? 
 
2. What features helped you to understand the security warning? 
 
3. Are you satisfied with the information provided? Why? 
 
Then the principal investigator will explain that the user needs to click help to proceed to the next section in order for the user to view the enhanced security warning 
(adaptation version). 
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Questionnaire A – Standard security warning  
1.  What was the nature of the security dialogue? (Please choose only ONE answer) 
 An error message 
 Warning message 
 Information message 
 Questions message 
 Others: Please specify 
 
2. What type(s) of problem(s) did the security dialogue shows? (You may choose more than one answers) 
 Unable to download the software due to an error 
 Potentially became a victim of malware (e.g. virus, worms, Trojans etc) 
 Trying to download.docx document 
 Downloads from unauthorized publishers 
 Does not facing any risk to proceed with the decision 
 Unable to view what other people do with regards to security message 
 Having difficulties to use guidance or help functions 
 Facing potential problem with regards to his/her action o download software 
 Others: Please specify 
 
 
Instructions: Please choose only (ONE) answer per question. 
1. The security dialogue was too complex for me to understand 
2. I spent enough time to view the information provided 
3. It was easy to understand the information provided  
4. The way information was presented helped me to complete the tasks  
5. I could effectively complete my task using the information presented 
6. It was easy to find the information I needed 
7. The interface of security dialogue was understandable 
8. The security dialogue helped me to fix the problem in the way that I understood 
9. The available help increased my knowledge and awareness about the contents and features of the dialogue.   
10. This dialogue had all the functionality and capability I expected it to have 
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                                     Strongly                                                                              Strongly                                                                                              
                                               Disagree                                                                               Agree                                                    
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Questionnaire B – Enhancement security warning 
1.  What was the nature of the security dialogue? (Please choose only ONE answer) 
 An error message 
 Warning message 
 Information message 
 Questions message 
 Others: Please specify 
 
2. What type(s) of problem(s) did the security dialogue shows? (You may choose more than one answers) 
 Unable to download the software due to an error 
 Potentially became a victim of malware (e.g. virus, worms, Trojans etc) 
 Trying to download.docx document 
 Downloads from unauthorized publishers 
 Does not facing any risk to proceed with the decision 
 Unable to view what other people do with regards to security message 
 Having difficulties to use guidance or help functions 
 Facing potential problem with regards to his/her action o download software 
 Others: Please specify 
 
 
Instructions: Please choose only (ONE) answer per question. 
1. The security dialogue was too complex for me to understand 
2. I spent enough time to view the information provided 
3. It was easy to understand the information provided  
4. The way information was presented helped me to complete the tasks  
5. I could effectively complete my task using the information presented 
6. It was easy to find the information I needed 
7. The interface of security dialogue was understandable 
8. The security dialogue helped me to fix the problem in the way that I understood 
9. The available help increased my knowledge and awareness about the contents and features of the dialogue.   
10. This dialogue had all the functionality and capability I expected it to have 
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                                                                   Strongly                                                                               Strongly                                                                                              
                                                                    Disagree                                                                                Agree                                                    
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Interview on standard security warning  
 
1. What do you think will happen if you click run? 
2. What do you think of the feature(s) that are available to help you make a decision in this security warning? 
We assess the details by asking them, please show me…. 
Anything else until they say no 
3. Were there any aspects of the warning that you found hard to understand or interpret? 
If user answers (Yes/No) investigator will probe users’ understanding about signal icons, signal words, technical terminology, choices/options, help functions etc.  
Do you understand the usage of signal icon/signal words in this security warning? 
- Do you understand the way information was presented, especially any technical wording? 
- Do you feel that that this security warning was presented with enough options to guide you? 
- Do you feel satisfied with help available for this warning? 
 
Interview on enhancement adaptation security warning 
 
 
1. What do you think of the feature(s) that are available to help you make a decision in this security warning? 
We assess the details by asking them, please show me…. 
Anything else until they say no 
2. Were there any aspects of the warning that you found hard to understand or interpret? 
If user answers (Yes/No) investigator will probe users’ understanding about signal icons, signal words, technical terminology, choices/options, help functions etc.  
- Do you understand the usage of signal icon/signal words in this security warning? 
- Do you understand the way information was presented, especially any technical wording? 
- Do you feel that that this security warning was presented with enough options to guide you? 
- Do you feel satisfied with help available for this warning? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D: USER STUDY 4 DOCUMENTATION 
 
 
 
 
359 
 
Interview on the last section (Comparison) 
 
Start with Usability Question: 
Effectiveness 
- Which of security warnings able to provide effective solutions for you to make a decision? 
- Why? 
Efficiency 
- Which of security warning able to guide me through to make a safe decision? 
- Why? 
User satisfaction 
- Ease of use – Which of this would be easy for you to use? Why? 
- Which of this would be your preferences? Why? 
 
 
1. What other elements that you think would be needed to improve the standard security warning and enhancement security warning? 
2. Comments/Suggestions 
 
End of session 
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Some other examples security warnings preferences 
classification 
 
It can be noted that these were the security warning that had been generated by the 
ASIA mock-up software.  Based on user’s decision or preference in Task 7, this security 
warning is generated (i.e. by pressing help button in the simplified security warning) 
accordingly.   
 
Combination Security warning Image 
Option 1 and 3  
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Option 5 
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Option 3 
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Option 1, 4 and 6 
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Option 1 and 6 
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Chi-Square Test results 
Formula:   
X
2 
= (O – E)2 
             E 
 
Where O is the standard warning frequency (observed frequency) 
             E is the enhance warning frequency (expected frequency) 
            df is the degree of freedom (C-1)(R-1) C= total of column & R = total of row 
            X
2 
is the Chi-Square 
 
Therefore df (3-1)(2-1) = 2.  Based on the df = 2 and X
2
.050 the critical value to be used 
is 5.991.  If X
2 
is equal to or greater than 5.991,  null hypothesis is rejected. 
The critical value is derived from Chi-Square Distribution Table. 
 
 Questionnaire 1 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 23 3 4 
(E) 25 3 2 
Enhanced (O) 27 3 0 
(E) 25 3 2 
Total 50 6 4 
O - E (S) -2 0 2 
O - E (E) 2 0 -2 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 4 0 4 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 4 0 4 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 0.16 0.00 2.00 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 0.16 0.00 2.00 
X
2
 4.32     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warnings in terms of “the 
security dialogue was too complex for me to understand” 
X
2 
< 5.991 Ho is accepted 
 
Descriptions: There is no significant difference between standard and enhanced warning 
that users’ encountered.  This indicates that neither warnings were complicated, but the 
results revealed that users were pruned to the enhanced version of warning.  
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 Questionnaire 2 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 5 23 2 
(E) 5.5 21 3.5 
Enhanced (O) 6 19 5 
(E) 5.5 21 3.5 
Total 11 42 7 
O - E (S) -0.5 2 -1.5 
O - E (E) 0.5 -2 1.5 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 0.25 4 2.25 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 0.25 4 2.25 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 0.05 0.19 0.64 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 0.05 0.19 0.64 
X
2
 1.76     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warning in terms of “I spent 
enough time to view the information provided” 
X
2 
< 5.991 Ho is accepted 
 
Descriptions: the enhanced version of warnings contained more information as 
compared to the standard warning.  Surprisingly based on this result, there is no 
significant difference between standard and enhanced warning that users’ encountered.  
This indicated that users were using ample time to view warnings and the information 
provided.     
 
 Questionnaire 3 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 7 20 3 
(E) 5 23.5 1.5 
Enhanced (O) 3 27 0 
(E) 5 23.5 1.5 
Total 10 47 3 
O - E (S) 2 -3.5 1.5 
O - E (E) -2 3.5 -1.5 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 4 12.25 2.25 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 4 12.25 2.25 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 0.80 0.52 1.50 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 0.80 0.52 1.50 
X
2
 5.64     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warning in terms of “it was 
easy to understand the information provided” 
 
X
2
 < 5.991 Ho is accepted 
 
Descriptions: There is no significant difference between standard and enhanced warning 
in terms of the ease of understanding the information provided.  However, the vast 
majority claimed that the enhanced warning is easier as compared to the standard 
version.  
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 Questionnaire 4 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 11 11 8 
(E) 6 19.5 4.5 
Enhanced (O) 1 28 1 
(E) 6 19.5 4.5 
Total 12 39 9 
O - E (S) 5 -8.5 3.5 
O - E (E) -5 8.5 -3.5 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 25 72.25 12.25 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 25 72.25 12.25 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 4.17 3.71 2.72 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 4.17 3.71 2.72 
X
2
 21.19     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warning in terms of “the 
way information was presented help me to complete the tasks” 
 
X
2 
> 5.991 Ho is rejected 
 
Descriptions: There is a significant difference between standard and enhanced warning 
in terms of the way information was presented to complete the task.  The vast majority 
of respondents agreed with the enhanced version, comparing it to the standard warning.  
It can be noted only 1 user specified that the enhanced warning was not helping the user 
to complete the task. 
 
 Questionnaire 5 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 9 12 9 
(E) 5.5 20 4.5 
Enhanced (O) 2 28 0 
(E) 5.5 20 4.5 
Total 11 40 9 
O - E (S) 3.5 -8 4.5 
O - E (E) -3.5 8 -4.5 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 12.25 64 20.25 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 12.25 64 20.25 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 2.23 3.20 4.50 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 2.23 3.20 4.50 
X
2
 19.85     
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warning in terms of “I could 
effectively complete my task using the information provided” 
 
X
2 
> 5.991 Ho is rejected 
 
Descriptions: There is significant difference between standard and enhanced warning in 
terms of effectively able to complete the task using the information provided.  the vast 
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majority of respondents claimed the effectiveness with the enhanced warning rather 
than the standard version.    
 
 Questionnaire 6 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 17 8 5 
(E) 9.5 17.5 3 
Enhanced (O) 2 27 1 
(E) 9.5 17.5 3 
Total 19 35 6 
O - E (S) 7.5 -9.5 2 
O - E (E) -7.5 9.5 -2 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 56.25 90.25 4 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 56.25 90.25 4 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 5.92 5.16 1.33 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 5.92 5.16 1.33 
X
2
 24.82     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warning in terms of “it was 
easy to find information I needed” 
 
X
2
 > 5.991 Ho is rejected 
 
Descriptions: There is a highly significant difference between standard and enhanced 
warning in terms of it was easy to find information that users needed.  As the vast 
majority claimed the easiness in enhanced warning, it is likely 57% of respondents 
mentioned the difficulties with the standard warning. 
 
  
 Questionnaire 7 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 10 16 4 
(E) 6.5 20.5 3 
Enhanced (O) 3 25 2 
(E) 6.5 20.5 3 
Total 13 41 6 
O - E (S) 3.5 -4.5 1 
O - E (E) -3.5 4.5 -1 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 12.25 20.25 1 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 12.25 20.25 1 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 1.88 0.99 0.33 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 1.88 0.99 0.33 
X
2
 6.41     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warning in terms of “the 
interface of security dialogue was understandable” 
 
X
2 
> 5.991 Ho is rejected 
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Descriptions: There is a significant difference between standard and enhanced warning 
in terms of the interface of security dialogue being understandable.  (25/30) claimed this 
was the case with the enhanced warning, whilst only 16 with the standard warning. 
 Questionnaire 8 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 14 11 5 
(E) 8 17.5 4.5 
Enhanced (O) 2 24 4 
(E) 8 17.5 4.5 
Total 16 35 9 
O - E (S) 6 -6.5 0.5 
O - E (E) -6 6.5 -0.5 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 36 42.25 0.25 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 36 42.25 0.25 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 4.50 2.41 0.06 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 4.50 2.41 0.06 
X
2
 13.94     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warning in terms of “the 
security dialogue helped me to fix the problem in the way that I understood” 
 
X
2 
> 5.991 Ho is rejected 
 
Descriptions: There is a highly significant difference between standard and enhanced 
warning in terms of the security dialogue helped users to fix the problem in which users 
can understand as the majority claimed it with enhanced warning.  On the other hand 
14/30 claimed difficulties with standard warning, and only 2/30 with enhanced warning. 
 
 Questionnaire 9 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 15 11 4 
(E) 8.5 19 2.5 
Enhanced (O) 2 27 1 
(E) 8.5 19 2.5 
Total 17 38 5 
O - E (S) 6.5 -8 1.5 
O - E (E) -6.5 8 -1.5 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 42.25 64 2.25 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 42.25 64 2.25 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 4.97 3.37 0.90 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 4.97 3.37 0.90 
X
2
 18.48     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warnings in terms of “the 
available help increased my knowledge and awareness about the contents and features 
of the dialogues” 
 
X
2 
> 5.991 Ho is rejected 
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Descriptions: There is a highly significant difference between standard and enhanced 
warning in terms of the available help increased users’ knowledge and awareness about 
the contents and features of the dialogues.  Therefore it can be suggested that security 
warning enhancement provided better contents and features as compared to the standard 
warning.  
 
 Questionnaire 10 No Yes Neutral 
Standard (O) 12 10 8 
(E) 7.5 16 6.5 
Enhanced (O) 3 22 5 
(E) 7.5 16 6.5 
Total 15 32 13 
O - E (S) 4.5 -6 1.5 
O - E (E) -4.5 6 -1.5 
(O-E)
2
 (S) 20.25 36 2.25 
(O-E)
2
 (E) 20.25 36 2.25 
(O-E)
2
/E (S) 2.70 2.25 0.35 
(O-E)
2
/E (E) 2.70 2.25 0.35 
X
2
 10.59     
 
Ho = There is no difference between standard and enhanced warning in terms of “this 
dialogue had all the functionality and capability I expected it to have” 
 
X
2 
>5.991 Ho is rejected 
 
Description:  There is a significant difference between both warning in terms of the 
dialogue had all functionality and capability that users expected to have.  This suggested 
that security warning enhancement were better in the sense of the overall functionality 
and features to help users, as compared to standard version. 
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 Adaptive Security Dialogues (ASD) Automated Security Interface Adaptation (ASIA) 
Goal 
Introduced an architecture that matches the complexity and the 
intrusiveness of security dialogues to the associated risks with 
the decisions that end-users are made to improve security 
behaviour of computer users.   
Introduced an architecture to improve security warning dialogues based on 
end-users preferences by utilising the information provided (interactively 
generate security warning enhancement) where it presented the information 
that end-users need on the first place.  Then the user will receive their security 
warning with the information that they wish to have.   
 
Means of data 
collection 
Implementing role played web based e-mail client that simulates 
ASD based on five types of warning messages (i.e. text file, Ms 
Excel file, Ms Power Point file, PDF file and Ms Word file).  Then 
participants are required to answer the questionnaire (i.e. 
usability, understanding and the interference with the tasks). 
Implementing role played ASIA simulation software where it utilised users 
experienced dealing with various types of security warning dialogues.  Then 
participants will be interviewed about their experience whilst using the 
software (recorded interviews) and finally they will be asked to complete a 
questionnaire in relation to the usability aspects and their preference on 
warning dialogue. 
Participants 
involved 
32 participants (i.e. 8 participants were excluded).  Students in 
computer science and engineering were excluded as the focus 
was given to the general users. 
50 participants (i.e. predominantly students and staff in the university) as long 
as they were eighteen years old or older.  They received £5.50 token for the 
completion of the study. 
How it works 
Participants experienced five contexts the dialogue box (i.e. warn 
& continue (W & C), multiple choice, security training, blank filling 
and clarification) via three different versions of e-mail application 
(W & C dialogues, ASD and ASDF) where it matches the 
complexity of warnings with the risk based on the decision that 
users have to make.  Then followed by the questionnaire session.   
Participants experienced seven different tasks of warning dialogue where they 
are required to make a selection of the list of choices/information that should 
be provided in the warning dialogue.  Then later, from the last task, the new 
security warning enhancement will be generated based on the selection that 
participant had chosen in the first place.  The new security warning 
enhancement utilise the additional features and more useful functions (i.e. 
hover with the quick information, risk level bar, guidance information and 
matching the signal cues with the current context of warnings which has not 
been highlighted before). Then followed by interview and questionnaire 
session.  
Limitations 
1. It was fixed into five types of warning messages rather than 
covers all types of warning dialogues. 
2. The sample size was too small and not representative 
3. It was difficult to conduct a long-term experiment that fully 
resembled the real scenarios pertaining to security warnings 
4. The usability assessment was conducted in a simple manner 
where it only asked about the overall usability rather than 
specifically asked about three main elements of usability 
(effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction)  
1. The study had been conducted as a mock-up rather than real-time system 
2. Sample size mostly was derived from the university’s environment (i.e. 
students and staffs) 
3. The usability assessment was more generic rather than a comprehensive 
assessment of each usability elements.  
4. As the interview session was recorded by the principal investigator, element 
of bias would be existed as the majority of participants might tend to say only 
good things rather than providing an honest answer. 
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End-User Perception and Usability of Information Security 
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3School of Computer and Security Science, Edith Cowan University 
Perth, Western Australia 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates users’ understanding of security features and application and examines 
perceptions relating to usability.  The study made use of an online survey consisting of five 
sections and recruited a total of 564 participants.  Respondents were presented with a range of 
questions designed to measure their experience and knowledge of security.  In addition, 2 
scenarios were presented to respondents which examined their understanding of security 
warnings and potential threats, including email phishing and a potentially fraudulent attack 
through downloading an application.  The survey results revealed that end-users are still 
experiencing significant difficulties with understanding and reacting to current state-of-the-art 
security applications, messages and potential threats.  Furthermore, evidence suggests there is a 
corresponding need for a novel approach to improve perception and usability of information 
security. 
Keywords 
Usability, Security, Interface, Perceptions, Warning, Messages, Human Computer 
Interaction 
 
1. Introduction 
Security features enable users to mitigate security risks by providing protection from 
potential threats.  However, the complex and sophisticated user interfaces hinder an end 
users’ operation of such applications, which can potentially increase the likeliness of 
incorrect configuration and consequential exploitation. Whitten and Tygar’s (1999) 
assessment of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 5.0 was one of the earliest studies on usability 
issues in the context of security.  Proctor et al., (2000) found usability problems existed 
in third party authentication methods and Wool (2004), determined usability problems 
in configuring firewalls to selectively filter traffic.  These usability problems indicated 
an essential link between usability and human factors.  A lack of usability can cause 
users to inadvertently change a secure system into an insecure system.  Users should be 
aware of the functionality and be provided with enough information to make informed 
decisions. In order to investigate the problem in practice, this paper presents findings 
from a survey assessing users’ understanding of security dialogues within web browsers 
(i.e. a common end-user application in which security risks can often be found).  The 
discussion begins with an overview of perception and usability issues, before 
proceeding to outline the research methodology and the associated findings.  The study 
focused upon users’ responses to two common security scenarios that can occur during 
web browsing (namely attempting to visit a potentially fraudulent website and an 
attempt to download a potentially harmful file).  The discussion examines the extent to 
which the users were supported in understanding and responding to these warnings, and 
highlights some resulting recommendations for future systems. 
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2. Overview of perception and usability 
According to Nielsen (2003), usability can be referred to as a quality attribute which 
evaluates how a user interface is being used.  It was stated that usability needs to be 
defined by five quality components, namely: learnability, efficiency, memorability, 
errors and satisfaction.  Usability was also defined by the ISO (1998): 
 
“…the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve 
specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context 
of use”. 
 
The interaction between usability and security is essential.  The concept of using design 
principles was introduced to improve the security of computer system (Saltzer & 
Schroeder, 1975).  This introduced eight examples of design principles that applied to 
protection mechanisms.  One essential finding was the term psychological acceptability 
which stated that a human interface was designed for ease of use and users should be 
able to apply the protection mechanism correctly.  Consideration of usability can help 
developers make better decisions and potentially help them to work more effectively 
(Radle & Young, 2001).  Nielsen (2003) identified that usability became a requirement 
for websites, e-commerce transactions and even the Internet.  Schultz (2007) 
demonstrated that there were significant problems in relation to usability in information 
security by examining research papers presenting results on the relationship between 
security and usability.  He summarised that there were usability problems in security-
related tasks with some rated “severe”.  Mannan & Van Oorschot (2008) analyzed the 
gap between usability and security in online banking and found that many security 
requirements were too difficult for general users to follow and were often misled by the 
marketing related messages on safety and security.  Venter et al., (2007) evaluated the 
usability and security of personal firewalls and concluded that current personal firewalls 
were generally weak at informing the users and creating security awareness.  It was also 
suggested that the software obstructed the creation of fine-grained rules which is a 
notable obstacle to usability and security of personal firewalls.  Furnell et al., (2007) 
assessed security perceptions of personal Internet users and found that users’ knowledge 
and understanding are still lacking.  Although the problems mostly refer to novice users, 
they were also applicable to those considering themselves as advanced users.  
Albrechtsen (2007) conducted a qualitative study on users’ view on information security.  
His findings showed that there is a gap between users’ intention and the actual users’ 
behavior as users did not perform many individual security actions.  Having said that, 
there is clearly a need to pay much more attention to human factors in information 
security tasks, this paper presents an initial study which was aimed to get a better 
understanding of user’s perception and usability of security features and applications.  It 
is clearly futile to build an effective user interface if the user still ignores warnings or 
does not understand how to use the system correctly (in a secure manner).  User 
feedback can help developers to create better, more understandable and more usable 
systems.  However, according to Coffee (2006), many software developers lack the 
interest or technical skill to develop secure systems.  They consider security as part of 
the non-functional requirements – i.e. security is not fully integrated into the 
development lifecycle process (Mouratidis et al., 2005).  Security should be considered 
during the whole development process, if it is ignored or only emphasised after the 
implementation stage, conflicts will rise and it could lead to future problems.  It is 
essential that developers are now slowly beginning to realise that information security is 
essential even if their primary function is not related to security (Tondel et al., 2008). 
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3. Methodology 
In order to determine users’ perception and usability issues in information security, an 
online survey was conducted to investigate preliminary insights from users regarding 
their level of understanding of particular issues in relation to the security of their 
computer system. The survey was conducted online between February-March 2010, and 
promoted to the end user community via e-mail, snowball sampling and news entry 
information on the university’s internal staff/student websites.  This survey consisted of 
41 questions offering both open and closed responses.  Respondents were not obliged to 
answer all questions as some of the questions were conditional.  Overall, 784 responses 
were submitted to the website however, only 564 responses were fully completed which 
represented a 72% completion rate. All of the figures and percentages reported were 
based upon the results of a simple statistical analysis on the proportions of completed 
responses in this study.     
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
From the 564 responses, there was an almost equal gender balance with 49% male 
responses and 51% female.  Most of the respondents were aged between 18-30 years, 
with at least degree level education and been using computers for more than 5 years. 
This showed that the vast majority of respondents had considerable familiarity with 
computing technology.  Respondents were primarily staff/students from the authors’ 
university together with individuals from the public/private sector.  Most respondents 
rated themselves as intermediate/advanced users and indicated that they were concerned 
with regards to issues relating to computer security.  In terms of security software usage, 
86% were using some form of protection at home or work leaving 14% who did not use 
it (or were unsure).  Before proceeding with further investigation, the survey asked 
respondents to describe the types of problem that they regularly encounter whilst using 
their computer.  Incidents of malware, problems with Internet connection, problems in 
understanding help functions, complex security features and user interface difficulties 
were the main concerns.  70% of respondents indicated that they were at concerned 
regarding issues of security in their computer with only 5% indicating they were not 
concerned at all. This finding provided an interesting baseline to assess the real situation 
of how end users’ perceived the security features of information system.  Indeed, the 
following responses from surveyed respondents highlight the issues: 
 
“I do not have to use any security software because I am using Mac. I believe 
there is no virus at all so I don’t have to use any of those” 
“I am using Linux. It is free from any malware attack. I don’t have to spend 
money to get antivirus software” 
“I do not care whether I have the antivirus or not as I believe it’s not my 
responsibility. It’s my company’s asset anyway” 
 
End users’ behaviour might lead them to a significant problem if they become a victim 
of a malware attack.  In the next sub-sections two scenarios are presented considering 
how users understand the usability of security features and how this can lead them to 
make a security-relevant decision.  Scenario 1 focuses on security warnings relating to 
possible phishing sites, while Scenario 2 looks at warnings that are issued when 
downloading executable files.  These scenarios are used to assess a user’s ability to 
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understand security features, usability and issues of security in their daily routine whilst 
using computer. 
 
4.1  Scenario 1 
 
In order to gauge the level of understanding of the usability of security features in a web 
browsing context, respondents were asked to indicate their preferred web browser.  As 
each browser has different methods of presenting security warnings, respondents were 
then shown a screenshot based on their chosen browser.  In this scenario, respondents 
were asked to imagine they had received an email from their bank and were asked to re-
activate their online banking account by clicking the hyperlink within the email.  
Respondents were then asked what they would do next.  The six images are depicted in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Mozilla Firefox  
Internet Explorer 7 
 
Internet Explorer 8 
 
Opera 
 
Google Chrome 
 
Safari 
Figure 1: Screenshots from various web browsers showing a security warning having detected a 
possible phishing website 
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The best practice actions were chosen by the majority of users as depicted in Figure 2, 
although a small proportion of respondents indicated that they would have ignored the 
warning and proceeded with the transaction.  Had this been a genuine email/website, it 
is likely that they would have become a victim of a phishing site that could result in 
their personal or financial information being passed to an unknown party.  Although 
13.3% indicated they would attempt to get more information about the meaning of the 
message, if they did not understand the information needed, it would also be possible 
for them to become victims.  This survey revealed that there were clear distinctions in 
the way that security warnings were presented by each browser (see Table 1).  This 
study focussed on 5 elements, namely: usage of help function, colours, icons, choices 
and terminology.  Based on these features, this study revealed that there were no 
specific standards to present security warnings, messages or notifications.  Each vendor 
had their own style or preference to present such warnings.  Currently, Microsoft (2011), 
had more specific guidelines for users that covered issues on controls, command, text, 
messages, interaction, windows and visual.  This documentation will guide them to 
create a standard and more meaningful outcome in relation of usability. 
 
 
Figure 2: Users’ preferred action when presented with the phishing security warning (Scenario 1) 
After assessing the users’ response towards the phishing warning, the next question 
attempted to assess users’ general understanding of the security warning presented.  75% 
responses understood the warning with the remainder unsure how to interpret the 
information presented.  From this group, 13% chose try to find more information about 
the meaning of the message.  Of most concern were a small percentage of respondents 
with 1% claiming to understand the depicted screenshot but still ignored the warning 
and proceeded with the transaction.  From the respondents who did not understand the 
phishing warnings, there were 3 main issues identified; technical terminology (62%), 
nature of the event being described (55%) and choices available (25%).  No attempt was 
made to further question the elements that they did not understand as the question was 
only presented in a general context. 
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Table 1: Comparison of the security warnings from various web browsers 
4.2  Scenario 2  
 
Using the respondent’s preferred browser, a second scenario was presented in which the 
user was presented with a security warning following a click on a link to install software 
(Figure 3).  Most respondents indicated they would save the file and then scan for 
viruses (35%).  Surprisingly, 29% of respondents who used Internet Explorer 7 decided 
to cancel or quit from the process.  This could be caused by the rather specific warning 
within the dialogue (indicating that the files could possibly contain malware), although 
Internet Explorer 8 used an identical prompt.  It is also notable that almost 10% of 
respondents would run the application straightaway without virus scanning it first 
(although it is possible that these users were under the impression that their anti-virus 
product would automatically scan the file before execution).  It has to be remembered 
that this may not accurately represent users’ real intentions as this scenario was 
effectively simulated. However, this demonstrated that users may be at risk by running 
applications directly from the source without scanning it.  One interesting finding from 
this survey was that a small percentage of users would not download the software if 
they used their own laptop or computer. 
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Internet Explorer 8 
 
Mozilla Firefox 
 
Internet Explorer 7 
 
Opera 
 
Google Chrome 
 
Safari 
Figure 3: Security warning in various web browsers 
By showing the six security warning messages in Figure 3, it can be noted that there 
was a clear method on how each security warning was presented except from the two 
versions of Internet Explorer.  Internet Explorer used the footnote area to provide 
additional explanation and access to the help function whist others did not use it at all.  
The usage of security icons was partially consistent except for Safari and Google 
Chrome.  There were no warning icons used at all in Mozilla Firefox and Opera.  When 
displaying the list of available choices (options) for users, each browser had a similar 
method.  Opera represented the help function via a button whilst Internet Explorer 7 and 
8 used a link to provide help.  Surprisingly, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Safari 
did not provide a help function for the security warning.  In terms of the title or header 
of the message, Internet Explorer and Safari used the same message, indicating “File 
Download-Security Warning” whilst the others presented the downloaded file name 
instead.  When asked if they were satisfied with the level of information provided for 
the warning messages 43% were satisfied whilst 54% agreed that the information given 
was not enough.  A somewhat interesting finding related to respondents who felt they 
had enough information based on the depicted warning, 17% decided to cancel or quit 
from the process whilst 9% decided to run the application straightaway.  These users 
claimed that the information was enough for them to make a decision however they 
were still unable to demonstrate secure behaviour.  When asked for additional content 
that would be useful when making such decisions, 38% would like to have details of the 
consequences if they were to proceed to run the application, 33% wanted to have 
confirmation of the legitimacy of the download, 27% wanted confirmation that their 
action was free from any kind of malware attack and 17% wanted to have provision of a 
proper help function.  Some of the responses suggested that the computer should have a 
strict defence process, more understandable features and automatic virus scanning.  
Some of the respondents indicated they would like to see information of the provider of 
the application in order to gauge their trust level.  They wanted to download only if it 
were from the provider that was well known and secured for them.  A further option 
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considered by some users was to present historical information, indicating the choices 
made by previous visitors to the site (when presented with the same warning). 
 
5. Conclusions and future work 
Respondents were clearly concerned and aware of the security issues however, they 
were still unsure of the appropriate action to take when presented with certain security 
events.  Respondents had demonstrated that they had used security technologies to help 
them to mitigate the risk of attacks (e.g. Antivirus, Internet Security etc).  Usage of 
security technologies is fundamental but understanding how to use it and the risks or the 
threats they are facing is far more essential.   
The results from the survey also revealed that users agreed that more appropriate 
information should be provided in security messages.  Although such information will 
not directly solve the problem, it will give more meaningful support to help users’ to 
make secure decisions and mitigate the risk of becoming a victim.  Security features are 
expected to help users in making a decision but are still beyond the comprehension of 
users with a basic level of understanding.  Users interact with computer with some 
purpose, when they have to cope with security features this can distract them from what 
they intend to do.  The less security related activities interfere with their actions, the 
more likely they are to use the system.  Yet, it is still not a guarantee for the users to use 
it correctly.  Simply putting such functionality in software/systems without proper 
guidelines and user friendly features will lead to end user misunderstanding. 
Current findings suggest that information provided in messages or warnings should use 
less technical terminology, offer sufficient provisional help to explain the circumstances 
and any further actions to be taken, and enough appropriate choices for the user.  These 
results show the importance of usability as part of the design challenge.  This study 
utilised scenarios to simulate computer security events, created based on the experience 
of dealing with computers as part of a daily routine and it was expected that most end-
users dealt with similar issues.  The current study was unable to determine the 
importance of the features as depicted in Table 1 (with the aim of developing a 
meaningful feature to help end-users).  It is expected that practical experiment study 
will be conducted so that the end-user can face the real situation and be able to express 
what they really understand and need in relation to usability issues and their perception 
towards it.  The results will be able to clarify the effectiveness of current security 
implementations and enhancement can be done to suit users’ needs. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates users’ understanding of security messages that can be encountered on a 
daily basis whilst using their computer.  An experimental study was conducted that made use of 
a custom-built program designed to capture security messages and examine users’ views 
regarding whether enough information is provided by the application to enable them to 
understand the message and (where appropriate) make an informed decision.  The study 
involved 36 participants with a range of education backgrounds and revealed that many 
participants still face difficulties in understanding the security warnings that they encountered 
on a daily basis. It is essential to use suitable and usable security features such as signal words, 
icons, help functions and accessible terminology in order to ensure that users fully understand 
security messages in the correct context. The results support the need for a better approach able 
to advance beyond current implementations of security warnings to improve end-users’ chances 
of understanding and using security effectively.      
 
Keywords:  Security warnings, Usability, Human Computer Interaction. 
 
Introduction 
In the world of computing, interfaces become the medium of interaction to deliver the 
information to user. Most users’ perceptions are based on what they feel and their 
experience with these interfaces. Computer security warnings are designated to protect 
users and their computers from any harm or potential threat. Wogalter (2006) puts 
forward the theory of hierarchy hazard control and states that warnings becomes the 
third line of defences after eliminating and guarding against hazards. Evidence suggests 
that some people do not read computer warnings (Egelman et al., 2008 and Sunshine et 
al., 2009), they quickly learn to visually and cognitively dismiss it (Bahr and Ford, 
2010), they do not understand them correctly (Downs et al., 2006), they do not pay 
attention to it (Schechter et at., 2007) and consequently, this results in users frustration 
(West et at., 2008). For the end-user, usability becomes the main concern whilst security 
is a secondary matter (Besnard and Arief, 2004). Most of the aforementioned 
researchers assessed users’ understanding of various security warnings and of various 
types of security warning interfaces. It can be suggested that warnings can be improved 
to provide more valuable information, hence able to reduce users’ frustration.  
According to Bravo-Lillo et al., (2011), computer warnings not only protect users from 
harm but also are able to change influence their behaviour to comply with existing 
safety regulation. In contrast, in order to improve security warnings, it is essential to 
determine how users’ understand the current security features by receiving various types 
of security warnings on a daily basis. This study makes use of Windows application 
security warnings using three web browsers (i.e. Internet Explorer, Google Chrome and 
Mozilla Firefox).  These were the most popular browsers chosen by users (W3Schools, 
1999 and W3Counter, 2004). This paper describes the results of the experimental study 
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that involves respondents from different backgrounds and may be relevant to the design 
of other configuration interfaces especially with regards to computer security warnings.   
 
Background and Related Work 
 
The interface of a particular system is important especially with regards to the security 
domain. Warnings should not be a replacement for good design and guarding but 
fundamentally it suffices as an add-on to good design (Lehto and Salvendy, 1995). A 
survey of 564 respondents conducted by Zaaba et al., (2011) revealed that end-users are 
still experiencing significant problems with understanding and responding to current 
state-of-the-art security applications, messages and potential menaces. Their results 
showed that problems in understanding help functions, complex security features, user 
interface difficulties and incidents of malware were the main concerns. Zurko et al., 
(2002) accessed the usability of Lotus Notes security warnings and found that the 
majority of its responses allowed unsigned content. Mandel et al., (2010) examined the 
effectiveness of improving warning efficiency. Based on the results, warning 
improvement was able to increase compliance albeit not at a statistically significant 
level. To this end, Downs et al., (2006) interviewed 20 non-expert participants to seek 
their level of understanding upon running into phishing sites. The results showed that, 
most of respondents were lacking awareness on phishing and security warnings, and 
thus failed to perform their duties. Hardee et al., (2006) performed a study with 56 
students to access their differences on how they perceived and made security decision 
with regards to computer and non-computer security domain based on security warnings 
scenarios. They revealed that the nature of gains across both domains were consistent in 
terms of protecting information, property and money. Furthermore, with regards to the 
loss of information it was varying within both decision domains. They proposed 
designers to make used the attributes of security warnings based on the results of the 
study (i.e. explain the potential loss explicitly).  Sunshine et al., (2009) conducted a 
survey with 400 users to examine their understanding and reactions on SSL warnings. 
Using two new design warnings on three web browsers, they suggested that using 
appropriate colours and text and reducing the warning frequency will improve the 
design of warnings. Raja et al., (2009) conducted a study with 60 participants to 
compare users’ mental model on Vista Firewall (VF) using their prototype versus basic 
interface. They proved that their prototype improved users’ mental model by revealing 
the hidden context. They suggested the designers should consider the impact of 
contextual factors before designing user interfaces of any security application. In 
summary, all of the aforementioned studies illustrated that computer security warnings 
still face a problem to convince users and to help prevent them from engaging in unsafe 
behaviours. It is essential to gather as much information as possible to determine 
whether users’ are satisfied with every security warning that they encounter on daily 
basis.  Then again, users’ able to learn the importance of security warnings to convey 
security information in response to immediate problems. In order to improve users’ 
understanding of security warnings, the authors developed a program to assess whether 
users’ felt they were provided with enough information to answer various security 
warnings with confidence.   
 
Methodology 
 
In order to determine users’ understanding whether enough information on the current 
features of security warning interfaces was available, a program has been created to 
capture users’ daily security warnings from web browsers and other applications that 
they used.  Then users made a decision whether enough information is provided to 
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enable them to understand the message and later able to make an informed decision. 
This has been implemented using the C# programming language. The subject group 
used this program for 5 days. For every security warning that users encountered, they 
received a custom dialogue (i.e. “Did you have enough information to understand the 
security dialogue that you just answered”) with 3 options; Yes, No and Not sure. 
Following the ethical approval of the study, an invitation to participate was promoted to 
end-users via e-mail and via the University’s Intranet portal.   
 
After assessing the demographic information, for every security warning that users 
encountered, they received a custom dialogue box. The detection process was based on 
the class/application name of the three main web browsers used (Internet Explorer, 
Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome) and from other applications (e.g. operating system, 
software etc).  These three web browsers were chosen because previous research 
suggests that these are the most popular with end-users (W3Schools, 1999).  According 
to Wogalter (2006) four main purposes of warnings are: 
 
i. To communicate an important safety information 
ii. To influence or to modify people’s behaviour in a way that will improve safety 
iii. To decrease or to prevent health problem, workplace injuries and property 
damage 
iv. To act as a reminder to people that already knew this hazard 
 
He claimed that using this guideline only, will not be adequate because every product 
and its design has its own characteristics and will involve people to use it. Based on 
these aforementioned principles, this study focused on various types of computer 
security warnings. The program captured these security warnings and stored them 
securely in a specific folder, while text data was stored in a database. This program also 
captured “receiving time” on every security warning that users received and “action 
time” with regards to the time when users took any action on the security message (i.e. 
clicking any buttons and clicking close).   
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Results and Discussion 
 
Overall, 36 respondents participated in this study; 61% female and 39 % male.  69% of 
the total respondents were aged between 26-35 years with at least a degree level of 
education and have been using computer for more than six years. This indicated that the 
vast majority of these responses had evolved with Information technology during their 
early years. Respondents were primarily staff and students from Plymouth University 
and secondarily they were individuals from government and private sectors. They were 
allowed to use this program either at home or in the workplace as long as they 
consistently used it on the same computer. 53% of  the respondents classified 
themselves as being intermediate computer skilled , 36% considered themselves as 
advanced users, 8% claimed to be experts and only 3% stated to be beginners. In terms 
of security software usage, a majority with 94% users claimed to use it, 6% did not used 
it (or were unsure). In the perspective of preferred web browsers, 47% had chosen 
Google Chrome, 33% used Mozilla Firefox, while only20% used Internet Explorer. The 
last question regarding preferred operating system indicated that Windows 7 was the 
most popular chosen by 50% of the users, followed by Windows XP by 44%, Windows 
Vista and Mac OS X with 3% respectively.  This paper addresses the clarity of 
messaging and conflicts with guidelines addressing the consistency of messages; and 
draws comparisons based on security warnings from three web browsers with regards to 
the consistency of experiences. The paper ends with conclusions and future works.    
 
Clarity of messaging and conflicts with guidelines 
 
Apparently, Microsoft (2011) was the only developer or provider that produced its own 
guidelines that covered the design principle, controls, commands, texts, windows, 
interactions, visuals, experiences and windows environments. Since Microsoft products 
are well-known and widely used by the majority of users, their guidelines had been used 
as a basis to compare the suitability with features on security warnings. Nodder (2005) 
conducted a Microsoft Case Study to discuss in further details on how users perceived 
implementation of security warnings and how trust can be developed with regards to the 
security warnings. This case study prompted four recommendations that should be 
applied to any trust interaction on computers; Let users make trust decision in context, 
make the most trusted option the default selection, present users with choices, not 
dilemmas and always respect the users’ decision.  
Below a set of images that have been captured are presented and analysed. The conflict 
began with the mismatch on the usage of signal icons in the context of security 
warnings. According to Microsoft (2011), the question mark icon should be used as a 
help entry whilst the information icon should be used to present only useful information 
in banners context.  Nevertheless, in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, the question mark 
icon and information icon had been used as a query sentence. This clearly conflicts with 
the guidelines.    
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Figure 1: Usage of question mark icon 
inappropriate context 
 
Figure 2: Usage of information icon 
inappropriate context 
 
 
Figure 3: Technical terminology (i.e. secure & nonsecure items) 
 
 
Figure 4: Usage of question mark icon in Mozilla Firefox in inappropriate context 
 
Meanwhile, in Figure 3, the security warning used a technical approach to present the 
information to users (i.e. secure and non-secure item). In contrast, however, it can be 
argued if the non-secure items caused harm to the user, it must not be presented in the 
first place as a choice to end-users. A similar usage of technical jargon occurred in the 
security warning shown in Figure 4. The usage of question mark was inappropriate and 
the warning icon should be used instead, as the security warning presented a condition 
that might cause a problem for users in future as mentioned by (Microsoft 2011).  
Information is delivered using technical terminology that baffled end users (i.e. 
unresponsive script, stop script). It complicated the situation for end-users and made it 
hard to understand the security warnings. Furthermore, it was noted that 16 users who 
claimed “no” and “not sure” on custom dialogue box choices took an average of 
approximately 2 seconds to proceed with this security warning. It can be speculated that 
they took fast action to read or to get rid of this security warning based on the average 
time taken. It was not surprising, as the majority of this group claimed themselves as 
intermediate ability users.   
 
In a different context, six users received a similar type of security warning as depicted 
in Figure 5 and all of them stated “no” and “not sure” when custom pop up appeared. 
They were among the users with higher and postgraduate background where four of 
them had intermediate computing skills, and two were beginners and advanced 
respectively. Users took 8 seconds on average with this type security warning.  It can be 
speculated that they needed longer time as they did not know what to do with this 
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version of security warnings. With this version of warning, there was no help function 
available. This can be troublesome especially for non-technical savvy users. For the 
next example shown in Figure 6  were four users who agreed that not been enough 
information has been provided. The technical way in which information about the usage 
of “secure HTTPS connection” has been presented, contributed to the reasons users’ 
baffled with this security warning.  Albeit users can use the “more info” button, in this 
context, they rarely decided to do that as already Bahr and Ford (2010) revealed. Users 
took only a quick glance of the pop up and considered it as highly annoying. More 
technical approaches to convince users were only suitable for those users that 
understood the meaning of terminology being used but not for laymen. As a result, 5 
seconds average time was recorded on this scenario.  
        
 
Figure 5: Unknown icon been used in 
security warning before opening file 
 
Figure 6: Technical terminology on security 
warning 
 
One of the most interesting findings of this study is linked to comparing the two signal 
icons shown in Figure 7.  Obviously, the question mark icon should not be used in this 
context as it is intended only to be used as a help entry point as stated by Microsoft 
(2011). Another problem occurred with the usage of information icon in the footnote 
areal. Two such icons should not be used concurrently in one security warning as it can 
confuse users. It is more useful if the security warnings are presented with a help 
function to help users to compare the basic and the complete set of options just before 
they press the options given. In another scenario, conflicts generated by signal words 
and signal icons have occurred as shown in Figure 8. The message stated that an error 
occurred with the connection. However, the warning icon has been used instead of an 
error icon. It has been shown that an error or a problem has occurred and clearly an 
error icon should be used instead. The wrong usage of signal icons and words 
contributed to users’ interpretation of every security warning that they received. It 
usually results in users’ dismissing the security warning even though an essential 
decision is needed.     
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Figure 7: Scenario with two conflicting 
signal icons 
 
Figure 8: Mismatch of signal word and signal icon 
 
Consistency of messages 
 
The authors showed a similarity with the header name of security warnings within two 
groups. These images used the same header name. However, it served for different 
purposes and contexts. Although these security warnings had a similar header name, the 
information is presented clearly differently, especially in terms of signal icons, technical 
terminology and help functions.  Group A was presented with security warnings that 
had similar header “security warning” whilst Group B shared the same header of an 
“Open File – Security Warning”.   
 
 
(a) 
 
(b)  
 
 
(c)  
Figure 9: Security warnings from Group A 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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(c) 
 
Figure 10: Security warnings from Group B 
Referring to Group A, Figure 9a displays the security warning from an Adobe 
application. The security warning used the question mark icon and asked user whether 
to allow or block the website.  In this context, the Warning icon should be used instead 
of question mark icon. Clearly the header was stated as a security warning and not as a 
help entry point (Microsoft, 2011). In Figure 9b the security warning from Mozilla 
Firefox is shown. It warned users that the connection was unencrypted and can cause a 
problem. Having said that, the terminology “encrypted” and “decrypted” was too 
technical for laymen. Furthermore, there was no appropriate help function for users 
supporting them in making the right choice. Clearly, it was meant to be a warning. Here, 
the signal icon warning should be used instead of the used question mark icon. On the 
other hand, a similar problem occurred in Figure 9c regarding a secure connection but 
apparently it used “HTTPS connection” terminology.  In order to gain more information 
users need to press the help button. Users always neglect an unpleasant job and always 
get rid of any kind of pop up when it appears. Instead of using complex jargon, it is 
more useful to use understandable language for all users. In terms of signal icon usage, 
it was used correctly and is suitable to the context of warning. 
 
In Group B scenarios security warnings addressing file opening within web browsers 
are presented. Here, the signal icon, information details and the help link have been 
used consistently on the footnote area based on Figure 10. However, the authors argued 
on the method of assistance on the footnote area as the information given suggested that 
users should run the software from the publishers that they trust. In reality, it was 
impossible for average users or laymen’s to know all the possible approaches/help 
options used by different publishers of the software that they wanted to download, 
especially if the software can be downloaded for free from website (i.e. it happen most 
of the time and preferred choice by end-users).   
             
Consistency of experiences 
The mini experimental study has been conducted to make a comparison based on 
features that have been presented in security warnings generated by a software 
download process from three web browsers. It compared the usage of signal icons, 
signal words, technical terminology and usage of help functions. This scenario has been 
chosen to reflect from one of the most popular security warnings prompted to users.  
Based on the current study results, user claimed that they were still in baffled with this 
type of security warning.  In addition, these security warnings still have a high level of 
layout/presentation and content complexity. Hence, if users make a wrong decision, it 
could potentially harm and put them at risk. The study revealed that there were clear 
distinctions in the way security warnings were presented by selected web browsers 
(with default settings) as shown in Table 1. Using a similar approach to Zaaba et al. 
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(2011), this comparison showed that conflicts occurred on the usage of signal icons, 
signal words, inappropriate help functions and difficulties on technical terminology. As 
previously observed, this study focused on Windows based applications or program as 
majority of used preferred to use it.  Microsoft (2011) provided specific guidelines on 
how these features can be used on security warnings and its application. By using this 
guideline as a basis of comparison, it will provide a more meaningful way for 
developers and end-users to understand on how it can be used in different contexts.  
This investigation provided a good platform to assess current and future security 
warning implementations based on the gathered information. Figures 11 to 13 present 
the security warnings encountered from three web browsers; Internet Explorer, Mozilla 
Firefox and Google Chrome respectively. 
      
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 11: Security warning that users encountered from Internet Explorer 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 12: Security warning that users encountered from Mozilla Firefox 
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Figure 13: Security warning that users encountered from Google Chrome 
 
After users executed the file, they received other versions of security warnings.  In this 
scenario, only two browsers showed another security pop up; Figure 11b– Internet 
Explorer and Figure 12b– Mozilla Firefox. When users open the file based on the 
security warning they received, another security warning appeared as depicted on Figure 
11c but only for Internet Explorer.  A detailed of comparison of the various warnings is 
presented in Table 1. 
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 Internet Explorer Mozilla Firefox Google Chrome 
Version 8.0.6001.18702 10.0.2 17.0.963.5 
Usage of 
help 
function 
a:  Provided a link for more 
information 
 
b:  Details of information 
stated that no threats have 
been detected 
 
c:  Provided a link for more 
information 
 
None provided a: Provided a link 
for more 
information 
 
 
Usage of 
signal words 
a: Depicted as security 
warnings 
 
b:  None 
 
c:  Depicted as security 
warnings 
 
 None provided a: Depicted as 
security warnings 
 
Usage of 
signal icon 
 
 
 
a:  Using warning icon to 
indicate a potential future 
problem.   
Using an unidentified 
program icon (white 
background) 
 
b: Using ticked icon with 
green colour 
Using the world icon and a 
folder 
 
c: Using an error icon 
 
a: Using an 
unidentified program 
icon (white 
background) 
 
b: Question mark 
icon 
a: Using warning 
icon to indicate a 
potential future 
problem.   
Using an 
unidentified 
program icon 
(white 
background) 
 
 
 
Execution 
process 
Application will be saved in 
designated location by the 
user. Then, user will execute 
the file 
Application will be 
saved in download 
dialogue box (pop 
up). Then, user will 
execute the file. 
Application will be 
saved in the 
download folder 
(default). Then, 
user will execute 
the file. 
 
Technical 
terminology 
a: The way data have been 
represented in a technical 
way with details of name, 
type and outlining the 
source.  
 
 
b: The way data have been 
represented in a technical 
way with details e.g. 
transfer rate, estimated time.  
a: The way data 
have been 
represented using a 
technical expression. 
(i.e. binary file, file 
name etc) 
 
b: Usage of 
malicious codes 
Usage of executable 
files 
a: The way data 
have been 
represented in a 
technical way with 
details of name, 
type and outlining 
the source. 
Publisher (digital 
signature) could 
not be verified  
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 Internet Explorer Mozilla Firefox Google Chrome 
c: Publisher (digital 
signature) could not be 
verified 
 
 
Legend: 
a = security warning that users encountered as first security warning prompt 
b = security warning that users encountered as second security warning prompt 
c = security warning that users encountered as third security warning prompt 
Table 1: Comparison of the security warnings from three web browsers 
 
Conclusions and future work 
 
Overall 36 respondents had encountered several types of security warnings on a daily 
basis on their computers. The paper outlined a good approach on how information can 
be gathered from users’ context (real situation) with the usage of capturing security 
message in various contexts and detection time (i.e. action time vs. receive time) on 
every security warnings. It can be noted that, users are still facing a dilemma with 
certain type of security warnings especially when it came across the complex 
terminology without a proper help functions and with too much information (i.e. 
security warnings layout) Users took more than 2 seconds in average to read the 
security warnings that they received. Some of the security warnings had more content or 
information than the other whilst it actually makes it worsen the situation.  However, 
some of users took less than average time to read the warnings. Then again, it can be 
speculated that users only had a quick glance on certain security warnings and quickly 
got rid of it (i.e. possibly users did not understand it or habituation effects). 
 
Current findings suggest that information and details on security warnings should use 
less technical terminology, offers appropriate and usable help functions (i.e. explain the 
circumstances in approachable way), and use appropriate signal icons and words in a 
correct context.  It shows the importance of usability of security warnings even in 
general applications. End-users should be able to understand their current situation 
whilst using their computer. The current study was unable to ask many questions on the 
custom dialogue box (i.e. every detection of security warning will interrupt users’ 
current task by displaying custom dialogue box). It is expected that enhancement can be 
done to current implementation of security warnings based on information that author’s 
have gathered. Then it can be tested in a control group (e.g. expert, advanced, 
intermediate and beginner) so that a broad perspective from different users can be 
collected. Later, the results will be able to clarify whether the improvement and new 
enhancement meets users’ satisfaction and needs. Microsoft (2011) provided a guideline 
on security warnings implementations in different contexts. It can be suggested to create 
a standard for the usage of signal words, icons, help functions and technical terminology 
so that users are able to learn and understand in a meaningful way the implementation 
of security warnings.                
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